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Foreword 
This Article adopts a two-tiered approach: it provides a detailed, his-
torical account of anti-terrorist finance initiatives in the United Kingdom 
and United States—two states driving global norms in this area. It then 
proceeds to a critique of these laws. The analysis assumes—and  
                                                                                                                      
 * Laura K. Donohue is a Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International 
Security and Cooperation. Special thanks to Robert Weisberg for providing detailed and 
thoughtful comments on the text and to Paul Lomio for his help in acquiring materials. Addi-
tional suggestions from Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Barbara Fried, Tom Grey, Khalid 
Medani, Brandon Reavis, and Jake Shapiro are much appreciated. This Article forms part of a 
book-length project on counterterrorist law in the United States and United Kingdom, which 
will be coming out next year with Cambridge University Press. 
DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
304 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 27:303 
 
accepts—the goals of the two states in adopting these provisions. It 
questions how well the measures achieve their aim. Specifically, it high-
lights how the transfer of money laundering tools undermines the 
effectiveness of the states’ counterterrorist efforts—flooding the systems 
with suspicious activity reports, driving money out of the regulated sec-
tor, and using inappropriate metrics to gauge success. This Article 
recognizes that both states consider the fight against terrorism to be 
partly military but also a matter of bringing certain democratic principles 
to bear. Critics have been quick to condemn some of the measures for 
their encroachments into civil liberties. My goal is not to measure the 
success of the laws according to any particular ideology but rather, ac-
cepting the governments’ democracy-promoting goals, and the role these 
play in generating domestic and international support, to clarify which 
components do not appear to serve the states’ aims. 
I. Introduction 
Preventing terrorist financial flows proves a nearly impossible task. 
The money comes from enterprises that range from legitimate businesses 
(e.g., taxi companies and donations to charitable organizations) to ille-
gitimate activities like smuggling, intellectual property theft, and drug 
trafficking.1 Terrorists move currency through complex wire transfers 
and unregulated alternative remittance systems. They physically carry it 
across international borders. They transfer cash into high value and hard 
to detect commodities—such as diamonds, tanzanite, and sapphires.2 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report on 
Money Laundering Typologies 2002–2003 (Feb. 14, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Financial 
Action Task Force Report]; The Organised Crime Task Force, Annual Report  
2005: Serious and Organised Crime in Northern Ireland [hereinafter OCTF  
2005 Report], available at http://www.octf.gov.uk/index.cfm/section/publications/page/ 
publicationList/viewArchives/true/month/Jun/year/2005; John Roth, Douglas Greenburg 
& Serena Wille, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United 
States, Monograph on Terrorist Financing: Staff Report to the Commission,  
available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf 
[hereinafter Staff Report]; Robert Block & Daniel Pearl, Underground Trade: Much Smug-
gled Gem Called Tanzanite Helps Bin Laden Supporters, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 2001, at A1; 
Thomas Catan & Michael Peel, U.S. Suspects Al-Qaeda African Diamond Link, Fin. Times 
(London), June 30, 2004, at 11; Douglas Farah, Al-Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade, 
Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 2001, at A1; Mark Huband, Report Links Al-Qaeda with Diamond Trade, 
Fin. Times (London), Apr. 17, 2003, at 8; Pat Robertson Partner Charles Taylor Funded Al-
Qaeda, Report Says, Church & St., Feb. 2003, at 14. 
 2. See, e.g., Amelia Hill, Bin Laden’s $20 M African “Blood Diamond” Deals, The 
Observer (London), Oct. 20, 2002; available at http://www.observer.co.uk/in; Robert 
Looney, Hawala: The Terrorist’s Informal Financial Mechanism, 10 Middle E. Pol’y 164 
(2003); Ronald R. Wilson & D.E. Glanczand Jr., Positive Trends in the Fight Against Money 
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And the amounts involved may be nearly impossible to detect. The Na-
tional Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(September 11 Commission) estimated that the 1998 East African em-
bassy attacks required just $10,000. The 2002 Bali bombings cost al 
Qaeda only $20,000. Despite the devastation caused by the September 
11, 2001, attacks, the total amount spent on the actual operation ran be-
tween $400,000 and $500,000.3 Such estimates are hardly unique to al 
Qaeda: the Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) assesses the Provi-
sional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) entire running costs at just £1.5 
million per year. The Ulster Defence Association, perhaps the largest 
Loyalist paramilitary group, requires only £500,000.4 
Despite these difficulties, both the United Kingdom and the United 
States consider the interruption of terrorist finance one of their top pri-
orities5—and with good reason: intercepting terrorist money may save 
lives. Diminished funds may reduce terrorist organizations’ ability to 
recruit skilled members. As the average level of expertise of those  
                                                                                                                      
Laundering, Am. Banker, June 25, 2004, at 12; Karen De Young & Douglas Farah, Infighting 
Slows Hunt for Hidden Al-Qaeda Assets, Wash. Post, June 18, 2002, at A1. 
 3. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 131. This number excludes overhead costs, such as 
recruitment and training. For discussion of the limited value of money to terrorists, see Rex A. 
Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and 
Why 14–19 (1999); and Raphael Perl, Terrorism, the Future, and US Foreign Policy, Issue 
Brief for Congress IB95112, at 4 (Apr. 11, 2003). This is not to say that money plays no role 
in terrorism. See, e.g., President’s Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for 
the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, of the 
Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress99/ 
freehct2.htm; Staff Report, supra note 1, at 144; James Adams, The Financing of Terror 
165 (1986); Sean O’Callaghan, The Informer 159–60 (1998); Mathew A Levitt, War on 
Terrorism Scorecard, Middle E.Q., Summer 2002, at 39; The Al Qaeda Manual, UK/BM-
3, [E] 19/220, eng. trans., at UK/BM-22, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/ 
manualpart1_1.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Al Qaeda Manual]. 
 4. Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, The Financing of Terror-
ism in Northern Ireland, Fourth Report of Session 2001–2, H.C. 978-1, Table 1, at 18 
[hereinafter Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Fourth Report]. In 1969 the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) split into the Official IRA (OIRA) and PIRA. The latter became 
the main Republican paramilitary organization in Northern Ireland and is frequently referred 
to as the IRA. In this Article I distinguish between OIRA and PIRA, as well as later splinter 
groups from PIRA, such as the Real IRA.  
 5. See, e.g., President George Bush, Remarks on United States Financial Sanctions 
Against Foreign Terrorists and Their Supporters and an Exchange with Reporters (Oct. 1, 
2001), in 37 Weekly Comp. Press 1364 , cited in Pamela M. Keeney, Frozen Assets of Terror-
ists and Terrorist Supporters: A Proposed Solution to the Creditor Collection Problem, 21 
Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 301 (2004); U.S. Dep’t of the Treas. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
National Money Laundering Strategy 2 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 National Money 
Laundering Strategy].  
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involved in violence drops, groups may shift their emphasis to training 
instead of violent attacks.6  
The problem is that the United Kingdom and the United States, two 
states driving international norms, have implemented anti-terrorist fi-
nance initiatives that undermine their security concerns. Yet legal and 
political analyses are few and far between, with historical accounts of 
the development of the law in both regions virtually nonexistent.  
This Article thus takes a hard look at anti-terrorist finance in the 
United Kingdom and United States. Part II lays out the history of the law 
in both regions. Two cases provide the context: Northern-Ireland-related 
terrorism in the United Kingdom and al Qaeda threats to the United 
States.  
Part II.A suggests that the Northern Ireland Executive, and later the 
U.K. government, maintained—but did not use—authority to interrupt 
the flow of funds to paramilitary organizations. The advent of the anti-
drug campaign in the mid-1980s, however, brought with it greater state 
powers vis-à-vis criminal financial flows. These regulatory, forfeiture, 
and investigatory powers soon moved into the counterterrorist realm—
where they expanded and intensified before seeping back into drug traf-
ficking statutes. The September 11 attacks accelerated the trend toward 
ever greater state authority and catapulted the new counterterrorist re-
gime into non-drug and non-terrorist-related offenses. The law moved 
from criminal law to civil law as a way to address criminal finance, 
weakening the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, eviden-
tiary rules, and the standards for determining guilt. 
Part II.B shifts the spotlight to the United States. It demonstrates 
that, unlike the United Kingdom, the United States is a relative late-
comer to the world of anti-terrorist finance. Prior to September 11, the 
U.S. administrative structure all but ignored this field. In the legal realm, 
it was only since 1995 that the Executive Branch maintained a Specially 
Designated Terrorist List—on which Osama bin Laden did not appear 
until 1998. The mid-1990s also saw the introduction of the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Outside of these regimes, 
however, as in the United Kingdom, the transfer of provisions from the 
drug war shaped the contours of U.S. policy. Post-September 11, the 
United States aggressively redirected its administrative, legal, and, to 
some extent, political agenda toward stemming terrorist finance. Title III 
of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, and the issuance of Executive Order 
13,224 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA), had a significant impact on individual rights. The latter action, 
                                                                                                                      
 6. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, The Quality of Terror, 49 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 515 
(2005).  
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in particular, reflects the Executive Branch’s effort to avoid not just 
criminal law but the judicial system altogether in its efforts to prevent 
the flow of funds. In the process, the United States replaced a criminal 
law standard with an intelligence one: mere links to known terrorists be-
came sufficient to “prove” financial support, and administrative 
procedures replaced judicial processes.  
These domestic measures, however, are only part of the story. Part 
II.C concludes the first part of this study with a brief discussion of both 
states’ efforts to drive the international agenda to advance anti-terrorist 
finance regimes. The United Nations, the Financial Action Task Force, 
and the European Union provide the primary vehicles. International 
measures are relatively recent, and because of the key role played by the 
United Kingdom and the United States in pursuing anti-terrorist finance 
initiatives, they reflect the approaches adopted by both countries within 
domestic bounds. This underscores the importance of the two case stud-
ies. 
Part III turns to analytic considerations. Here, the way in which the 
law evolved on both sides of the Atlantic—through the transfer of money 
laundering regimes to anti-terrorist finance efforts—means that the pro-
grams did not grow within a realm sensitive to the unique challenges 
posed by terrorism. As a result, many measures have been either ineffec-
tive or counterproductive. Suspicious Activity Reports, sensitive to 
political considerations, now flood the systems, making it difficult to 
separate the wheat from the chaff. Stricter reporting requirements have 
driven money out of the regulated sector, making it harder to trace terror-
ist funds. The metrics for gauging success fail to set goals appropriate to 
counterterrorist efforts. Instead of measuring the number of entities 
blocked and the value of assets frozen, a better approach would focus on 
the number of convictions for terrorist offenses, the importance of indi-
viduals captured, the percentage of overall terrorist assets seized, and the 
number and level of operations interrupted. 
A number of rights-based concerns also undermine the effectiveness 
of the current regimes. Part III.B, using the United States as an example, 
highlights the impact of the anti-terrorist finance measures on free 
speech, freedom of association, privacy, property, and due process. None 
of these rights are absolute: indeed, administrative and regulatory struc-
tures elsewhere have the ability to interfere with individuals’ holdings. 
But anti-terrorist finance presents a unique case: the absence of intent, 
the use of secret evidence and ex parte hearings, and the stigma associ-
ated with terrorism change the quality of the seizures. Unlike drug laws, 
where possession may trigger asset forfeiture, less concrete accusations 
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establish terrorist association. Also of concern is the seepage of these 
measures into the broader legal and regulatory structure.  
Outside of their impact on a broad range of entitlements central to 
the health of democratic states, rights considerations also carry practical 
consequences. Public perception, critical in any state’s counterterrorist 
program, is not blind to the effect of counterterrorist measures on indi-
viduals. The alienation of domestic and international audiences carries 
important negative consequences for the ability to prevent a terrorist 
threat. Here, “black lists” play a particularly important role. These lack 
important safeguards to protect individual rights, and states and private 
actors alike have increasingly called their credibility into question. Si-
multaneously, the U.S. refusal to allow external review of the list 
formation process, even if justified (namely, by the need to protect intel-
ligence sources), means the system is open to abuse from states who use 
the lists to stifle dissent. This runs counter to U.S. efforts to spread de-
mocracy and undermines other important national security concerns. 
This Article briefly mentions a possible alternative: the creation of lists 
that reward regions, states, or entities that prove particularly helpful in 
tracing terrorist assets; and it considers the importance of public com-
munication and the recent success of the United Kingdom in this area. 
The Article concludes by highlighting some of the most important 
challenges facing the antiterrorist finance regimes of both the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Terrorists are just now moving into the 
electronic realm. Efforts to police the Internet and e-commerce raise is-
sues related to anonymity, the lack of barriers, and clandestine 
communication. Given the concerns highlighted throughout this Article, 
the wholesale transfer of money laundering tools to anti-terrorist finance 
should be treated with some skepticism.7 
                                                                                                                      
 7. Lurking outside the specter of this inquiry is the question of whether the battle 
against terrorism is, indeed, “war.” Certainly, in seeking to interrupt funding, both states ap-
pear to consider terrorism as a fundamentally different challenge than ordinary crime—even 
transnational criminal activity. Some arguably unique qualities do present themselves: it is 
difficult, for instance, to prove that foreign recipients of funds who are not subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction are engaged in terrorism. Terrorist suspects frequently change names or make it 
seem as though they are engaged in legitimate enterprises to secure funding. And a rapidly 
changing environment suggests that administrative processes, instead of legislative mecha-
nisms, may be the most effective way to interrupt terrorist finance. I have tried to be cognizant 
of these challenges throughout the Article, so as to present the strongest arguments for the 
provisions introduced. With that said, however, I reject the proposition that the “war on terror” 
goes beyond these considerations—that it is a “war” in the traditional sense. For detailed dis-
cussion of this point, see Allen S. Weiner, Law, Just War, and the International Fight Against 
Terrorism: Is it “War”? (Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Working 
Paper No. 47, 2005), available at http://cddrl.stanford.edu/publications/law_just_war_ 
and_the_international_fight_against_terrorism_is_it_war/. 
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II. Development of the Law 
Despite the emphasis on anti-terrorist finance on both sides of the 
Atlantic, precious little attention has been paid to the development of the 
law or the effectiveness of current measures. Yet understanding the his-
tory is critical to apprehending the shortcomings of the current regimes. 
Part II offers a narrative of British and U.S. efforts to grapple with terror-
ist finance. For the former, Northern Irish terrorism is instrumental. For 
the latter, al Qaeda proves pivotal. International bodies, through which 
both states drive global norms, echo the U.S. and British transfer of 
money laundering regimes to counterterrorist finance. 
A. The United Kingdom 
Contrary to popular belief, most of the money underwriting North-
ern Ireland terrorism comes from domestic operations such as robberies, 
tax fraud, and black taxis. Only a small amount derives from overseas 
organizations such as Noraid. In the late twentieth century, paramilita-
ries’ shift to political activity increased their monetary demands. 
Ironically, even as they attempted to obtain political legitimacy at the 
negotiating table, these groups increasingly turned to organized crime to 
fund their ventures, creating a murky overlap between ordinary criminal 
activity and terrorist intent. This evolution has had important conse-
quences in the British legal and administrative realm.  
Turning to the state’s anti-terrorist finance regime, it quickly be-
comes clear that an almost symbiotic relationship between anti-drug and 
anti-terrorist finance measures has emerged since the mid-1980s, leading 
to a steady expansion in the number and range of related offenses, inves-
tigatory authority, regulatory provisions, and powers of forfeiture. 
September 11 served not as a seismic shift but merely an acceleration of 
a preexisting trend. With the obscuring of the line between terrorism and 
ordinary criminal activity, many of the more extreme provisions trans-
ferred into broader efforts to prevent crime.  
In this transition, the United Kingdom shifted its emphasis from 
criminal to civil standards, divorcing financial forfeiture provisions from 
conviction of any underlying offense. Simultaneously, the burden of 
proof, presumption of innocence, evidentiary rules, and the standards 
employed to determine guilt weakened. Perhaps of greatest concern is 
the recent lifting of client-attorney privilege attached to state investiga-
tory powers in Northern Ireland. While the statutory instrument currently 
applies only to the province, the history of British anti-terrorist finance 
measures suggests such powers may someday extend throughout the 
United Kingdom. 
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1. Northern Irish Paramilitary Funding 
The recent Northern Bank raid, and the United Kingdom’s subse-
quent failure to recover the money, provides a stark example of one 
traditional source of Northern Ireland terrorist funds—and the difficulty 
of preventing their acquisition and transfer.  
The story of the bank raid begins the evening of December 19, 2004, 
when the temperature hit an icy zero degrees Celsius. Armed men, pos-
ing as police officers, knocked at the home of a 23-year-old Northern 
Bank official. The intruders forced Chris Ward to go under guard to his 
supervisor’s home while Ward’s family stayed behind at gunpoint. The 
men arrived with Ward at Kevin McMullan’s home in Loughinisland, 
County Down, where they took McMullan’s wife away to a secret loca-
tion. Acting on the kidnappers’ instructions, on Monday morning Ward 
and McMullan arrived at work as usual. Toward closing time they sent a 
messenger and three employees home. Ward and McMullan then entered 
the vaults that serviced the bank’s 95 branches across Northern Ireland. 
They stacked 24 boxes of money onto trolleys and wheeled them to a 
loading bay. Men in a white Ford Transit van with false registration 
plates met them and drove away with £26.5 million pounds sterling and 
over £1 million in euros and U.S. dollars.8  
Nearly 50 police officers began working around the clock to find the 
culprits. In just over a fortnight, the police service amassed 560 exhibits 
and carried out 100 interviews. On January 7, 2005, the Chief Constable 
issued his interim report: PIRA, and would they please give it back?9 
Surprisingly, they did. Not all of it, but a month later a “police offi-
cer” telephoned and directed the Ombudsperson to five shrink-wrapped 
£10,000 bundles stuck in toilets at the Newforge Country Club—a law 
enforcement sports association in south Belfast. Hugh Orde, the Chief 
                                                                                                                      
 8. See Owen Bowcott & Ted Oliver, £20m Stolen in UK’s Biggest Bank Robbery, The 
Guardian (London), Dec. 22, 2004, at 3; Alan Erwin, Millions Stolen in Belfast Bank Raid, 
The Indep. E-Mail Newsl., Dec. 21, 2004; Simon Hunter, IRA Issues Bank Robbery Denial, 
Belfast News Letter, Jan. 19, 2005, at 5; Jonathan McCambridge, We Didn’t Botch our 
Job, Insists Detective; Police at Scene 5 Minutes After Alert, Belfast Telegraph, Dec. 24, 
2004; Morning View: Lessons to be Learnt from this Huge Robbery, Belfast News Letter, 
Dec. 22, 2004, at 8. 
 9. See Derec Henderson, Police Chief Blames IRA for £26m Bank Heist, The Indep. 
E-Mail Newsl., Jan. 7, 2005; Jonathan McCambridge, Rubbish Searched in Bank Heist 
Hunt; Police Sift Through Refuse at Council Site, Belfast Telegraph, Dec. 31, 2004; Jona-
than McCambridge & Maureen Colemann, Bank Heist Swoop; Police Raid Home of Leading 
Republican, Belfast Telegraph, Dec. 24, 2004; David McKittrick, Blow to Peace Process 
as IRA Blamed for Bank Heist, The Indep. (London), Jan. 7, 2005, at 14; Police Say IRA 
Behind Bank Raid, BBC News, Jan. 7, 2005, available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk; Robbery 
Probe Chief to Quit, Belfast News Letter, Mar. 17, 2005, at 7; Jonathan McCambridge, 
West Belfast Target in Bank Heist Probe; More Premises Are Searched, Belfast Telegraph, 
Dec. 30, 2004. 
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Constable, reflected, “I’m not particularly impressed . . . but I did ask 
them to give the money back.”10 
As the security services redoubled their efforts, Republican panic set 
in. Down in County Cork, a burnt bank note drifted over a garden wall. 
The suspicious neighbor alerted the Garda Síochána. Officers arrived to 
find someone shoving Northern Bank notes into a bonfire.11 Across the 
Channel, reports began to circulate about efforts to buy English houses 
with Northern Irish currency.12 And in March 2003, “a disproportionate 
amount of Northern Ireland sterling changed hands” during the four-day 
Cheltenham horse race festival.13 In the meantime, more than 100 Gardaí 
took part in Cork and Dublin raids, uncovering £2.3 million linked to a 
PIRA money-laundering ring. Unfortunately, it appeared to be the wrong 
one.
14
 As of the time of writing, investigators have established no formal 
link between this money and the robbery. 
The Provos made a half-hearted attempt to distance themselves from 
the incident. PIRA issued the lengthy statement, “We were not in-
volved,” signed by P. O’Neill, the IRA’s historical nom de plume. Ian 
Paisley, Jr., scoffed, “P. O’Neill obviously stands for Pinocchio 
O’Neill.”15 The Irish Taoiseach, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
United Kingdom Independent Monitoring Commission, Irish Garda 
Síochána, Northern Ireland Police Service, and, indeed, most members 
of Dáil Éireann and Westminster seemed to agree.16 
                                                                                                                      
 10. Ian Graham, Bank Raid Cash “Planted by IRA”, Belfast News Letter, Feb. 21, 
2005, at 6. 
 11. See Andrew Anthony, The Price of Peace, The Observer (London), Mar. 6, 2005, 
at 20. 
 12. Angelique Chrisafis, IRA “Laundering Stolen Cash in UK Housing Market,” The 
Guardian (London), Mar. 30, 2005, at 7. 
 13. Suspicion over Ulster Notes at Race Meeting, Belfast News Letter, Mar. 28, 
2005, at 4. 
 14. Although the Republic of Ireland announced that the money “absolutely” came 
from the heist, only £60,000 worth of the bank notes even bore the bank’s insignia. See An-
gelique Chrisafis, Raids May Yield IRA Link to Robbery, The Guardian (London), Feb. 18, 
2005, at 2; Martin Hodgson, The Editor: What They Said About . . . IRA Finances, The 
Guardian (London), Feb. 21, 2005, at 18; Gemma Murray, Notes “Absolutely” Linked to 
Bank Raid, Belfast News Letter, Mar. 3, 2005, at 4. But see Minister Names MPs as Mem-
bers of IRA Ruling Army Council, Belfast News Letter, Feb. 21, 2005, at 8; Police Quiz 
Seven Over “IRA Cash,” BBC News, Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk. 
 15. Hunter, supra note 8, at 5. See also Don’t Fall for Pinnochio O’Neill Lies, Says 
Wilson, Belfast News Letter, Jan. 20, 2005, at 9. 
 16. For the connection drawn by the government to Sinn Féin, see David Charter, No.10 
Urged to Cancel its Invitation to Sinn Féin, The Times (London), Jan. 21, 2005, at 31; 
Stephen Dempster, IMC Must be Given Bite to Match its Bark, Belfast News Letter, Feb. 
15, 2005, at 8; Minister Names MPs, Belfast News Letter, Mar. 28, 2005, at 4; Sinn Féin 
Leaders “Backed Raids”, BBC News, Feb. 10, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4253627.stm; Ann Treneman, Murphy 
He May Be, But He’s Hardly Stout, The Times (London), Feb. 23, 2005, at 24. 
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The amount of money in the vault took everyone—including, appar-
ently, PIRA—by surprise.17 The terrorists had a real problem: the entire 
annual operating budget of the organization throughout the 1980s and 
1990s routinely came in under £5 million.18 Even multiple robberies each 
year (including three in Belfast earlier in 2004) comprised only a small 
portion of the total. Two immediate complications ensued: what to do 
with the unanticipated loot and how to withstand the assault from the 
security establishment on both sides of the border, awakened by the 
sheer volume involved. Of the £26.5 million, some £16.5 million were 
new notes, making them difficult to move without identification.19 As for 
the remaining £10 million, Northern Irish promissory notes proved more 
or less useless outside of the province: most commercial and retail estab-
lishments, even in Great Britain, refuse to accept them, forcing 
individuals to exchange them for legal tender at banks. And Northern 
Bank upped the ante: three weeks after the robbery, it announced the 
recall and replacement of £300 million in bank notes, with currency 
bearing a new logo, new colors, and different prefixes on the serial num-
bers.20 Britain and Ireland initiated one of the largest investigations in 
either state’s history. PSNI recovered the kidnappers’ feces from McMul-
lan’s sewage system for DNA analysis and began pouring over hundreds 
of hours of closed circuit television footage.21 And the Northern Ireland 
Police Service decided not to retire more than 800 reservists as previ-
ously planned—ensuring continued scrutiny of PIRA. 
Despite these drawbacks, however, in many ways the heist brilliantly 
played to PIRA’s advantage. For one, its sheer audacity and apparent 
success—without loss of life—earned the grudging respect of both secu-
rity forces and the mainstream media.22 “Gerry, Gerry give us a loan” 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Anthony, supra note 11. 
 18. See, e.g., 106 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1986) 423; See also James Glover, 
Defence Intelligence Staff, Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends (1978); 
Adams, supra note 3, at 131. 
 19. Within three days of the raid, police released the serial numbers on the £1.5 million. 
See McCambridge & Colemann, supra note 9; Jonathan McCambridge, Stolen Note Alert, 
Belfast Telegraph, Dec. 24, 2004. 
 20. Gary Anderson, Two Arrested After Bank Notes Found, Belfast News Letter, 
Jan. 11, 2005, at 6. 
 21. Jonathan McCambridge, The Northern Job: What We Need to Know, Belfast 
Telegraph, Dec. 23, 2004. 
 22. See, e.g., Morning View: Lessons to be Learnt from this Huge Robbery, supra note 
8, at 8 (reporting, “This was a very highly organized robbery in a league well above anything 
that has gone before in Northern Ireland.”); Alan Murray, Query on Everyone’s Lips: Why 
Wasn’t an Alarm Triggered?, Belfast Telegraph, Dec. 22, 2004 (leading off, “A heist on the 
scale of the Northern Bank robbery is the stuff of Hollywood movies.”) Within a week of the 
incident, Cliff Goodwin (an English author) and Justin Stanley (an American producer) had 
signed agreements to turn it into a book, Spectacular, and then a film. Goodwin announced, 
“As a writer, this is a tremendous story. I appreciate there are victims involved but I will make 
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turned up scrawled on walls in the North.23 Republicans, feeling the 
weight of pressure for decommissioning, considered it a slap in the face 
of the British government.24 Indeed, it had an immediate and profound 
impact on the peace process.25 While it could be argued that the heist 
undermined the Republicans’ position by portraying them as common 
criminals,26 the sophistication of the raid and the resources it produced 
elevated them to a force to be taken seriously. The British government 
decided to interpret the raid as a sign of PIRA’s capability, not inten-
tion.27 In some ways 10 Downing Street did not have a choice: it needed 
Republicans at the negotiating table. Sinn Féin swept the April 2005 
Northern elections, pushing the nationalist Social Democratic Labour 
Party (SDLP) efforts to capitalize on the heist aside.28 In a crucial by-
election south of the border, Sinn Féin gained 13 percent of the first-
preference votes.29 Simultaneously, for the first time since the drawing of 
the border in 1922, the Northern Ireland police and the Garda Síochána 
signed an agreement to exchange personnel, furthering PIRA’s goal of an 
integrated Ireland.30 Nor did the raid appear to dent Sinn Féin’s fundrais-
ing ability abroad: Unionists’ calls to halt EU PEACE II funding to the 
Republicans’ constituents failed.31 Although Washington banned Gerry 
Adams from fundraising during his traditional March tour of the United 
                                                                                                                      
my book as accurate and interesting as possible.” Bank Raid Story to Hit Big Screen, Belfast 
News Letter, Feb. 1, 2005, at 4. 
 23. Angelique Chrisafis, Sinn Féin and Dublin in Grudge Match, The Guardian (Lon-
don), Feb. 4, 2005, at 6. Gerry Adams, to whom the quote refers, is the President of Sinn Féin, 
the political arm of PIRA. 
 24. See, e.g., id.; E-mail exchange between Danny Morrison & Charles Moore, printed 
in Charles Moore & Danny Morrison, Bite My Bullet: Take Two: Are Irish Republicans Really 
Committed to Peace, Charles Moore and Danny Morrison Thrash it Out, The Observer 
(London), Mar. 5, 2005, at 21. 
 25. See, e.g., Sixth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, House of 
Commons, Session 2004–2005, Column No. 16–23 (2005). See also Anthony, supra note 11; 
David McKittrick, supra note 9, at 2. 
 26. See, e.g., Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Official Report 2005, 
H.C. Vol. 429, Column No. 429; Henry McDonald, Man Questioned over Bar Killing, The 
Observer (London), Feb. 27, 2005, at 3; Sinn Féin Has to Renounce Crime: Party Financing 
Must be Above Board, The Observer (London), Feb. 20, 2005, at 28. 
 27. Sixth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, supra note 25, at 
Column No. 23. 
 28. Id. Column No. 8; Public “Must Not Pay Cost of Raid,” Belfast News Letter, 
Jan. 10, 2005, at 5. But see Angelique Chrisafis, Election 2005: Sinn Féin Likely to Tighten 
Grip in SDLP Heartlands, The Observer (London), Apr. 20, 2005, at 7. 
 29. Henry McDonald, IRA “Untouchables” Still Out of Reach: Witnesses Remain Silent 
on the Murder of Robert McCartney as His Sisters Carry on their Fight for Justice, The Ob-
server (London), Mar. 13, 2005, at 6. 
 30. Ian Graham, Irish Police Officers to Cross the Border, Belfast News Letter, Feb. 
21, 2005, at 5. 
 31. Northern Raid Raised in Euro Cash Debate, Belfast News Letter, Jan. 11, 2005, 
at 9. 
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States (and disinvited him to the White House St. Patrick’s Day party), 
this temporary slap on the wrist appears to have been just that.32 And, as 
of the time of writing, the only money from the heist that has resurfaced 
is the £50,000 deliberately placed in the toilets of the police officers’ 
club. 
This heist and the subsequent unfolding of events illustrate the diffi-
culties of preventing terrorist groups from obtaining and transferring 
funds. Multiple soft targets exist. In a nationalist conflict fought over 
state legitimacy, the political costs of robbing the state, or multinational 
corporations, may be low. Sympathizers may see such operations as vic-
timless. Weaknesses in the private sector’s recordkeeping may make it 
difficult to recover assets. And the movement of funds across interna-
tional borders may create jurisdictional and administrative difficulties, 
exacerbated by inconsistent domestic legal structures. These issues are 
particularly pronounced in the U.S. context, where al Qaeda acts as a 
transnational force. As Part III.B suggests, hawala banking, the use of 
religion to facilitate financial exchanges, interregional smuggling and 
trade, and the emergence of a global Arab and Islamic media make the 
international nature of groups linked to the al Qaeda network particularly 
important. Even Northern Irish terrorist groups are beginning to operate 
on a global scale. These developments suggest the importance of a more 
comprehensive strategy for interrupting terrorist finance. 
a. Domestic Sources of Money 
Raids like the one on the Northern Bank, while a traditional form of 
paramilitary funding, are far from the only option. In the early twentieth 
century, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) also robbed in-transit services, 
bookmakers, retail establishments, and post offices.33 It exacted fines 
from the local population.34 And it solicited (“voluntary”) donations.35 
Branches of Republican groups in Great Britain funneled money back to 
                                                                                                                      
 32. See Crack Down, The Times (London), Mar. 3, 2005; Sinn Féin’s Challenge, The 
Times (London), Mar. 16, 2005, at 19. 
 33. See, e.g., House of Commons, The Times (London), June 3, 1921, at 6; Irish Bank 
Robbers Sentenced, The Times (London), June 22, 1926, at 7; Bank Messenger Robbed, 
Thieves’ Escape with £2,000, The Times (London), June 24, 1936, at 18; The Free State Elec-
tion: Sectional Interests, The Times (London), Aug. 11, 1923, at 10. 
 34. See, e.g., DeValera’s Telegram: Sinn Féin Defence, The Times (London), Oct. 27, 
1927, at 10. 
 35. In 1934, for instance, the organization attempted to run the “Cambridge Sweep” to 
raise proceeds for the paramilitary movement. The tickets featured a picture of a soldier in a 
green IRA uniform trampling on the Union Jack, with the General Post Office in Dublin, the 
site of the 1916 Easter Rising, burning in the background. Sweepstake Tickets Seized: Irish 
Republican Army Scheme, The Times (London), Aug. 24, 1934, at 14. 
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the island.36 And prominent Republicans traveled to the United States to 
raise money.37  
The terrorist demand for financial resources, at least in the early to 
mid-twentieth century, was not a constant; on the contrary, following the 
Civil War in the South, only three Republican campaigns emerged. This 
changed, however, with the dawning of the Troubles in the late 1960s 
and the assumption of Direct Rule by Parliament. For the next three dec-
ades, violence on both sides of the sectarian divide raged. With the 
growth of paramilitary organizations came the diversification of funding 
streams. The number of armed robberies and the percentage they con-
tributed annually to paramilitary coffers declined: extensive sentences 
specifically for terrorist-related robberies and modern forensic tech-
niques (which made it easier for the police to identify the culprits) 
increased the risk to those engaged in such operations. Simultaneously, 
protection rackets made paramilitary robberies on their own turf some-
what of a moot point. This led to more sophisticated forms of organized 
crime.38 Already in control of local communities, paramilitaries used 
their power to make more money, which reinforced their social and eco-
nomic dominance—while undermining their claims to be engaged in 
political, not criminal, pursuits.39 Tax fraud, extortion, drinking clubs, 
black taxis, smuggling operations, drug trafficking, and kidnapping 
opened new revenue streams. This section briefly discusses each. 
i. Tax Fraud 
In the 1970s, the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), and later 
PIRA, moved into building site fraud using tax exemption certificates. 
Forged documents (costing between £3,000 and £13,000 on the black 
market), allowed the organizations to pocket a 30 percent income tax by 
                                                                                                                      
 36. See, e.g., Irish Deportees: Hearing of Further Claims, The Times (London), Jan. 
15, 1924, at 8. 
 37. Mr. Eamon DeValera: The Embodiment of Irish Nationalism, The Times (London), 
Aug. 30, 1975, at 14. See also O’Brien’s Defence, The Times (London), July 3, 1923, at 16. 
Between 1820 and 1920, approximately five million Irish left the “Emerald Isle” for Boston, 
Providence, New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere. This community proved to be a rich 
source of funds for the fledgling Republican movement. Irish Look Back from America, The 
Times (London), Mar. 18, 1959, at 11. Even as late as 1940, the Irish government was “certain 
that large sums of money in dollars were coming in from America” to regenerate Republican 
coffers. Public Safety in Eire: Emergency Powers Demanded, The Times (London), Jan. 4, 
1940, at 8. See also Irishman With an Iron Cross: Alleged Funds for the I.R.A., The Times 
(London), June 22, 1940, at 3.  
 38. Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in 
Northern Ireland, 2001–2, H.C. 978-I, at 5. 
 39. See Christopher Walker, Provisional IRA Man Dies in Parkhurst After Hunger 
Strike, The Times (London), June 4, 1974, at 1; Christopher Walker, Three IRA Men at Albany 
Begin Hunger Strike, The Times (London), Apr. 11, 1974, at 2. 
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making it look like building companies passed work on to subcontrac-
tors. By the time Inland Revenue caught up with the last company in the 
chain to collect the taxes owed, it turned out that the operation, generally 
registered to a dead person, did not exist. Given the three-year window 
for each falsified certificate, the relatively inefficient state administrative 
structure, and the persistent bureaucratic bias that such schemes repre-
sented fish too small to fry, PIRA frequently used the same certificate for 
a number of fraud schemes. Toward the end of the decade, the Ulster 
Defence Association (UDA), a Loyalist paramilitary, also moved into the 
business. By the mid-1980s fraud from the tax exemption certificates 
had grown to approximately £40 million per year. Some £10 million of 
this appears to have been divided between Republican and Loyalist pa-
ramilitaries. In addition to tax fraud, both sides ran social security 
schemes, with workers on construction sites drawing unemployment 
benefits—which were then earmarked for paramilitary reserves. Between 
1984 and 1986 the courts upheld some 87 convictions for this offense, 
with the total money in question amounting to £13.25 million.40 
ii. Extortion 
The early 1970s saw a number of other innovations. Protection rack-
ets became so ingrained that business contracts eventually built in a 10 
percent increase to pay off paramilitaries. By the mid-1980s the cruder 
forms of intimidation had given way to quasi-legitimate security compa-
nies. From only six security firms in Belfast in 1970, more than sixty 
materialized by the mid-1980s. Some side effects followed: as protection 
schemes expanded, paramilitaries, unable to conduct robberies, initiated 
more raids in the South. 
Although ordinary criminal enterprises attempted to enter the protec-
tion market, by the early twenty-first century most extortion rackets 
tended to be controlled by paramilitaries, particularly Loyalists.41 Popu-
lar targets included fast food restaurants, retail establishments, licensed 
premises, garages, and filling stations.42 Terrorist groups learned to de-
mand just enough money to maintain their income streams—and thus 
                                                                                                                      
 40. See 110 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1987) 406. 
 41. The Organised Crime Task Force, The Threat Assessment 2002, Serious and 
Organized Crime in Northern Ireland, http://www.octf.gov.uk [hereinafter OCTF 2002 
Report]. In 2002 the Organised Crime Threat Assessment revealed that of 99 instances of 
extortion reported to police between January 1, 1999, and March 6, 2002, more than 80% 
linked to paramilitaries. As of 2004, approximately 70% of all extortion was attributable to 
Loyalists. Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force, Confronting the Threat: 
Serious and Organised Crime in Northern Ireland Threat Assessment & Strategy 
2004, at 9, http://www.nio.gov.uk/octf_threat_assessment_and_strategy_2004.pdf [hereinafter 
OCTF 2004 Report]. 
 42. OCTF 2002 Report supra note 41, at 3.  
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tailored the payments to each establishment’s financial profile. Wide-
spread intimidation, reinforced by acts of violence, made this a 
particularly difficult area for the police to penetrate. Even today, victims 
report only an estimated 10 percent of all cases of extortion to the police. 
Most of those who do approach the police request that the security forces 
not act on their information.43 Victims report abusive and threatening let-
ters, death wreaths, Mass cards, and rounds of ammunition—frequently 
delivered to their homes—serving as overt threats against potential po-
lice informants. 
iii. Drinking Clubs and Black Taxis 
Other quasi-legitimate businesses, such as shebeens and black taxis, 
also became important sources of funding. The former, from the Irish 
síbín (“illicit whiskey”), began to proliferate in Belfast in the early 
1970s. In return for “protection,” breweries supplied drink at reduced 
prices, providing paramilitaries with both a social outlet and a source of 
quick money. With names like the “Sweety Bottle,” “Dr. Hood’s,” and 
“Zebra Crossing” (PIRA establishments) and the “Cracked Cup” or 
“Long Bar” (OIRA affiliates), the drinking clubs came under pressure in 
a series of raids in 1977. Thereafter they became quasi-legitimate, with 
the proceeds—and money from the one-armed bandits gracing their 
walls—funneled to paramilitaries.44 The slot machines alone yielded sub-
stantial profits: At some £27,000 per year from each unit, by the mid-
1980s they generated more money for the movement than Noraid (ad-
dressed below).45 
In 1972 PIRA also moved into the black taxi market.46 To create de-
mand, the organization first firebombed the public transportation system: 
the campaign forced Citybus to retire more than 300 buses, which cost 
the city £10 million, plus annual revenue losses thereafter of another £2 
million. PIRA then stepped into the transportation gap and within three 
months had 600 cabs running in Catholic areas. In what can be described 
as a vertically-integrated enterprise, drivers rented cabs from the para-
militaries, had them repaired at Republican garages, bought fuel from 
PIRA petrol stations, and paid dues into a central fund. The taxi network 
proved not just a source of revenue but a way of moving weapons and 
                                                                                                                      
 43. In 2002–2003, 65% of those reporting the crime requested that the police not take 
action. In 2003–2004, the number increased to 81%. OCTF 2004 Report, supra note 41, at 
31.  
 44. Adams, supra note 3, at 178. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Chris Dishman, Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation, 24 Stud. in Conflict & 
Terrorism 43, 48 (2001). 
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people through the city. In time, the Ulster Volunteer Force and other 
Loyalist paramilitaries followed suit.47 
iv. Smuggling Operations 
Smuggling and fraud also generated significant sources of income, 
with contraband ranging from pigs to tobacco.48 Perhaps the most notori-
ous operation is that of Thomas “Slab” Murphy, who earned his 
nickname from his habit of dropping cement blocks on peoples’ legs. In 
the mid-1980s, Murphy led an active service unit along the border. For 
many years he served as a member of the IRA northern command and 
currently is believed to be the Chief of Staff of the IRA. In 1970 Murphy 
constructed a barn that straddles the border with the Republic of Ireland. 
When the European Economic Community offered a subsidy to Irish 
farmers for every animal exported to the United Kingdom, Murphy 
brought livestock into the North by ferry, collected the subsidy, and then 
herded the animals into one end of his barn. The livestock then went 
through the structure to the South, whence Murphy again ferried the 
animals up North for the collection of the subsidy. As of 2005, Murphy’s 
smuggling operations were believed to net PIRA and Sinn Féin in the 
range of £20 million per year.49  
Murphy proved to be a trendsetter, with other farmers along the bor-
der setting up similar schemes.50 These and other smuggling operations 
extend well beyond livestock. Over the past decade, for instance, petrol 
fraud has generated increasing attention. The offense ranges from indi-
viduals living 30 to 40 miles from the border with the Republic filling up 
in the South to more formal smuggling and laundering exercises. For the 
most part, Republicans control this sector. At one point the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland issued an order limiting petrol tankers to cer-
tain roads.51 Ian Pearson, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, estimated that the revenue lost in 2002 from petrol 
fraud came to £115 million.52 The smuggling operations have an enor-
mous impact on the Northern Ireland fuel market: as prices plummeted 
and paramilitaries took hold, 139 filling stations closed between 1994 
                                                                                                                      
 47. Adams, supra note 3, at 167–75. 
 48. See, e.g., OCTF 2004 Report, supra note 41. 
 49. See Remarks of Mr. Jeffrey M. Donaldson, in Northern Ireland Grand Com-
mittee, Proposal for a Draft Special Educational Needs and Disability (Northern 
Ireland) Order 2004, col. 4, available at http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/ 
cm200304/cmstand/nilrelg/st040520/40520s01.htm. See also the remarks of Mr. David Trim-
ble, Mr. Ian Pearson, and Rev. Ian Paisley. Id. 
 50. Adams, supra note 3, at 157–60. 
 51. O’Callaghan, supra note 3, at 168. 
 52. Northern Ireland Grand Committee, Proposal for a Draft Special Edu-
cational Needs and Disability (Northern Ireland) Order 2004, supra note 49, col. 3.  
DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
Winter 2006] Anti-Terrorist Finance 319 
 
and 2004. Of the 700 remaining establishments, around 200 to 250 sell 
only or mostly illegal fuel, while 400 to 450 have some involvement 
with illegal trade.53 In response to increased pressure from HM Customs 
& Excise, the illegal market appears to have receded slightly in the past 
year.54 Other smuggled items include alcohol, tobacco, and counterfeit 
goods such as currency, CDs, perfume, designer clothes, and videos.  
v. Drug Trafficking 
Like protection rackets, drug trafficking in the North appears to be 
dominated by Loyalist organizations. This does not mean that Republi-
cans play no part: following the 1994 ceasefire, for instance, small-scale 
dealers began to distribute ecstasy, marijuana, and LSD in Republican 
neighborhoods. For much of the Troubles, however, PIRA claimed to be 
acting against drugs, occasionally conducting “purges” to this end. In the 
mid-1980s, for instance, a concerted operation in Belfast led to a number 
of deaths. In late 1995 and early 1996, a Republican group called Direct 
Action Against Drugs “killed five men in as many weeks”.55 At least 
some of these efforts to expunge drugs from the North, however, appear 
to have been efforts to consolidate power bases within the movements, 
using drugs as something of an excuse.56 The recent discovery of links 
between PIRA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia 
(FARC), however, suggests a changing formal relationship with traffick-
ing.57 The most commonly seized drug in Northern Ireland is cannabis, 
which constitutes approximately 75 percent of all illegal drugs annually 
intercepted by the state.58 Ecstasy, which comes in at 15 percent, is 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Northern Ireland Affairs Committee: The Financing of Terrorism in 
Northern Ireland ¶ 30, 2001–2, H.C. 978-I. 
 54. Northern Ireland Grand Committee, Proposal for a Draft Special Edu-
cational Needs and Disability (Northern Ireland) Order 2004, supra note 49, col. 5. 
Also see Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Impact in Northern Ireland  
of Cross-Border Road Fuel Price Differentials: Three Years On, 2002–2003, avail-
able at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmniaf/204/ 
204.pdf.  
 55. The IRA Flexes its Muscles, Economist (U.S. Edition), Jan. 6, 1996, at 44. 
 56. Author interviews with convicted Republican paramilitaries, Londonderry, North-
ern Ireland (1993). 
 57. See Colombia “IRA” Trial Adjourned, BBC News, Dec. 4, 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2537537.stm; Jeremy McDermott, IRA 
Training and Tactics Help Colombian Rebels, News.telegraph, May 5, 2005, available at 
http://portal.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/05/10/wcol10.xml. But see P. 
O’Neil, IRA Reiterates Colombia Position, An Phoblacht, Apr. 25, 2002, available at 
http://republican-news.org/archive/2002/Apr.25/25iras.html (denying PIRA involvement in 
Colombia). 
 58. See, e.g., The Organised Crime Task Force, The Threat Assessment 2003, 
Serious and Organized Crime in Northern Ireland, http://www.octf.gov.uk [hereinafter 
OCTF 2003 Report]; OCTF 2004 Report, supra note 41. 
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widely available at dance venues and many licensed premises. More re-
cently, there is evidence that cocaine is gaining ground. The Loyalist 
Volunteer Force (LVF), in particular, appears involved in this market.59 
vi. Kidnapping 
Unlike other paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, PIRA 
branched out to kidnapping as a way to raise money. Almost all of its 
efforts failed. In 1973, for instance, the organization abducted the Bel-
fast-based German industrialist Thomas Niedermayer, who died during 
the ordeal, without any money changing hands. In 1975 PIRA impris-
oned Dr. Tiede Herrema, a Dutch Industrialist, in County Kildare. 
Thousands took to the streets in protest. After a two week siege, Eddie 
Gallagher and Marion Coyle released Herrema—and went to jail. Ireland 
granted Herrema and his wife honorary citizenship, but his departure for 
the Netherlands resulted in the closing of his factory and a loss of 1,400 
jobs in Limerick.60 In 1983 Don Tidey, head of Associated British Foods, 
stopped at a fake Garda checkpoint near Rathfarnham, Dublin. After 23 
days of captivity, the kidnapping ended in a shoot-out.61 Perhaps the most 
famous case of the time involved not people but the Epson Derby-
winner, Shergar.62 In 1981 the race horse disappeared from the Aga 
Khan’s stables in County Kildare. Lloyds of London had put the value of 
the horse at stud at some £10 million. The following morning the kid-
nappers phoned in a ransom of £2 million—but within hours dropped the 
demand to £40,000.63 The 40 stakeholders in the horse, however, refused 
to pay, saying that while this was the first such kidnapping, they did not 
want to encourage similar acts. Rumors circulated of Shergar sightings, 
but he was never officially seen again. 
The British state contributed to the failure of such operations: spe-
cifically, Westminster introduced legislation making it illegal to negotiate 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See Northern Ireland Organized Crime Task Force, Confronting the Threat: Drugs, 
http://www.octf.gov.uk/index.cfm/section/article/page/drugs; see also Organized Crime  
Task Force, News: Dutch Police Seize LVF Linked Ecstasy Haul, http://www. 
octf.gov.uk/index.cfm/section/News/page/details/key/D03F1C86-B0D0-7815-0F04D3517720 
D30D/?month=10&year=2003 (for discussion of LVF involvement in cocaine and the inter-
ception in The Netherlands of 750,000 ecstasy tablets tied to the LVF in October 2003). 
 60. IRA Kidnappers Release Industrialist, BBC News, Nov. 7, 1975, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/November/7/newsid_2539000/2539461.stm. 
 61. Paul T. Colgan, Ireland’s Richest Businessmen Victims of 1980s Kidnap Epidemic, 
Sunday Business Post, Sept. 22, 2002, available at http://archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/ 
2002/09/22/story604929528.asp. 
 62. For accounts of these and other high-profile kidnappings in Northern Ireland, see 
Paul Howard, Hostage: Notorious Irish Kidnappings (2004). 
 63. 1983: Police Hunt Shergar’s Kidnappers, BBC News, Feb. 9, 1983, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/February/9/newsid_2538000/2538595.stm. 
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privately or take out insurance for kidnapping.64 By the end of the 1980s, 
PIRA had largely ceased such attempts. 
vii. Additional Domestic Sources 
Additional sources of funding present themselves. Contributions 
from supporters in Scotland help to fund Loyalist paramilitaries: a recent 
Parliamentary report put the total support generated from Scotland to the 
UDA/Ulster Volounteer Force (UVF) in 1992 at approximately £100,000 
per year.65 Paramilitaries on both sides of the divide use public gather-
ings such as funerals to garner funds.66 Some also engage in contract 
bombing, where individuals pay for paramilitaries to destroy their busi-
nesses, entitling them to insurance or compensation.67 One area of 
growing paramilitary involvement is intellectual property theft. Counter-
feit items include website-based operations for DVDs, CDs, clothing, 
computer video games, power tools, computer software, perfume, sun-
glasses, and the like. Currency also presents a potential profit: Northern 
Ireland has more than 55 different types of notes in circulation, making it 
difficult for retailers to detect a forgery.68 Importantly, as with the North-
ern Bank raid that opened this Article, many members of the public view 
counterfeiting as a victimless crime. According to surveys conducted by 
law enforcement, approximately one-third of the British population 
would knowingly purchase counterfeit goods if the price and quality 
were right.69 
Most recently, law enforcement has witnessed a movement by para-
militaries into high technology. Some crimes, which focus on computers 
and IT networks, hack, spread viruses, engage in denial of service at-
tacks, and create spoof web sites. Other crimes, such as fraud, blackmail, 
extortion, pornography, identity theft and cyber-stalking, simply use new 
technologies for old crimes. As of 2003, approximately 25 percent of the 
cases undertaken by the Police Service Northern Ireland Computer 
Crime Unit related to terrorism.70 Both Republicans and Loyalists have 
                                                                                                                      
 64. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, ch. 56, §§ 10–11 (Gr. 
Brit.). 
 65. Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Fourth Report, supra note 4, at 
19. 
 66. Twelve Soldiers Hurt, 26 Arrests in Derry Clash, The Times (London), Mar. 30, 
1970, at 1. 
 67. See Criminal Damage (Compensation) (Northern Ireland) Order, 1977, S.I. 1247 
(N.Ir 14), art. 11. See also Kennedy Lindsay, The British Intelligence Services in Ac-
tion 158 (1980). 
 68. Northern Ireland Organized Crime Task Force, Counterfeit Currency, http:// 
www.octf.gov.uk/index.cfm/section/article/page/CounterfeitCurrency. 
 69. OCTF 2005 Report, supra note 1.  
 70. OCTF 2004 Report supra note 41, at 51.  
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also attempted to raise funds from similar activities in Great Britain. The 
Real IRA, a late twentieth century off-shoot of the PIRA, has been par-
ticularly active in this area.  
b. International Sources of Money 
Although, as detailed above, most paramilitary money derives from 
domestic operations, neither Republicans nor Loyalists limit their fund-
raising efforts to the domestic realm. The IRA, for instance, initially 
drew money from the Irish government—with or without sanction.71 In 
the early 1970s, on the grounds that Libya would fight the United King-
dom everywhere, Moammar Gaddafi began sending money, arms, and 
equipment to PIRA.72 Republican arms also arrived from the Czech Re-
public.73 Loyalist paramilitaries raised money in Canada and obtained 
weapons from South Africa.74 By far the most publicized and well-
known source of funding, though, resides in the United States. The Irish 
Northern Aid Committee (Noraid), founded in 1969 by Irish civil war 
veterans, has at times provided important ideological and financial sup-
port to PIRA.75 
With one or two exceptions, the United States initially turned a blind 
eye to Noraid—which claimed that all donations went to humanitarian 
aid for people in Northern Ireland.76 Gradually, however, it became clear 
that Noraid’s claims fell somewhat short of the truth: by the early 1970s 
Noraid was supplying more than 50 percent of the resources required for 
PIRA’s armed campaign.77 James Callaghan, the British Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, complained, “We take 
every opportunity to make these facts known to American senators and 
congressmen as well as to the administration.”78 Eventually the diplo-
matic pressure paid off. Aided too by the growing disillusionment of the 
                                                                                                                      
 71. New Violence in Ulster May be Linked to Reforms—Mr. Maudling, The Times 
(London), Feb. 16, 1971, at 9. 
 72. Robert Fisk, Three Civilians Killed in Belfast Battle Between Troops, Protestants 
and Catholics, The Times (London), Jun. 12, 1972, at 1; Paul Martin, The Cost of Libya’s 
Revolutionary Largesse, The Times (London), Aug. 17, 1972, at 12. 
 73. Gerard Hogan & Clive Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ire-
land 161–2 (1989). 
 74. Author interviews with members of the Ulster Defense Association, Londonderry, 
Northern Ireland (circa 1994). 
 75. New York Irish March Supports IRA Violence, The Times (London), Mar. 10, 1983, 
at 1; New York Honour for IRA Man, The Times (London), Feb. 16, 1984, at 8; Philip Webster, 
Thatcher Rejects Inquiry on Noraid Incident, The Times (London), Aug. 21, 1984, at 1. 
 76. Adams, supra note 3, at 154. 
 77. Id. at 136. 
 78. Complaint Over Fund Raising in United States for IRA, The Times (London), Feb. 
19, 1976, at 6. 
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Irish American community with PIRA’s tactics, the United States began 
to take a more active role in stemming the flow of money.  
In 1983 the Reagan administration closed six years of negotiations 
with an extradition agreement. Although the document itself did not re-
fer specifically to PIRA or Noraid, Department of Justice officials 
announced that the treaty, which made it easier to extradite individuals 
seeking to generate funds through Noraid, underscored Reagan’s stance 
against terrorism.79 The FBI became more focused on Noraid’s role in 
arms smuggling,80 and in 1982 the judiciary ruled that Noraid would 
have to comply with the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act and regis-
ter as PIRA’s agent.81  
Tactics adopted by PIRA also alienated U.S. citizens otherwise sup-
portive of a united Ireland. The 1979 assassination of Lord Mountbatten, 
the Queen of England’s second cousin, in Mullaghmore played a particu-
larly polarizing role: PIRA bombed his fishing boat, killing not just 
Mountbatten, a frequent visitor to Ireland’s shores and clearly a soft tar-
get, but his 14-year-old grandson and his grandson’s friend, 15-year-old 
Paul Maxwell from Donegal. The rest of the family suffered severe inju-
ries. And an 82-year-old woman on the expedition died the following 
day.  
Until the attack, support for PIRA largely derived from the context 
of the Irish civil war.82 But after the ambush, funds from supporters 
slowed, and U.S. prosecutions of PIRA members and supporters in-
creased. Noraid had to establish a special reserve, the Irish-American 
Defense Fund, to cover legal costs.83 Simultaneously, Britain upped the 
ante with a public relations campaign against Noraid, substantially as-
sisted by the increasing militancy of PIRA operations.84 By the mid-
1980s, less than £135,000 of PIRA’s annual budget came from the 
United States.85 In 1994 Gerry Adams launched a new fundraising or-
ganization to replace Noraid: Cairde Sinn Féin now funnels money to the 
Republican political arm.86 Following September 11, under Executive 
Order 13,224 (discussed below) the United States government formally 
                                                                                                                      
 79. U.S.-Ireland Extradition Deal Signed, The Times (London), July 15, 1983, at 7. 
 80. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of the United States v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 668 F.2d 159 
(1982); Att’y Gen. of the United States v. The Irish People, Inc., 796 F.2d 520 (1986); The 
IRA; Luck of the Irish, Economist (U.K. Edition), Nov. 13, 1982, at 50. 
 81. Irish N. Aid Comm., 668 F.2d; see also J.L. Stone, Jr., Irish Terrorism Investiga-
tions, FBI Law Enforcement Bull., Oct. 1987, at 18–23. 
 82. The IRA; Luck of the Irish, supra note 80, at 50.  
 83. Adams, supra note 3, at 152. 
 84. Id. at 155. 
 85. Id. at 136. 
 86. Jimmy Burns, Battle Over Ulster Fraud Stepped Up: Renewed Fears on Racketeer-
ing, Fin. Times, Dec. 9, 1994, at 8. 
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blocked all assets held by the Real IRA, Continuity IRA, LVF, Orange 
Volunteers, Red Hand Defenders, and Ulster Defence Association/Ulster 
Freedom Fighters (UFF).87 
c. The Impact of Politics on Paramilitary Funding 
As noted at the beginning of this Article, a terrorist campaign does 
not require extensive funding. The annual estimated costs of PIRA run to 
only £1.5 million. The UVF requires between £1 and £2 million, and the 
UDA, the largest Loyalist group, requires only £500,000 per anum. 
These represent the largest and most complex terrorist operations—
some, such as Continuity IRA, run on a budget of £30,000 or less.88 Not 
only are these budgets fairly low level, but the rate of return per pound 
sterling represents a significant gain when measured against the cost to 
the British state: in 1993, for instance, for every £1 raised by terrorist 
organizations and put into acts of violence, the average cost to the 
                                                                                                                      
 87. Parliament spoke out in support of these measures. See, e.g. Committee on 
Northern Ireland Affairs, Fourth Report, supra note 4, at (e), List of Conclusions and 
Recommendations. Also note that although Noraid gained notoriety for its assistance to Re-
publicans, Loyalist paramilitaries also obtained arms and funding from the United States. 
Friends of Northern Ireland, for instance, located in the vicinity of Chicago, had as its aim the 
provision of a gun to every Protestant household in Northern Ireland. See Robert Fisk, Mr. 
Whitelaw Expected to Relax the Ban on Parades in Ulster, The Times (London), Apr. 5, 1973, 
at 1. 
 88. Police Service Northern Ireland, reprinted in Committee on Northern Ireland 
Affairs, Fourth Report, supra note 4. 
Table 1 
Organization Annual Estimated Running Costs 
Annual Estimated Fundraising 
Capacity 
Provisional IRA (PIRA) £1.5million £5-£8million 
Real IRA (RIRA) £500,000 £5 million 
Continuity IRA (CIRA) £25,000-£30,000 N/A 
INLA £25,000-£30,000 £500,000 
UDA £500,000 £500,000-£1m 
UFF £250,000 N/A 
UVF £1-£2million £1.5 million 
LVF £50,000 £2 million 
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United Kingdom and Ireland in countering or repairing the subsequent 
damage ran around £130.89  
While terrorism itself does not require exorbitant amounts of money, 
politics does. And as paramilitaries have moved into the political realm, 
important effects have followed. Gerry Adams noted in the 1980s that £2 
million in operating funds would prove woefully inadequate to run a £5–
10 million political machine. His personal attention to this issue resulted 
in the “slow but steady and noticeable ‘professionalization’ of the IRA’s 
handling of its finances.”90 To meet increased demand, paramilitaries be-
gan to diversify their funding schemes, and, in a Darwinian sense, they 
“learned” from their own—and other groups’—successes and failures. 
Even as paramilitaries have increased their appetite for money, the 
presence of ceasefires has introduced a new element into the dynamic. 
With the peace process addressing political aspirations, the profit motive 
has increasingly played a role. In many ways, this has made it easier for 
the British state to address the financing issue, treating it as criminality 
not as political challenge. The Article now turns to the United King-
dom’s formal efforts to stem the flow of terrorist funds. 
2. The State Response 
Unraveling the United Kingdom’s efforts to interrupt terrorist fi-
nance in the first three quarters of the twentieth century proves difficult. 
Although from 1922 to 1972 the Northern Ireland Executive main-
tained extensive authority to seize private assets,91 very little information 
                                                                                                                      
 89. From this Andrew Silke estimates that the overall cost of Northern Irish terrorism to 
the United Kingdom in 1993 was around £2 billion. See Committee on Nortern Ireland 
Affairs, Fourth Report supra note 4, ¶ 14. 
 90. O’Callaghan, supra note 3, at 168. 
 91. Intended to be in place for one year, the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
(SPA), 1922 (UK) remained in force until Westminster took direct control of Northern Ireland 
in 1972. Drawing from military powers introduced under the 1914–1915 Defence of the 
Realm Act and the 1920 Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, the new statute gave the civil 
authority the ability “to take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for 
preserving the peace and maintaining order.” Civil Authorities, (Special Powers) Act, 1922, 
§ 1. Even while recognizing the importance of property rights writ large, the statute empow-
ered the state to take away or destroy property and refuse compensation where acts contrary to 
the public good might be involved. Civil Authorities, (Special Powers) Act, 1922, § 11(1)-(3). 
The legislation also created a positive right for the state to take possession of any private prop-
erty. Regulations For Peace and Order in Northern Ireland, 1922, § 8 (UK). See also id. § 20. 
Regulations subsequently issued under the legislation made it illegal to raise money for unlaw-
ful associations. See id. § 24. Another regulation gave the state the ability to prevent the illegal 
smuggling of fuel, requiring individuals to provide information on the use and transfer of 
motor spirits. See id § 9. All entities became required to provide information when requested 
by either law enforcement or the civil authority. See id. § 17. The state also could enter and 
search banks and other financial institutions without warrant. See id. § 18. During the post-
World War II rapprochement, the Northern Executive relaxed many of the provisions intro-
duced under the 1922–1943 SPAs. Yet while powers related to arbitrary arrest, restriction, 
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appears in the Public Record Offices in Belfast or London that details the 
manner in or extent to which such powers issued. In part this may be 
because the 1922–1943 Special Powers Acts and Regulations did not 
require the Civil Authority to lay property seizure or arrest orders before 
Stormont, the Northern Ireland Parliament, nor did they demand their 
promulgation in the Belfast Gazette or local newspapers. Journalists, in 
turn, made only random and limited references to state actions in this 
area.
92
 Particularly from the mid-1960s forward, the lack of information 
may have been due to the persistent omission of monetary property 
rights in civil liberties concerns: neither the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association nor the Standing Advisory Commission on Human 
Rights addressed the issue. In its well-known semimonthly accounting of 
events related to the Troubles, Fortnight makes not one reference in rela-
tion to the seizing of assets from 1970 through 1974. Instead, property 
rights only appear relative to security force destruction of personal prop-
erty in the course of search operations.93  
Another, and perhaps more convincing, reason for the lack of infor-
mation on these powers may be that the British state, while it had the 
authority to take possession of resources supporting the commission of 
violence, simply did not in practice make heavy use of this authority. 
Indeed, when faced by dispersing riots, finding gelignite, and defusing 
bombs, the state may have assigned a low priority to examining revenue 
streams. The problem with this explanation is that it does not elucidate 
the apparent lack of use of these powers during the substantial periods of 
relative calm in Northern Ireland. For this reason, I suggest—although I 
am happy to entertain contrary theses—that the lack of emphasis on and 
use of such powers merely reflects a cultural norm. 
 That is to say, under Stormont, certain ways of dealing with the 
threat from Republicanism became standard. Officials may have seen 
emphasizing the financial underpinnings of the movement as pointless: 
terrorist operations did not require tremendous amounts of money, and it 
would have been difficult to trace such funds prior to the growth of the 
                                                                                                                      
curfew, censorship, and the closing of roads temporarily left the books, the civil authorities 
retained the ability to “examine bank documents where it is suspected that money has been 
collected for a purpose prejudicial to the preservation of the peace.” Civil Order in Ulster: 
Forty-one Old Regulations Revoked, The Times (London), Aug. 29, 1949, at 4. The state also 
preserved its authority to interfere with personal property without compensation and to seize 
property where its use interfered with public order. 
 92. See, e.g., Sinn Féin March in London To-Day: The Dead Lord Mayor Prisoners’ 
Tribute, The Times (London), Oct. 28, 1920, at 12; Irish Plots in Britain: Rebel Campaign of 
Outrage, The Times (London), Mar. 16, 1923, at 12. 
 93. See, e.g., The Past Two Weeks, Fortnight, Feb. 19, 1971, at 16 (reporting women 
residents of New Lodge Road in Belfast parading outside the Army Barracks in protest); The 
Past Two Weeks, Fortnight, May 28, 1971, at 17 (reporting a meeting of over 1,000 people 
to protest the same). 
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modern banking and credit industries. The government may also have 
deemed this approach an inefficient way to prevent attacks—particularly 
when the Executive could simply imprison suspects and hold them in-
definitely without judicial interference. 
What is clear, however, is that from the mid-1980s forward, the em-
phasis shifted. A steady ratcheting of state authority occurred within 
counterterrorist legislation and between counterterrorist law and drug 
trafficking statutes. It is particularly in relation to the latter that the cul-
tural norms changed—in turn influencing and being influenced by 
antiterrorist finance provisions. Contemporary events assisted in this 
evolution: as discussed above in Part II.A, the peace process brought 
with it an increased demand for money to fund political activities—as 
well as a need to satisfy claims to legitimacy in order to sustain partici-
pation in the negotiations. This basically forced paramilitaries between a 
rock and a hard place. Deviations from the law became important propa-
ganda tools for the state to undermine groups’ participation in the 
dialogue. 
a. Statutory Measures Prior to September 11 
Two seminal pieces of legislation comprise Westminster’s counter-
terrorist efforts prior to the introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000: the 
1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (1973 EPA) and the 
1974 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (1974 PTA). 
The former applied to Northern Ireland and the latter primarily to Great 
Britain, with some overlap to Northern Ireland. Although technically 
both statutes operated under sunset provisions, they never lapsed. On the 
contrary, successive Secretaries of State called for the extension of the 
powers, in a dialogue occasionally punctuated by Parliament reissuing 
the statutes with amendments.94 Two points are of note. First, the EPA’s 
powers went well beyond those incorporated into the PTA. This was a 
conscious decision made by the British government to limit inroads into 
property rights in Great Britain. The state accepted that this meant it 
would not be able to cut off terrorist funding entirely. Reginald Maud-
ling, appointed Home Secretary in 1970, gave voice to the concern that 
                                                                                                                      
 94. In 1973 Westminster repealed the 1922–1943 SPAs and introduced the 1973 EPA to 
govern the security situation in Northern Ireland. Thereafter, the “temporary” statute became 
permanently entrenched in the Northern Ireland constitution. The statute, intended to be in 
place for 12 months, was extended on an annual basis, amended in 1975, and again extended 
on an annual basis. In 1978 Parliament reissued the statute, and for the next nine years the 
Secretary of State continued the temporary measures at six month intervals. In 1987 Westmin-
ster added some measures to the Act, again extending it semiannually until replacing it with 
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991 (which it renewed annually thereaf-
ter). In 1996, Westminster again replaced the entire statute, amending it further in 1998. The 
EPA finally left the books in 2000, replaced by the permanent counterterrorist measures. 
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both efficacy and individual rights would be sacrificed should the state 
seriously attempt to stop all resources flowing to the IRA:  
It is admittedly offensive that the IRA factions…should flaunt 
themselves over here and openly collect money for their subver-
sive purposes. But there has to be a stronger reason to take 
extraordinary powers than the removal of such flaunting and col-
lecting, especially since the powers would not by their mere 
assumption remove the activities, but would have to be exercised 
with a thoroughness that would quickly give rise to objections of 
a different kind.95 
There seems to have been fairly widespread public agreement with this 
approach. Even the Times of London, not particularly known for being a 
hotbed of radicalism, suggested that as long as the IRA was not trying to 
exploit legal loopholes regarding proscription, ordinary powers were 
sufficient to prevent paramilitaries from obtaining resources in Great 
Britain. The Times also raised concerns regarding individual rights:  
[I]n conditions of free political debate and in the absence of an 
overwhelming public conviction concerning the objectives of 
policy, recourse to unaccustomed powers of coercion, the sus-
pension of normal rights and safeguards, may confuse and 
embitter opinion in a way that actually works to the advantage of 
those against whom the special measures are directed.96  
For most of the Troubles, then, the EPA contained the more extreme 
powers related to anti-terrorist finance.97 
Second, despite reductions in violence related to Northern Ireland, the 
powers included in both statutes steadily expanded. If anything, an inverse 
relationship between the level of violence and state focus on terrorist fund-
ing seemed to exist. In part this may be due to the influence of drug 
trafficking and money laundering provisions in the final decades of the 
twentieth century. I will return to this below. It may also reflect the state’s 
approach of countering rising levels of violence not with financial provi-
sions but, first and foremost, with measures implicating life and liberty. 
This section begins with a brief discussion of the evolution of pow-
ers in the EPA and PTA, focusing on the grant of authority to the state to 
interfere with property rights writ large, the ability of the judiciary to 
                                                                                                                      
 95. Editorial, A Special Powers Act?, The Times (London), Mar. 1, 1972, at 15.  
 96. Id. 
 97. The only real exception to this came in 1989, when the PTA introduced the offense 
of financing terrorism and associated forfeiture provisions. Within two years, however, the 
EPA not only adopted these powers, but, as the Article later discusses, it expanded them in 
important ways. 
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order the forfeiture of property, and the creation of offenses related to 
terrorist finance. Both statutes, particularly in their later years, also in-
cluded significant shifts in burdens of proof and expansions in state 
investigatory powers to obtain financial and other, related records. Most 
of these provisions are general; on only one occasion does either statute 
target a particular form of terrorist financing: protection rackets and the 
“security industry.” 
i. Property Rights and Asset Forfeiture 
The 1973 EPA provided the British government substantially 
broader powers to interfere with property in Northern Ireland than it 
could exercise in the rest of the United Kingdom. Drawing heavily from 
the 1922–1943 SPAs, under the 1973 EPA, “A constable may seize any-
thing which he suspects is being, has been or is intended to be used in 
the commission of a scheduled offence . . . .”98 The legislation authorized 
any member of Her Majesty’s forces to enter any premises to detain, de-
stroy, or move any property, or to “do any other act interfering with any 
public right or with any private rights of property . . . .”99 Although the 
statute also required that the state pay compensation for real or personal 
property taken, occupied, destroyed, or damaged, this provision did not 
apply when issues related to public order or terrorist violence presented 
themselves.100 These powers remained untouched through the turn of the 
century.101 The Prevention of Terrorism Act, in contrast, did not include 
an equivalent right to state interference with property, nor did subsequent 
iterations of the statute build one into the law. 
The 1973 EPA also had special financial provisions related to pro-
scribed organizations. The legislation allowed the court to demand the 
forfeiture of assets where an individual, convicted of membership in an 
illegal organization, controlled money or property that benefited the list 
of banned entities: Sinn Féin, the IRA, Cumann na mBan, Fianna na  
                                                                                                                      
 98. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, 21 & 22, ch. 53, § 11(3) (taken 
directly from reg. 23 of 1922 SPA) [hereinafter 1973 EPA]. 
 99. Id. § 17 (taken directly from reg. 2 of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Regula-
tions, reg. 8 of the 1922 SPA). 
 100. See 1973 EPA, supra 98, § 25 (taken directly from reg. 11 of the 1922 SPA). 
 101. The only amendment came in 1987, when Parliament set a time limit for filing for 
compensation where no offense against the legislation might be involved. See Northern Ire-
land (Emergency Provisions) Act (Amendment), 1975, ch. 62; Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5. It is possible to trace the sections through the different Acts, e.g., 
§ 11(3) became § 13(3); § 17 became § 19(1); and § 25 became § 28. Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act 1987, ch. 30; Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, ch. 
24. § 19(1) became § 24(1); in addition, the right to compensation previously in § 28 is enu-
merated in § 63(1). Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22; Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1998, ch. 9. 
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hÉireann, Saor Éire, and the UVF.102 The legislation made it an offense to 
solicit or invite financial or other support for a proscribed organization, 
or to knowingly make or receive any contribution to the resources of the 
same. Criminal penalties applied.103  
An important point here is that, under the 1973 EPA, charges of con-
tributing to a proscribed organization amounted to a scheduled offense: 
those accused of this crime automatically entered the Diplock Court sys-
tem, losing their right to trial by jury. Other important legal restrictions 
applied, such as limits on bail and the use of in camera and ex parte pro-
ceedings.104 
Unlike the 1973 EPA, the 1974 PTA did not initially allow the court 
to order the forfeiture of proscribed organizations’ assets. And, while it 
also made it an offense to fundraise for, or contribute to, a proscribed 
organization, only one group graced the list: the IRA.105 In 1976, how-
ever, the new PTA added a forfeiture provision that allowed the state to 
seize any money or other property controlled by an individual convicted 
of membership, where such resources were intended for use in Northern 
Ireland terrorism.106 Similarly, the statute made it an offense to solicit 
contributions for a proscribed organization, intending, knowing, or sus-
pecting that the resources would be funneled to terrorist ends.107 
Although the 1976 statute limited this provision to solicitation within the 
United Kingdom, Westminster dropped this requirement in 1984—while 
still restricting its application to proscribed organizations.108 Five years 
later, however, a significant broadening of state powers occurred.  
ii. Anti-Drug Trafficking and Counterterrorism  
Although not directly related to counterterrorist provisions, British 
alarm at growing drug abuse resulted in a series of statutes aimed at upset-
                                                                                                                      
 102. By 1991 this list included: the IRA, Cumann na mBan, Fianna na hEireann, Red 
Hand Commando, Saor Eire, UFF, UVF, INLA, and the Irish People’s Liberation Organisa-
tion. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, ch. 2, schedule 2. The Terrorism 
Act, 2000, schedule 2 proscribed: the IRA, Cumann na mBan, Fianna na hEireann, Red Hand 
Commando, Saor Eire, Ulster Freedom Fighters, Ulster Volunteer Force, Irish National Lib-
eration Army, Irish People’s Liberation Organization, Ulster Defence Association, Loyalist 
Volunteer Force, Continuity Army Council, Orange Volunteers, and Red Hand Defenders. 
 103. Summary conviction yielded six months’ imprisonment and a £400 fine. Indictment 
resulted in up to five years’ imprisonment plus fine. See 1973 EPA supra note 98, § 19(1). In 
1978 Westminster increased imprisonment on indictment to 10 years; but these powers other-
wise remained largely constant through the twenty-first century. 
 104. See 1973 EPA, supra note 98, schedule 1(12) for inclusion of contributions as a 
scheduled offense and the remainder of statute for special Diplock proceedings. 
 105. The state added the INLA to the list of illegal organizations in 1984. Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, ch. 8, § 1. 
 106.  Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, ch. 8, § 10. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. § 10(4). 
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ting the flow of money in drug trafficking. These laws set new standards 
for inroads into individual property rights, which quickly seeped over into 
efforts to interrupt the flow of funds to terrorist organizations. These ini-
tiatives began in May 1985, when the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee warned that unless the United Kingdom took immediate, 
preventative measures, within five years the country would face a drug 
crisis on par with that in the United States.109  
Within weeks, Leon Brittain, Home Secretary, unveiled extraordi-
nary powers to stem the flow of illicit substances. Commentators 
immediately labeled the new measures Draconian. They had a point: 
the legislation authorized courts to seize assets, required a reform of 
banking law to allow the state to undertake a closer examination of fi-
nancial records, reversed the burden of proof (requiring drug barons to 
prove that any assets not subject to forfeiture were obtained in a man-
ner unrelated to trafficking), and created a new offense of handling 
assets made from trading in hard drugs.110 By autumn a new bill sat be-
fore Parliament.111 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of what became the Drug 
Trafficking Offenses Act grew from the seizure of assets. The legisla-
tion empowered the court to impose a confiscatory fine equal to the 
proceeds of trafficking and then hold the debt against all the accused’s 
property, unless she could prove that the items did not come into her 
possession through drug money. The legislation granted law enforce-
ment and customs the authority to gather new information and gave the 
state the ability to freeze assets, even prior to arrest, for anyone “rea-
sonably suspected of involvement in drug trafficking or money 
‘laundering.’ ” Sentence enhancements of up to 10 years imprisonment 
applied.112  
The 1989 PTA drew inspiration from these anti-drug laws. It sev-
ered the dependence of the financial provisions on a list of proscribed 
organizations and created a new offense of financial contributions to 
acts of terrorism. This included Northern Ireland-related violence as 
well as international terrorism, where such acts constituted triable of-
fenses within the United Kingdom. (The legislation, however, 
specifically exempted other acts of terrorism related to British  
                                                                                                                      
 109. Richard Evans, Tough Powers in Bill to Tackle Drug Traffickers, The Times (Lon-
don), July 30, 1985, at 1. 
 110. Id. This article is the first time the words “money laundering” ever appeared in the 
newspaper. 
 111. See Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1986. 
 112. See Onslaught on Drug Barons Wins Applause, The Times (London), Oct. 10, 
1985, at 4. 
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domestic matters.113) Simultaneously, the statute expanded judicial for-
feiture powers.114 
The 1989 PTA divided financial assistance to terrorism into four of-
fenses: the first, as discussed, focused on contributions toward acts of 
terrorism writ large. The second preserved the previous offense of con-
tributing resources to a proscribed organization. But it broadened this to 
include entering into an arrangement making money or property avail-
able to an illegal group.115 The third offense targeted the mass of 
accountants, fund managers, and other professionals employed by terror-
ist organizations, placing any assistance with the management of 
terrorist funds beyond the pale.116 The statute significantly increased the 
penalties associated with the first three offenses.117 As to the fourth of-
fense, where previously the PTA required disclosure of information 
related to acts of terrorism, the 1989 PTA expanded this requirement to 
criminalize failure to disclose information about terrorist funds.118 
Shortly thereafter, the British government extended this to include mere 
suspicion of financial assistance for terrorism.119 This section essentially 
removed any contractual obligations that might otherwise apply to par-
ties engaged in interactions with terrorist entities. 
Conviction for any of these offenses carried with it the possibility of 
court-ordered forfeiture of assets. Like the drug laws, an important shift 
in the burden of proof applied: where before the state would have to 
prove the defendant intended the resources under his control to benefit a 
proscribed organization, from 1989 the court became entitled, as under 
the 1986 Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, to assume “in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary . . . that any money or property” in the defen-
dant’s control could be used for terrorist ends. The statute only required 
                                                                                                                      
 113. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, §§ 9–13. Labour 
abstained on the second reading of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill instead of voting against 
it. The party strongly opposed the powers related to detention without trial and exclusion, but 
it equally strongly supported the confiscation provisions. Conflict over how to handle the 
situation led to a backbench revolt and, later in the week, the resignation of two front-bench 
spokespeople. Charles Hodgson, Dispute on Anti-terror Stance Defused, Fin. Times (London), 
Dec. 8, 1988, at 14. 
 114. These changes came in an entirely new section of the statute, which focused on 
financial assistance for terrorism writ large. 
 115. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 10. 
 116. Id. § 11. 
 117. From five years’ imprisonment and a fine on indictment (the penalty previously 
applied, e.g., to the second offense), the penalty increased to fourteen years’ imprisonment 
plus fine. See id. 
 118. Id. § 12. 
 119. Id. § 18A. 
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the court to give the owner of the property “an opportunity to be 
heard.”120 
In 1991 the EPA followed suit—and went one further. A new section 
retained the provisions related to proscription but added a new set of 
powers and offenses dealing with terrorism. The statute incorporated the 
four offenses of the 1989 PTA and added two more. The first made it 
illegal to help anyone retain the proceeds of terrorist-related activities.121 
The second outlawed concealing or transferring the proceeds of terrorist-
related activities.122 Each new offense became scheduled, moving related 
cases into the Diplock realm.  
Where the forfeiture provisions of the PTA allowed the court to de-
mand assets, new confiscation powers in the EPA required the court to 
make confiscation orders. Instead of narrowly tying its provisions to re-
sources actually linked to acts of terrorism, the EPA allowed the court to 
assume that whatever resources arrived into the defendant’s possession 
in the six years prior to conviction, or any time that had elapsed since 
conviction (above a £20,000 minimum), could be seized. Realizable 
property included any property held by the defendant, plus any property 
held by someone else to whom the defendant had directly or indirectly 
made a gift. The statute placed the burden on the defendant to refute the 
prosecution’s claims regarding which assets applied and to demonstrate 
that such an order would be unfair or oppressive.123 Schedule 4 of the act 
further provided for the court to issue a restraint order, prior to convic-
tion, on any specified realizable property. Courts could conduct these 
procedures ex parte. Violation could result, on indictment, in up to 14 
years’ imprisonment plus fine.124 
The 1991 EPA also expanded the state’s investigatory powers, allow-
ing the Secretary of State to appoint an individual to report on terrorist 
financing. The act required suspects, when requested, to produce infor-
mation to investigators, except where legal privilege or banking 
obligations of confidence applied.125 In 1996 investigators became au-
thorized to remove any requested documents, unless reasonable cause 
existed that such information might be subject to legal privilege.126 
                                                                                                                      
 120. Id. § 13. 
 121. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, supra 102, § 53. 
 122. Id. § 54.  
 123. Id. §§ 47–52. 
 124. Id. § 9, schedule 4. 
 125. Id. § 57, schedule 5, §§ 2–3. 
 126. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, § 24. 
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iii. Northern Irish Emphasis on Racketeering 
Coinciding with the influence of drug provisions on the broader 
counterterrorist considerations was a shift in the state’s approach to ter-
rorism. Prior to this time, despite the presence of legislative authorities 
granted to prosecutors and the court, the Northern Ireland bureaucracy 
did not treat stemming the flow of funds as a matter central to state secu-
rity. On the contrary, in 1977 a Housing Executive memorandum showed 
that far from cracking down on paramilitary funding, during the 1975 
ceasefire government ministers actually ordered the protection of PIRA 
members’ jobs—regardless of claims of fraud.127 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the state took some steps to 
counter specific schemes: for instance, the Northern Ireland Housing 
Executive, particularly vulnerable to tax exemption certificate fraud, be-
gan to require that sublet work be approved by a supervising officer and 
that subcontractors register with the Executive. The introduction of li-
censes for drinking clubs and slot machines similarly attempted to 
interrupt these sources of income.128 Yet not all of these measures were 
properly enforced. 
In 1983 the provincial focus began to shift. In February of that year, 
an important Northern Ireland Office study drew attention to paramili-
tary financial flows. The report noted that PIRA’s resources derived from 
bank robberies on both sides of the border, extortion rackets, tax exemp-
tion frauds, and gaming machines. Overt streams of cash arrived from 
clubs, social functions, shops, direct collections, subscriptions, and over-
seas sympathetic contributions. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
responded by creating a general racketeering squad, labeled “C19” and 
known locally as the “Al Capone squad.” But this unit, responsible for all 
racketeering, had only fifteen officers and two supervisors.129 In 1988 the 
RUC further reformed its bureaucratic structure, forming a specialist unit 
to track terrorist financing.  
Reflecting these changes, in 1987 Westminster introduced provisions 
specifically targeted at preventing paramilitaries from running protection 
rackets. The EPA prohibited security services from operating without 
first obtaining a certificate from the Secretary of State. It required com-
panies to supply the government with the identities of their employees, 
partners, and officers. Businesses had to report any new hires, officers, or 
partners. The Secretary of State retained the authority to withdraw the 
                                                                                                                      
 127. MPs to Raise Secret Ulster Memo in Commons, The Times (London), Jan. 22, 
1977, at 2. 
 128. See Betting, Gaming, Lotteries and Amusements (N.I.) Order 1985 S.I. No. 1204 
(N.I. 11); Registration of Clubs (N.I.) Order 1987 S.I. No. 1278. 
 129. Adams, supra note 3, at 178–82. 
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certificate, which was renewed annually, at any time. The 1987 EPA 
made it illegal to promote or employ any security firm that did not have 
a special certificate. Criminal penalties on summary conviction of six 
months plus fine applied.130 The state continued its effort to target this 
type of fundraising by strengthening its protections for victims to en-
courage them to come forward with more information.131 
iv. Counterterrorism and Anti-Drug Trafficking 
In 1993 Westminster revisited the issue of drug trafficking and 
passed measures that further limited property rights. Part III of the 
Criminal Justice Act provided for confiscation orders to be issued either 
by a prosecutor or the court.132 It also allowed the court to postpone de-
terminations for up to six months from the date of the conviction.133 The 
1991 EPA, in turn, influenced drug law: the Criminal Justice Act 
strengthened assumptions about the proceeds of drug trafficking; instead 
of providing that the court may assume property derives from trafficking, 
it required the judiciary to assume all property flowed from illicit pro-
ceeds, unless the defendant could prove otherwise or injustice would 
result.134 The statute expanded the number of people who could have 
their assets frozen or confiscated to anyone who knowingly acquired or 
used property related to drug proceeds.135 Like § 18A of the 1989 Preven-
tion of Terrorism Act, the legislation created an offense in connection 
with money laundering, making it illegal for anyone to fail to disclose 
knowledge or suspicion of money laundering—or to notify suspects that 
they are under investigation.136 The legislation gave the Commissioners 
of Customs and Excise the power to initiate prosecution for drug of-
fenses.137 
Critically, Part III of the legislation amended the 1988 Criminal Jus-
tice Act to create a new and weaker standard of proof. It adopted a civil, 
not criminal, standard to determine whether a person benefited from 
drug proceeds and thus forfeited their possessions.138 This shift, from 
“beyond reasonable doubt” to “a balance of probabilities,” proved criti-
cal in later European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) proceedings: 
                                                                                                                      
 130. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1987, §§ 17–20. 
 131. See generally Organized Crime Task Force, Extortion, http://www.octf.gov.uk/ 
index.cfm/section/article/page/extortion.  
 132. Criminal Justice Act, 1993, ch. 36, § 7. 
 133. Id. § 8. 
 134. Id. § 9. 
 135. Id. § 16. It is a sufficient defense to argue that the state gained possession for ade-
quate consideration. 
 136. Id. § 18.  
 137. Id. §§ 29–32. 
 138. Id. § 27. 
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because of it, the ECHR standard requiring the presumption of inno-
cence did not apply. 
Part IV of the legislation addressed, specifically, the financing of ter-
rorism and further signaled a merger between counterterrorist law and 
drug trafficking law. It amended the 1991 EPA to give courts more flexi-
bility to confiscate whatever amount they might consider appropriate. 
Bringing counterterrorist law into line with drug trafficking law, the leg-
islation changed the standard of proof to the “balance of probabilities” 
for determining: (a) whether a person benefited from terrorist-related 
activities; (b) the value of the proceeds of those activities; and (c) the 
amount of the required payment under a confiscation order.139 Instead of 
the six months’ postponement allowed for ordinary crime, the legislation 
allowed the court to postpone any final decision on assets already confis-
cated for “such period as it may specify.”140 The legislation lifted any 
barrier to self-incrimination, requiring the defendant to provide the court 
with any information it requested.141 And it created a duty of disclosure, 
requiring certain professionals to inform a constable when they know or 
suspect an individual is acting in a proscribed manner.142 
Within a year, yet another important statute entered the books. The 
1994 Drug Trafficking Act consolidated the 1986 Drug Trafficking Of-
fenses Act and provisions in the 1990 Criminal Justice (International 
Cooperation) Act dealing with illicit trafficking. Part I again addressed 
confiscation orders, expanding court authority to confiscate without a 
prosecutor’s complicity. The statute required the court to determine, first, 
whether the defendant benefited from drug trafficking (defined broadly 
as receiving any payment or other reward at any time in connection with 
drug trafficking). The court could then order the defendant to pay the 
requested amount. The standard of proof for determining both whether 
the individual benefited and the amount to be recovered again lay in the 
civil realm: the balance of probabilities.143 The statute required the court 
to assume that any property received six years prior to the date of con-
viction came free of other interests in it and that all expenditures during 
that time derived from drug proceeds.144 These provisions essentially ex-
panded the drug trafficking powers to equal those that the Proceeds of 
Crime Act had introduced for terrorist offenses. 
                                                                                                                      
 139. Id. § 36.  
 140. Id. § 36(4). 
 141. Id. § 39. 
 142. Id. §§ 48, 51. The statute also amended the 1989 PTA, making it irrelevant whether 
property used for consideration or not.  
 143. Drug Trafficking Act, 1994, ch. 37, § 2. 
 144. Id. § 4. 
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The legislation, however, went further: like the 1991 EPA, it in-
cluded tainted gifts as seizable items.145 And, again drawing from the 
1991 EPA, a prosecutor’s signed statement, asserting the defendant bene-
fited from drug trafficking and estimating the value of the proceeds, 
became sufficient to reverse the burden of proof, forcing the defendant to 
answer the charges and indicate evidence on which he would rely to re-
fute them. In further keeping with counterterrorist law, where mere 
reasonable cause sufficed to establish that a defendant had benefited 
from drug trafficking, the statute authorized the High Court to issue a 
restraining order to prohibit any person from dealing with any realizable 
property held by a specified person either before or after the date of the 
order.146 
In addition to these changes, the 1994 Drug Trafficking Act gave 
HM Customs and Excise officers the authority to seize cash if any rea-
sonable grounds existed for suspecting the money directly or indirectly 
represented drug proceeds. In the event of such a seizure, the magis-
trates’ court would make a forfeiture order, which the affected individual 
had to appeal within 30 days.147 
The final section of the statute laid out a series of offenses connected 
to the proceeds of drug trafficking: it criminalized concealing or disguis-
ing any property, or converting or removing property from British 
jurisdiction, to avoid prosecution or the enforcement of a confiscation 
order. If a third party knew, or had reasonable grounds to suspect, that 
certain property related to drug proceeds, he became barred from acquir-
ing, using, or taking possession of it. Criminal penalties applied to these 
offenses, as well as to the failure of any professional to report incidents 
of actual or suspected drug money laundering.148 
In the mid-1990s, with the potential end of political violence loom-
ing large, the British government began contemplating the introduction 
of permanent counterterrorist law. Lord Lloyd’s report, issued in 1996, 
became a basis for the subsequent 2000 Terrorism Act. Before the gov-
ernment could introduce the legislation, however, in 1998 the Real IRA 
killed 28 people in Omagh. Prime Minister Tony Blair angrily an-
nounced in Parliament, “we must take exceptional measures to mop up 
the last recalcitrant and renegade terrorist groups that are prepared to 
threaten the future of Northern Ireland.”149 The subsequent 1998 Criminal 
                                                                                                                      
 145. Id. § 8. 
 146. The restraint order, which could only be made on application by a prosecutor, could 
be presented ex parte to a judge in camera, but it still had to provide notice to all persons 
affected by the order. Id. §§ 25–26. 
 147. Id. § 42. 
 148. Id. § 52. 
 149. Tony Blair, 317 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1998) 705.  
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Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act gave the court the power to order 
the forfeiture of any property used in connection with the activities of 
the Real IRA or other similar groups. This caught both deliberate and 
unwitting aid in its remit. In other words, if the Real IRA buried a steel 
drum containing weapons in a ditch on the edge of a farm, the farmer 
could technically lose the land. Moreover, the statute increased already 
severe penalties in order to emphasize the “gravity of the offense.”150 It 
left the forfeiture decision entirely to the discretion of the courts. Intro-
ducing the provisions, Jack Straw suggested that, because the new 
provisions retained judicial discretion, they actually were not that ex-
treme compared to those simultaneously under consideration in 
Ireland.151 The act applied throughout the United Kingdom, with its pro-
visions subject to annual renewal.  
Members of Parliament expressed concern at the time about the 
measure’s interference with property running afoul of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Simply allowing someone to 
appear before a judge did not ensure a balanced trial. Moreover, “Where 
people have different interests in a piece of property—land, a house or a 
car—one cannot just seize it under the European convention if that will 
punish another person.”152 Nevertheless, the legislation flew through Par-
liament under extraordinary procedures, attracting the most attention not 
for its financial provisions but for its extraterritorial powers and the re-
laxed rules of evidence it imposed for convicting defendants of terrorist 
offenses. 
Finally, in the year 2000, the Terrorism Act became the first perma-
nent counterterrorist law in the United Kingdom. The financial clauses 
maintained the importance of an actor’s intent in finding an offense war-
ranting forfeiture.153 These measures also included judicial checks and 
balances on the determination to seize assets.154 Although the legislation 
broadened the number of people authorized to confiscate cash at the bor-
                                                                                                                      
 150. Jack Straw, 317 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1998) 747. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Kevin McNamara, 317 Parl. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) (1998) 783.  
 153. Part III of the statute focused on terrorist property and largely followed along the 
lines of the 1991 EPA. It incorporated five offenses, making it illegal to fundraise for terrorist 
organizations or to use or possess terrorist funds. Terrorism Act, 2000, ch. 11, §§ 15–16. The 
legislation outlawed entering into funding arrangements with terrorists. Id. § 17. It made it 
illegal to engage in the money laundering of terrorist assets. Id. §§ 18, 19. The criminal penal-
ties for these offenses mirrored those of the 1991 EPA: up to 14 years imprisonment plus fine 
on indictment. All of these offenses, if committed outside the United Kingdom, became pun-
ishable by law. The statute also placed a duty of disclosure on anyone who believed or 
suspected that money or property related to terrorism. Id. § 63. The legislation also amended 
the Extradition Act 1989 to encompass the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financ-
ing of Terrorism.  
 154. Id. § 23. 
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ders, it required HM Customs and Excise to apply to a magistrate’s court 
immediately for an order to detain the money for up to three months, 
after which officials would either return or permanently seize the assets. 
The court could only grant the request if reasonable grounds existed to 
suspect the cash related to terrorism and continued retention was neces-
sary pending further investigation. The legislation required the court to 
serve notice on anyone affected by the subsequent order, granting an op-
portunity for appeal within 30 days.155 The statute also attached interest 
requirements to offset the disadvantage created by the temporary suspen-
sion of property rights for ultimately exculpated individuals. Although 
the statute placed a duty of disclosure on individuals, it made a profes-
sional exemption for legal advisors who obtained relevant information in 
privileged circumstances. And while law enforcement could approach 
financial institutions for customer information, the legislation inserted a 
warrant process and limited the type of information they could obtain.156 
The statute also avoided some of the most extreme measures previ-
ously in place, dropping the EPA’s broad powers regarding the 
suspension of property rights and eliminating the 1998 Criminal Justice 
(Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act provisions allowing the state to seize 
property unwittingly related to terrorist crime.  
The entire package derived in large part from the lengthy and public 
consultation process that preceded the statute’s introduction. This is not 
to say that the measures were optimal, but the effort to balance state 
power with judicial protections reflected the importance of due process 
considerations. 
v. Confluence: The Organized Crime Umbrella 
While permanent counterterrorist law allowed the state to respond to 
international terrorism and recalcitrant groups that splintered from the 
mainstream paramilitary organizations, the United Kingdom still faced 
the problem of paramilitary participation in ordinary criminal enter-
prises. The professionalism and strength of these organizations presented 
a particular challenge, for which ordinary criminal law appeared insuffi-
cient. The numbers here are significant: approximately 230 organized 
criminal gangs operate in Northern Ireland, two-thirds of whom have ties 
to paramilitaries.157 Some 97 percent of the population considers organized 
                                                                                                                      
 155. Id. §§ 26–27. 
 156. Id. § 5, schedule 6. 
 157. OCTF 2004 Report supra note 41; Mervyn Wilson & Brian French, Northern 
Ireland Office, Statistics and Research Branch, Views on Organised Crime in Northern Ire-
land: Findings from the Apr. 2004 Northern Ireland Omnibus Survey, Res. & Stat. Bull. 1 
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crime a severe threat.158 Indeed, approximately 85 of the identified gangs 
conduct what intelligence refers to as top-level activities.159 
In September 2000, Adam Ingram, the Minister of State for the 
Northern Ireland Office, announced that the government had to look be-
yond terrorism to organized crime more generally. He announced a new 
bureaucratic entity, the Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF), to address 
the legacy of the Troubles. The group would include government, law 
enforcement, and various other agencies working to drain criminals’ fi-
nancial resources.160 In May 2004, the group identified its top priorities 
as: (a) reducing extortion, intimidation, and blackmail; (b) disrupting the 
supply of illegal drugs; (c) reducing the loss to the Exchequer from fuel 
smuggling and dilution; and (d) interrupting alcohol and tobacco smug-
gling. The task force also targeted money laundering and the forfeiture 
of criminal assets and singled out intellectual property crime and in-
transit robberies for special attention.161 
To provide the statutory authority, in March 2001 the Home Secre-
tary announced a new instrument specific to Northern Ireland: the 
Financial Investigations (Northern Ireland) Order. The draft Proceeds of 
Crime Bill would apply to the United Kingdom more broadly.162 These 
legal instruments transferred powers previously reserved to counterter-
rorist law and drug forfeiture provisions to the broader criminal realm. 
Prior to this time, the main Northern Ireland legislation addressing 
criminal—as opposed to terrorist—finance was the 1996 Proceeds of 
Crime (Northern Ireland) Order. Article 49 allowed the state to appoint a 
financial investigator to assist the police in determining the proceeds re-
lated to criminal activities. The financial investigation powers, set out in 
schedule 2, included the ability to issue a general bank circular to iden-
tify accounts held by named individuals. Such authority could only be 
exercised following a county court judge’s ruling that the appointment of 
                                                                                                                      
 158. See OCTF 2003 Report, supra note 58. 
 159. See OCTF 2004 Report, supra note 41. 
 160. See Financial Investigations (Northern Ireland); Northern Ireland Grand Commit-
tee, Mar. 22, 2001, Westminster, Financial Investigations (N.I.) Order, Session 2000–01 
(Statement of Adam Ingram, Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmstand/nilrelg/st010322/pm/10322s01.
htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 161. The task force meets regularly and is supported by sub-groups, such as those fo-
cused on alterations in the law and publicity, as well as expert groups. See What We Do, 
http://www.octf.gov.uk/index.cfm/section/article/page/WhatWeDo (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 162. See Financial Investigations (Northern Ireland), Northern Ireland Grand Committee, 
Mar. 22, 2001, Westminster, Financial Investigations (N.I.) Order, Session 2000–01 (State-
ment of Adam Ingram, Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmstand/nilrelg/st010322/pm/10322s01.
htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (requesting that the committee consider a proposal for draft 
Financial Investigations (N.I.) Order 2001). 
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a financial investigator would substantially enhance the investigation. 
Between August 1996 and December 2000, judges used this power mod-
estly, appointing financial investigators in only 28 cases. These 
investigators issued 23 general bank circulars which, in turn, identified 
more than 1,200 previously unknown accounts linked to people under 
investigation.  
In 2001 the Financial Investigations (Northern Ireland) Order further 
expanded these powers. The new order granted HM Customs and Excise 
the ability, previously reserved for the police, to apply for the appoint-
ment of a financial investigator to assist with investigations into proceeds 
of crime. Investigators received the same access to material under pro-
duction orders as was previously available only to law enforcement.163 
The statutory instrument widened the range of financial institutions to 
which investigators could issue a general bank circular, making it possi-
ble for the state to demand information from anyone possibly engaged in 
business with the accused.164 Customs officers could now issue general 
circulars to financial institutions and solicitors, demanding informa-
tion.165  
Most controversially, one portion of the order granted the state the 
entirely new power to issue a general solicitors’ circular, directly impact-
ing client-attorney privilege.166 Ingram suggested that this measure 
addressed quirks unique to Northern Ireland, where two systems for reg-
istering land exist. Registration of title is not compulsory, and any 
inquiry regarding land ownership can only be made in reference to the 
property itself—not the owner. The Law Society of Northern Ireland and 
the Human Rights Commission, however, took a different view of the 
suspension of client-attorney privilege. Ingram responded angrily to 
these claims, asserting that no client-attorney privilege exists where an 
issue relates to furthering criminal intent. He cited drug trafficking stat-
utes as precedent for the move:  
The obligation on solicitors to report to the police or NCIS any 
suspicious transactions as defined by our current money launder-
ing offenses has effectively weakened the duty of confidentiality 
that solicitors owe to their clients. Therefore, there has already 
                                                                                                                      
 163. 2001 Financial Investigations (N.I.) Order, art. 4. 
 164. Id. art. 5. Prior to the order, the scope was restricted to banks and building societies. 
The state wanted to extend it to securities, futures, options, and insurance markets, so as to 
include investment firms, insurance companies, and others in the regulated financial sector. 
 165. Id. art. 3. 
 166. Id. art. 6. 
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been an acceptance in law of the need to tackle organized 
crime.167  
Even if the law did recognize a need to address organized crime, 
however, Ingram’s answer avoided the key issue, which was that the new 
powers essentially suspended client-attorney privilege prior to any find-
ing of wrongdoing by a court. 
The proposed powers generated heated debate. Ingram acknowl-
edged the individual rights concerns, but he suggested they were 
overridden by the right of British subjects not to suffer from organized 
crime.168 Ingram cited the insertion of a county court judge into the proc-
ess for appointing a financial investigator as a safeguard, as well as the 
requirement that investigators have reasonable grounds to believe a per-
son had benefited from serious crime before issuing a circular. Ingram 
noted that the power to issue a solicitors’ circular would be unique to 
Northern Ireland—unwittingly emphasizing the two-tiered system of 
justice within the United Kingdom.  
The issue of rights figured significantly in the Northern Ireland 
Grand Committee. Although the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP), Sinn Féin, and the SDLP did not show up for the hearing, Wil-
liam Ross of the Ulster Unionist Party welcomed the order. He 
announced, “The Minister was right to declare that there is always a con-
flict between the protection of individual rights and what is good for the 
community.” Although this was not what the minister had said, Ross 
went on to suggest that “even the European convention on human rights 
recognizes that the prevention of crime is sufficient reason for interfering 
with the right of criminals to a private life.” Ross saw the issue as a con-
flict of entitlements: “[T]he right of society to fight crime successfully is 
pitted against an individual’s right to privacy in his legal affairs.” He 
ended his address with:  
I appreciate that the Government wants to tread cautiously be-
cause of the conflict—it is at the heart of the matter—between 
freedom, the necessity of privacy and the need to investigate 
crime and prosecute those who are engaged in it in a proper 
manner that will give confidence to people.169 
The existence of the solicitors’ circular underscores the growing 
pressure on the legal profession. What began as an indemnity under 
counterterrorist law for a solicitor to come forward morphed into a duty 
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to disclose information not obtained under legal privilege. With the 2001 
Financial Investigations (Northern Ireland) Order, this expanded further 
to allow the state to request specific information from a solicitor. In 
March 2003, the Home Secretary issued yet another White Paper, this 
time entitled: “One Step Ahead: a 21st Century Strategy to Defeat Organ-
ised Criminals.” In this document, the state explained that because 
defendants could exploit legal safeguards, the government wanted to turn 
the tide. In practice this meant the state saw financial institutions and 
lawyers, both considered the “regulated” financial sector, as an extension 
of its intelligence-gathering arms. If they refused to participate, they 
would be found guilty of an offense. This approach creates problems, 
such as what advice an attorney can give clients under state scrutiny 
without “prejudicing an investigation.”  
b. Post-September 11 Developments 
Despite the careful consideration legislators gave to anti-terrorist fi-
nance in preparation for the 2000 Terrorism Act, September 11 resulted 
in further expansion of counterterrorist law. The 2001 Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) enabled the state to confiscate any 
money it believed to be related to terrorist operations, whether or not a 
court had brought proceedings in regard to an offense connected with 
the cash.170 The statute completely blocked the judiciary from playing a 
role in the freezing of assets of non-U.K. entities. When Treasury rea-
sonably believed a non-U.K. person posed a threat to the British 
economy, British nationals, or United Kingdom residents, the Secretary 
of the Treasury could issue a statutory instrument seizing the individual’s 
assets. At the end of 28 days, each House of Parliament had to pass a 
resolution for the order to continue.171 The legislation also expanded the 
function of freezing orders: Not only did their issuance result in a sus-
pension of access to funds, but they could also require persons to 
disclose information. Criminal penalties of up to two years’ imprison-
ment for failing to abide by the order—or provide the requested data—
applied.172 
The legislation, however, did not stop there. It expanded the number 
of people who could seize cash beyond HM Customs & Excise and re-
lated functions to any authorized officer.173 The statute also amended the 
2000 Terrorism Act by allowing law enforcement to apply for an open 
                                                                                                                      
 170. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, ch. 24, Part I. The new provisions 
replaced § 24 with § 31 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
 171. Id. ch. 24, Part II. 
 172. Id. schedule 3. 
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warrant, essentially giving the state the ability to conduct ongoing ac-
count monitoring rather than requiring the appropriate officer to seek 
judicial approval each time she sought information related to a terrorist 
investigation. The order can only be in place for 90 days, although re-
newal is possible. Applications may be made ex parte.  
The ATCSA further amended the Terrorism Act by making it an of-
fense for any person in the “regulated sector” to fail to inform law 
enforcement promptly where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting 
another person committed an offense relating to terrorism and laundering 
terrorist funds. While the duty of disclosure overrode statutory or profes-
sional limits,174 failure to disclose was excusable where the person “is a 
professional legal adviser and the information or other matter came to 
him in privileged circumstances.”175 
i. Assets Recovery and Statutory Authorities 
In the area of the monitoring and interception of criminal finance, 
September 11 did not so much create new measures as accelerate a proc-
ess already in motion. In June 2000, a government report argued the state 
had hitherto dramatically under-utilized its potential to recover criminal 
assets.176 As was previously mentioned, Ingram soon thereafter an-
nounced the introduction of legislation to address this problem. The 
resultant 2002 Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) essentially applied ex-
traordinary state powers, previously limited to terrorist and drug activity, 
to mainstream criminal behavior.177 Simultaneously, it rejected pursuing 
terrorist funds through the criminal law system, opting instead for the 
civil domain and its softer protections of individual rights.  
The legislation granted the Executive broad powers and limited judi-
cial intervention. Where the courts did become involved, the legislation 
turned them into a “one-stop shop,” allowing the prosecution to “ ‘pur-
chase’ pre-trial restraint of assets, criminal conviction, sentence, and, 
ultimately, confiscation of the restrained assets.”178 It severed assets re-
                                                                                                                      
 174. Id. Part III. 
 175. Id. schedule 3A, Part 1(1), § 21. 
 176. In June 2000 the Performance and Innovation Unit issued a report, Recovering the 
Proceeds of Crime, available at http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/su/criminal/crime.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2006). 
 177. For example, the statute defines Money Laundering Offenses strictly in relation to 
the crime: “A person commits an offense if he (a) conceals criminal property; (b) disguises 
criminal property; (c) converts criminal property; (d) transfers criminal property; (e) removes 
criminal property from England and Wales or from Scotland or from Northern Ireland.” Pro-
ceeds of Crime Act, 2002, Part VII, § 327. 
 178. Edward Rees & Richard Fisher, 4 Blackstone’s Guide to The Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (2005). See also Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Part IV, §§ 189–191, 199. 
DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
Winter 2006] Anti-Terrorist Finance 345 
 
covery from any sort of criminal conviction,179 and it adopted the more 
lenient civil standard of proof—a “balance of probabilities”—instead of 
“beyond reasonable doubt.” By consciously sidestepping criminal law, 
the state did not have to presume the innocence of the accused. (The 
House of Lords, Privy Council, and European Court of Human Rights 
had all previously held similar civil confiscation provisions outside the 
scope of criminal law—and thus not subject to the presumption of inno-
cence as embodied in article 6(2) of the ECHR.180) 
Previously the 1996 Drug Trafficking Act had required the court to 
consider any property received in the six years prior to a case to be de-
rived from crime. In contrast, the 1988 Criminal Justice Act had allowed 
for judicial discretion in that determination. POCA combined and ex-
tended these regimes, creating the universal assumption that the 
defendant benefited from crime. The statute reversed the burden of 
proof, creating the “criminal lifestyle” standard and requiring self-
incrimination under production and disclosure orders.181 The statute 
obliged the court to assume that all expenditures in the six years prior to 
the case came from property obtained through criminal conduct.182 On 
appeal, the court could confirm, quash, or vary a confiscation order183—
making the decision to appeal a bit like Russian Roulette. Jane Kennedy, 
the Minister of State for the Northern Ireland office, hailed the legisla-
tion as “a formidable addition to our arsenal.”184 
To administer this new regime, the statute created the Assets Recov-
ery Agency (ARA), a non-ministerial department that reports to the 
Home Secretary, although it maintains operational independence. The 
organization operates throughout the United Kingdom, with its main 
branch located in Great Britain and a subsidiary office in Northern Ire-
land.185 Its strategic aim is to interrupt criminal activity by recovering 
criminal assets and to promote financial investigations as a key element 
of criminal cases. The agency takes on cases referred by the police, HM 
Customs and Excise, the prosecution authority, and other law enforce-
ment. The system creates an alternative to criminal law: the state must 
have attempted and failed to prosecute through the criminal system or 
                                                                                                                      
 179. Id. Part V, ch. 3, §§ 281–9. 
 180. Rees & Fisher, supra note 178, at 2. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, Part IV, § 160. 
 183. Id. § 182. 
 184. Jane Kennedy, After Dinner Speech to the Ulster Society of Chartered Accountants 
and Law Society for Northern Ireland, Sept. 25, 2002, available at http://www.octf.gov.uk/ 
index.cfm/section/News/page/archivelist/ (follow “September 2002” hyperlink; then follow 
“After Dinner Speech by Jane Kennedy to Ulster” hyperlink). See also Identification Rules are 
Over the Top, Say IFAs, Investment Adviser, Apr. 21, 2003. 
 185. Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, Part I. 
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else prosecution must be non-feasible. The minimum amount of recover-
able property is set at £10,000, and it must include items other than cash 
or negotiable instruments (although these could be included if other 
property also is of issue). The organization is staffed by lawyers, ac-
countants, ex-police investigators, forensic accountants, and customs and 
excise and Inland Revenue personnel. External advisors drawn from the 
private sector and the Treasury Solicitor’s Office also assist.  
The agency opened for business in January 13, 2003. Between Feb-
ruary of that year and the following May, it received 142 referrals from 
other agencies. But when asked in March 2005 which assets of PIRA, 
Real IRA, Continuity IRA, Official IRA, Irish National Liberation Army, 
Ulster Defence Association, and Ulster Volunteer Force had been seized 
or frozen by the Assets Recovery Agency, Ian Pearson, the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, provided less than im-
pressive figures: he put Loyalist assets under interim receiving orders at 
£350,000, with another £1.25 million agreed for recovery; Republican 
cases, in turn had only netted £173,332 in frozen funds and £225,000 
agreed for recovery.186 David Burnside, from South Antrim, pointed out 
in response, “If ever there were a description of the tip of an iceberg, that 
is it.” Slab Murphy’s empire alone was worth some £40 million—
making the paltry £225,000 recovered from Republicans almost mean-
ingless.187 Pearson replied that it was, as yet, early in the program. He 
had a point: not only was the organization in its infancy, but initially 
only 10 people worked there (as opposed to 40 in its southern counter-
part).188 Indeed, considerable incentives exist for the agency to pursue 
more, rather than fewer, funds: the statute made ARA self-financing, 
thereby creating an incentive for aggressiveness in the organization. To 
some degree, this seems to have worked: by March 31, 2004, although 
its business plan only targeted £10 million, the ARA had frozen £14.8 
million. But its overall “success” in the paramilitary realm leaves much 
to be desired. 
Going by the ARA’s public press releases, only two cases, both Loy-
alist, appear thus far to relate directly to paramilitaries: in the first, a 
UDA case in South-East Antrim, the agency obtained assets held by 
David and Pauline Hill in the United Kingdom and United States. In 
March 2005, the agency wrestled about £4.8 million in assets from Colin 
Armstrong and Geraldine Mallon, both of whom had links to the Ulster 
Volunteer Force and later the Loyalist Volunteer Force, when the organi-
                                                                                                                      
 186. Northern Ireland Grand Committee, House of Commons, Session 2004–05, Col-
umn Nos. 10–11 (2005). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Gavin Hinks, Numbers Game, Accountancy Age, July 17, 2002, at 3. 
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zation split.189 They were linked to drug trafficking between Belgium and 
Northern Ireland. 
The United Kingdom’s embrace of this agency reflected a growing 
international consensus that asset recovery is an appropriate way to ad-
dress global money laundering and organized crime. Indeed, the ARA 
borrows heavily from the Criminal Assets Bureau in the Republic of Ire-
land and, as of the time of writing, works closely with its Irish 
counterpart.190 
ii. Summary 
The approach that currently dominates the United Kingdom’s anti-
terrorist financing dialogue—a broad, strategic approach that focuses on 
stemming the flow of funds—is a relatively recent creation. In large part 
it started with the drug war and the expansion of asset forfeiture and 
money laundering regulations, which spilled over into the counterterror-
ism realm. A symbiotic relationship, however, quickly developed, 
wherein expansions in terrorist finance authorities seeped back into drug 
trafficking. With September 11 came the transfer of these powers to the 
broader criminal realm—not without consequence for individual rights. 
The anti-terrorist finance regime in the United Kingdom has moved 
from criminal law to civil law standards, with the forfeiture of property 
ultimately divorced from conviction on any underlying criminal offense. 
The presumption of innocence no longer applies. The burden shifted to 
those seeking to prevent the state from claiming their assets to prove that 
such property does not relate to criminal activity. Simultaneously, the 
standard for determining guilt weakened: instead of beyond reasonable 
doubt, a balance of probabilities applies. And the number and range of 
offenses related to the financing of criminal activity has rapidly ex-
panded. 
Not only has the United Kingdom eroded these entitlements and, 
consequently, property rights, but the state has created institutions with a 
vested interest in aggressively wielding investigatory powers and pursu-
ing forfeiture proceedings. While, in one sense, these initiatives are 
meant to strengthen the state’s ability to respond to a very real threat, 
their transfer to the ordinary criminal system means their repercussions 
                                                                                                                      
 189. See press releases available at http://www.assetsrecovery.gov.uk; see also IRA 
“Laundering Stolen Cash in UK Housing Market,” The Guardian (London), Mar. 30, 2005, 
at 7. 
 190. For discussion of anti–terrorist finance provisions in the Republic of Ireland,  
see An Garda Síochána/Police Service of Northern Ireland, A Cross Border  
Organised Crime Assessment 2004, available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/cross_ 
border_organised_crime_assessment_2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006). See also Hogan & 
Walker, supra note 73, at 271–72.  
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emanate beyond the terrorist realm. Yet little focus has been given to the 
broader impact of these authorities. Perhaps of greatest concern has been 
the suspension, in Northern Ireland, of client-attorney privilege as part of 
the state’s investigatory powers. If the history of anti-terrorist finance is 
any indication, this shift may eventually extend throughout the United 
Kingdom. 
Instead of stopping to question the significant expansion in state 
powers, British efforts to address the flow of criminal funds generally, 
and terrorist finance in particular, continue apace. In 2003, the govern-
ment issued Money Laundering Regulations, which entered into force on 
April 1, 2003.191 The regulations require that every individual in the 
course of relevant business comply with identification procedures,192 re-
cord-keeping procedures,193 internal reporting procedures,194 and 
training.195 All money service operators and high value dealers must reg-
ister with HM Customs & Excise,196 which can impose civil fines and 
penalties to noncompliant entities.197 In the legislative realm, a consulta-
tion paper issued in March 2004 floated new proposals looking at 
witness compellability, evidentiary standards, sentencing, and license 
conditions. Conspiracy law and proposals for a National Witness Protec-
tion Program also graced the text. And the administrative structure 
continues to evolve: In February 2004, the government announced the 
formation of the Serious Organised Crime Agency. This entity draws 
from responsibilities divided between the National Crime Squad, the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service, HM Customs & Excise, and the 
Immigration Service. Chaired by the Home Secretary, the Serious Or-
ganised Crime Agency focuses on developing national strategies and 
                                                                                                                      
 191. These regulations replaced the Money Laundering Regulations 993 and 2001. The 
idea was to bring them into line with Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the 
financial system for money laundering. 
 192. Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 3075: The Money Laundering Regulations 2003, 
reg. 4 (sets £15,000 as the threshold after which identification procedures are required).  
 193. Id. reg. 6 (requires that records be retained for five years after the relationship or 
one-off transaction ends; requires the business to retain a copy of identification records or 
information as to where they can be obtained).  
 194. Id. reg. 7 (details internal reporting measures). 
 195. Id. reg. 3 (requires businesses to train employees on how to recognize and deal with 
transactions that may be related to money laundering; also requires that employees are famil-
iar with the 2002 POCA and the 2000 Terrorism Act §§ 18, 21A. Failure to do so carries a 
criminal penalty.). 
 196. Id. reg. 9. A money service operator is anyone who accepts deposits, carries out 
long-term insurance contracts, deals in investments as principal or agent, arranges deals in 
investments (manages them, safeguards, or administers them), establishes collective invest-
ment schemes, advises on investments, or issues electronic money. A “high value dealer” is 
anyone dealing in goods by way of business when the transaction involves more than £15,000. 
 197. Id. regs. 14, 20. 
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encouraging communication across bureaucratic barriers. In Part III of 
this Article, I discuss aspects of this regime that have proven unhelpful 
or even counterproductive in the effort to prevent terrorist organizations 
from raising money and transferring funds. 
B. The United States  
Unlike the United Kingdom, where September 11 merely acceler-
ated a contemporary trend, in the United States it abruptly changed the 
course of anti-terrorist finance policy. Prior to the attacks, the U.S. ad-
ministrative structure all but ignored terrorist finance: the Department of 
Justice tended not to bring criminal charges for contributions to terrorist 
organizations.198 Terrorism did not require much money, and so popular 
belief suggested that more efficient ways of preventing attacks existed. 
Not a single unit at FBI headquarters focused on the financing of terror-
ist organizations; nor did the Criminal Division of the Department of 
Justice have a national terrorist financing program.199 As a result, the FBI 
lacked the detailed intelligence necessary to conduct a successful anti-
finance campaign. And turf battles, the scourge of the bureaucratic state, 
compounded the issue. 
The CIA, for its part, had precious little insight into the financial un-
derpinnings of groups associated with al Qaeda. Like the FBI, the CIA 
did not consider interrupting the flow of money a high priority, but it had 
different reasons: the general belief within the Agency was that, at least 
in regard to al Qaeda, the money came from bin Laden. (They were 
wrong.)200 Plus, the complicated manner in which terrorists obtained and 
transferred funds made efforts to follow the money less effective than 
other approaches to addressing the threat. The CIA did have a virtual 
station (ALEC station), initially named the Counter Terrorism Center 
(CTC)—Terrorist Financial Links, but it only dealt with financial matters 
connected to other Agency efforts. The ALEC Station Director, more-
over, strongly believed that money did not reveal much about an 
organization’s plans. The Office of Transnational Issues, within the Di-
rectorate of Intelligence, ran an Illicit Transaction Group that addressed 
terrorist finance. It was not, however, considered part of the CTC.201  
                                                                                                                      
 198. Successful prosecution required the state to trace donor funds to particular terrorist 
attacks. DOJ found it easier to use minor charges to disrupt operations. On the more serious 
cases, the FBI was concerned that if it opened a criminal investigation, it would not be able to 
use broader powers under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to place suspects under 
surveillance. The FBI also claimed (after the fact) that the political climate would not have 
allowed them to go after religious charities. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 32. 
 199. Id. at 33. 
 200. See Staff Report, supra note 1, at 20, 34. 
 201. Id. 
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Other bureaucratic entities with a vested interest in the matter shared 
a similar story: The National Security Agency (NSA) did have a handful 
of people addressing terrorist finance, but its foreign language capabili-
ties left something to be desired. The Treasury Department’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) ran the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking 
Center (FTATC), but Herculean battles with the CIA following the 2000 
Bremer Commission report limited OFAC’s effectiveness—which in any 
event was bounded by U.S. borders. FinCEN, Treasury’s Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network, born in 1990, tended to focus on Russian 
money launderers and other high-profile crimes. The only federal or-
ganization seriously addressing the issue was the National Security 
Council (NSC): After the 1998 East Africa bombing, Richard Clarke 
started an NSC-led interagency group on terrorist financing, which also 
included Treasury, CIA, FBI, and the State Department. The task force 
initially focused on determining bin Laden’s asserts. (It was this group 
that later discredited the CIA’s assumption regarding al Qaeda funding.) 
The administrative structure was not alone in exhibiting malaise; the 
legal framework arose rather late in the game. In the mid-1990s, the first 
efforts to address nonstate actors’ funding emerged. These initiatives 
narrowly focused on specific actors. The financial regulatory regime, for 
its part, existed quite separately and almost wholly in the realm of drug 
trafficking and money laundering. 
September 11, however, heralded a dramatic shift in approach. Title 
III of the USA PATRIOT Act and Executive Order 13,224 led the charge. 
The administrative structure suddenly began to focus on the issue, plac-
ing increased pressure on both allied and non-allied states to introduce 
new structures for stemming the flow of funds to international terrorist 
organizations.  
Part III.A looks at legislative authorities and the judicial interpreta-
tion of these powers prior to September 11. Part III.B then takes a step 
back and examines, specifically, al Qaeda funding. The terrorist network 
provides a case study that in some ways mirrors, and in others departs, 
from the Northern Ireland situation. Part III.C then focuses on U.S. 
measures introduced following September 11 and highlights the inroads 
into individual entitlements generally—and property rights in particu-
lar—that mark the current U.S anti-terrorist finance regime. 
1. U.S. Anti-terrorist Finance Provisions Pre-September 11 
Three legislative streams flowed into the United States’ anti-terrorist 
finance regime. The first originated with the 1917 Trading with the En-
emy Act (TWEA), which gave the president the ability to “investigate, 
regulate . . . prevent or prohibit . . . transactions” during war or national 
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emergencies.202 The statute reflected congressional intent to prevent indi-
viduals located within the United States from conducting transactions 
with declared enemies. Although initially viewed as an instrument of 
war, in 1933 Congress amended the statute to apply during any national 
emergency. Abuses during the Nixon era led to its revocation and re-
placement with the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA).203 In the final decade of the twentieth century, the Executive 
issued an order under this statute that created a list of Prohibited Persons 
and Specially Designated Terrorists with whom financial transactions 
could be banned. The second legislative source, the 1996 Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), created two lists of entities 
against which financial strictures applied: state sponsors of terrorism and 
designated foreign terrorist organizations. Statutes related to drug traf-
ficking and anti-money laundering constitute the third legislative stream. 
This section briefly traces the evolution of each.  
a. OFAC List of Prohibited Persons and the 
Specially Designated Terrorist List 
The 1977 IEEPA required that any economic regulation introduced 
by the President arise from extraordinary threats located wholly, or 
mostly, outside the United States. In such circumstances, the President 
can declare a national emergency in regard to the specific threat. A broad 
range of powers then goes into effect. The President can designate indi-
viduals or entities he considers a national security threat, freeze their 
assets, and block transactions between them and every U.S. person by 
making it illegal to make or receive any contribution of funds, goods, or 
services to or from those included in the list.204 Once the President makes 
the order, he must report it within 10 days to the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC). OFAC then informs banks, whose refusal to comply 
may result in criminal or civil penalties.205 Like the 2001 ATCSA in the 
United Kingdom, banks hold all blocked assets in interest-bearing ac-
counts that maintain a rate roughly commensurate to the market average. 
These accounts cannot be debited (although they can be credited). Early 
uses of the IEEPA applied to Libya and Cuba; in the 1990s, however, the 
                                                                                                                      
 202. 50 U.S.C.S. appendix § 3. Prior to that time, however, the Executive could exercise 
its foreign affairs power to exert control of non-U.S. persons. See United States v. Curtis-
Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (finding a joint congressional resolution 
authorizing the President to ban sale of weapons to states enmeshed in conflict in Bolivia 
constitutional under the President’s foreign affairs power). 
 203. Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (1977). In times of war, the 
Trading with the Enemy Act remains in force. 
 204. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2001).  
 205. The criminal penalties run up to $500,000 for corporations and up to $250,000 
and/or 10 years in jail for individuals. The legislation caps civil penalties at $11,000.  
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Executive began to go after nonstate actors: first, Palestinian organiza-
tions, and later, drug traffickers like the Cali cartel in Colombia. 
In January 1995 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,947 
under the IEEPA. The instrument blocked all U.S. assets of specified 
terrorists or groups threatening to use force to disrupt the Middle East 
peace process.206 It prohibited all U.S. persons from engaging in transac-
tions with entities included on the “Specially Designated Terrorist List.” 
The justification for the provision was the centrality of peace in the 
Middle East to U.S. national security. The Clinton Administration did 
not originally include Osama bin Laden on this list. After the 1998 East 
Africa bombings, however, Executive Order 13,099 added bin Laden and 
a number of his key aides.207 In 1999, in retribution for their protection of 
bin Laden, the Executive authorized OFAC to block financial transac-
tions with the Taliban.208 
Two cases in the 1980s tested Executive authority to act under both 
TWEA and the IEEPA. In the first, the Supreme Court upheld Executive 
authority to freeze assets to create a bargaining chip for foreign rela-
tions.209 From this case it became clear that although Congress intended 
the IEEPA to limit the President’s power during peacetime, the statute 
actually did not reduce overall Executive power to control foreign assets. 
In the second, the Court held that the sanctions regime against Cuba had 
properly moved from the Trading with the Enemy Act to the IEEPA.210 
These two decisions, in addition to the removal of the legislative veto in 
INS v. Chadha,211 afforded the Executive significant discretionary power. 
As long as the President declares a national emergency, he has the power 
to place sanctions on recalcitrant actors and request that OFAC issue 
regulations. These decisions suffer little scrutiny from the courts.212 
b. Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
The second stream of authorities stems from the 1995 Oklahoma 
City bombing. Although U.S. nationals planned and carried out the at-
tack, many of the counterterrorist provisions Congress subsequently 
                                                                                                                      
 206. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (Jan. 23, 1995), reprinted as amended 
in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2003). 
 207. Exec. Order No. 13,099, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 (Aug. 20, 1998). 
 208. Rudolph Lehrer, Unbalancing the Terrorists’ Checkbook: Analysis of U.S. Policy in 
its Economic War on International Terrorism, 10 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 333, 345 (2002). 
 209. Dames & Moore v. Regan, Sec’y of the Treas., et al., 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981). 
 210. Regan, Sec’y of the Treas., et al. v. Wald, et al., 468 U.S. 222, 232 (1984). 
 211. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 212. Lehrer, supra note 208, at 341–44; see also Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon 
S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Milena Ship Mgmt Co. v. Newcomb, 995 F.2d 
620, 625 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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incorporated into AEDPA dealt with foreign threats. Two sections related 
to anti-terrorist finance. 
Section 321 made it a criminal offense for U.S. persons, except as 
approved by Treasury in consultation with the State Department, to en-
gage in financial transactions with the governments of states designated 
under the 1979 Export Administration Act as international state sponsors 
of terrorism. Criminal penalties applied. Until recently, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria found themselves on the list. 
(Prior to September 11, Afghanistan was on a special “not cooperating 
fully” list.) The beginning of the U.S. occupation of Iraq coincided with 
that state’s removal from the list. 
Section 302(a), which provided a legislative supplement to Execu-
tive Order 12,947, created another set of powers particularly relevant to 
the current discussion.213 This measure made it a crime to provide “mate-
rial support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” U.S. law 
defined “material support” rather broadly to include currency or finan-
cial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or 
assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communi-
cations equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 
personnel, transportation, or any other physical assets, except medicine 
or religious materials.214 A federal court later determined that material 
support also included food and shelter.215 In order for a group to qualify, 
it must be foreign, engage in terrorism or terrorist activity, and threaten 
national security or the safety of U.S. nationals. Terrorism is understood 
as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”216 
“Terrorist activity” does not get off so lightly, with an incredibly lengthy 
definition that hinges on using a range of illegal, violent, criminal acts as a 
way to compel others to act or abstain from acting.217 Criminal penalties 
                                                                                                                      
 213. Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 302(a), codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B. 
 214. 18 U.S.C § 2339A(b). The court later held that the terms “personnel” and “training” 
in the definition of material support were impermissibly overbroad and thus void for vague-
ness under the First and Fifth Amendments; but these could be severed from the statute. 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 1998). See also Hu-
manitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904 
(2001) (upholding the district court decision); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003) (again affirming the lower court’s ruling on this point). 
 215. Charangeet Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 216. 22 U.S.C. § 2656(f)(d)(2). 
 217. 18 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). For discussion of the procedure followed, see State 
Department Office of Counterterrorism, Fact Sheet on Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Aug. 
9, 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm. 
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for violations apply.218 In October 1997, Secretary of State Madeline Al-
bright issued a list of 30 entities. Two years later, State reissued the list, 
reducing it to 27. It was not until late October 1999 that al Qaeda joined 
the other designated groups.219 
By May 2000, it was clear that, according to the courts, these ex-
traordinary powers lay firmly within the Executive domain. For non-U.S. 
persons, the judiciary could only speak to an extremely narrow set of 
issues: whether the entities listed were “foreign” and “engaged in terror-
ist activities.” In regard to the former, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit explained, “[A] foreign entity without property or pres-
ence in this country has no constitutional rights, under the due process 
clause or otherwise.”220 As to the latter, as long as it appeared that the 
Secretary of State came to her conclusions based on some sort of infor-
mation, the court had no power to review the actual decision. 
The Fourth Circuit seemed concerned that its decision not be taken 
as an endorsement of the Executive’s findings: “In so deciding we are 
not . . . allowing the reputation of the Judicial Branch to be ‘borrowed by 
the political Branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial 
action.’ We reach no judgment whatsoever regarding whether the mate-
rial before the Secretary is or is not true.”221 The court appeared 
uncomfortable with AEDPA’s procedures and the manner in which the 
Executive implemented them: “As we wrote earlier, the record consists 
entirely of hearsay, none of it was ever subjected to adversary testing, 
and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the organizations 
affected.”222 Nevertheless, “As we see it, our only function is to decide if 
the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information before her 
to come to the conclusion that the organizations were foreign and en-
                                                                                                                      
 218. State Department Releases Facts on Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 79 Inter-
preter Releases 1240 (2002). 
 219. In 2000 the State Department added the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; then in 
2001 Secretary of State Powell added the Real IRA and the United Self-Defense Forces of 
Columbia. On October 8, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell redesignated 25 of the 28 
foreign terrorist organizations whose designations were set to expire. State Department Redes-
ignates 25 Groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 78 Interpreter Releases 1603 
(2001); Powell combined Kahane Chai and Kach into one group. The two groups removed, 
the Japanese Red Army and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Peru), were dropped 
because they had not committed any “significant” acts of terrorism since the last designation. 
Over the next eight months Powell added five new organizations: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 
Asbat al-Ansar, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and Salafist Group for Call and Com-
bat. 
 220. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17 (4th 
Cir. 1999). The court looked to United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) 
for precedent. It found that INA § 219 did not deprive the organization of due process (thus 
distinguishing the case from Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath). 
 221. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 182 F.3d at 25. 
 222. Id. 
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gaged in terrorism.”223 Thus, while the Secretary of State might be 
wrong, it did not lay within the court’s purview to exonerate foreign or-
ganizations. The question as to whether U.S. persons could fall within 
the statute’s remit, for the moment, remained open. But not for long. 
In a rare exception to judicial deference on these matters, in June 
2001 National Council of Resistance v. State suggested that the truncated 
procedures adopted in AEDPA did deny U.S. persons due process.224 Un-
der the existing procedures, organizations could be designated on the 
basis of classified information immune to challenge, with an extremely 
limited scope of subsequent judicial review.225 The court, however, again 
left open a significant question: What procedures, at what point, would 
satisfy due process? Only broad guidelines, involving notice and an op-
portunity for meaningful review followed. The court hedged even these 
guidelines, though, with language recognizing “the privilege and pre-
rogative of the executive” and the desire of the court “not . . . to compel 
a breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect.” This 
case came down three months before September 11. The Supreme Court 
has yet to determine exactly which procedural devices the Executive 
must grant to designated groups or individuals to protect their interests 
and at what point such devices must be given.226 Courts have repeatedly, 
however, upheld the narrow interpretation of the judicial role.227 
The courts also view political advocacy for foreign regimes as out-
side the remit of the First Amendment.228 Similarly, it is not up to the 
judiciary to consider whether the humanitarian efforts of designated or-
ganizations stand separate from their violent activities.229 Nevertheless, 
for “material support or resources” to designated foreign entities to be a 
crime, the Executive must supply proof that individuals charged with 
violating AEDPA know about either the organization’s designation or the 
unlawful activities that led to its inclusion on the list:230  
                                                                                                                      
 223. Emphasis added and internal citations omitted. 
 224. National Council of Resistance of Iran v. State 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 225. Id. at 208–09 (Sentelle, J.). 
 226. But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (explaining that it may be neces-
sary to postpone notice or a hearing “to meet the needs of a national war effort”). See also 
United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the statutory 
scheme for FTO designation derived supporters their right to due process and any meaningful 
opportunity to be heard); Due Process: Constitutional Violation in Terrorism Designation 
Process, 16 Crim. Prac. Rep. 13, July 24, 2002. 
 227. See, e.g., United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 
2004); 65 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 338. 
 228. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 
U.S. 904 (2001). 
 229. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 230. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
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[G]uilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a 
status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the re-
lationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal 
activity . . . that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to 
satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack 
under the Due Process Clause.231  
Because Congress included the word “knowingly” in the statute, the 
court had to read the law to include a mens rea requirement; conduct 
regulated by statute did not fall into the “public welfare” category of 
conduct excepted from a scienter requirement:  
Thus, to sustain a conviction under § 2339B, the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the donor had 
knowledge that the organization was designated by the Secretary 
as a foreign terrorist organization or that the donor had knowl-
edge of the organization’s unlawful activities that caused it to be 
so designated.232 
c. Money Laundering 
The third stream of legislative authority stemmed from efforts to 
prevent money laundering, particularly as it related to drugs. These pro-
visions tended to focus on creating a paper trail to help the state detect 
and investigate violations of the tax and criminal law. Together with the 
1998 Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act, which re-
quired Treasury to work with state and local officials to write a national 
money laundering strategy, three pieces of legislation—the Bank Se-
crecy Act, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, and the Housing and Community 
Development Act—created the due diligence standard to which banks 
were held prior to September 11.233 
The first of these measures, the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act and Regula-
tions, emphasized money laundering and the use of secret foreign 
accounts.234 The legislation required financial institutions (defined by 
Treasury) to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) for questionable 
transactions. The rationale ran thus: private industry stood in a better 
                                                                                                                      
 231. Id. at 224–25. 
 232. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
 233. Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105–310, 
112 Stat. 2941. 
 234. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as 
amended in parts of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.). See also Cal. Bankers 
Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 47–49, 61 (1974) (upholding record-keeping as a way to detect 
criminal activity); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (focusing on the justifications 
for the record-keeping requirements). 
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position than the state to detect illicit movement of money. And having a 
nongovernment entity file the reports protected customer privacy. The 
statute required that the financial entity “know” its customers—i.e., the 
beneficial owner of the account, the source of the funds, and whether the 
transaction reflected the customer profile. The bank, in turn, could more 
effectively limit its exposure to risk. Criminal penalties, civil fines, and 
administrative sanctions could accompany the failure to file SARs within 
30 days or to have an appropriate system in place. The SAR scheme 
made it more difficult for money launderers, drug dealers, and fraudsters 
to use the U.S. banking system.235 
Constitutional challenges to the statute on grounds of privacy and a 
Fourth Amendment property interest in bank records failed.236 Legislators 
responded with the 1978 Right to Financial Privacy Act, which limited 
the state’s ability to request and obtain financial records.237 It required 
investigators, for the most part, to make requests in writing and com-
pelled banks to provide notice to customers when the state requested 
their records. The regulatory scheme in the Bank Secrecy Act can never-
theless be viewed as a way around these procedures or, for that matter, 
grand jury subpoena. 
In 1986 the second important piece of legislation, the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act, included in its auspices a set of provisions aimed at further 
emasculating money laundering schemes.238 Three new criminal offenses 
made it illegal to knowingly assist in laundering, to handle transactions 
of more than $10,000 derived from criminal proceeds, or to structure 
transactions to dodge statutory reporting requirements. The statute upped 
the ante on the criminal and civil penalties, including the forfeiture of 
“any property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted 
transaction” that violated the reporting rules.239 The legislation also gave 
Treasury the authority to require financial organizations to file geo-
graphically-focused reports on suspect regions. 
The third significant measure emerged in 1992: Title XV of the 
Housing and Community Development Act gave regulators the ability to 
close accounts and seize the assets of financial institutions that violated 
                                                                                                                      
 235. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 54–56. 
 236. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 237. Financial Institutions and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 
Stat. 3641, 3697–3710 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422); See also 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9306. 
 238. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 
(1986)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957); see also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified as amended in different parts of 
the United States Code). 
 239. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c) (2003). 
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money laundering statutes.240 This legislation essentially expanded the 
application of SARs to an even broader range of financial institutions.241 
Outside of general guidelines, though, the legislation left the determina-
tion of what amounted to suspicious activity to the banks. The financial 
industry vigorously opposed the bill. Nevertheless, the final statute re-
quired institutions to maintain records of wire transfers so that the state 
could produce such information later as evidence in court. As a com-
promise, Congress made the rules on the format and content of such 
records rather vague, leaving their exact structure up to the individual 
institutions. Subsequent regulations from Treasury and the Federal Re-
serve proved equally broad. The statute also introduced an interesting 
administrative penalty, forbidding anyone convicted of money launder-
ing from engaging in business with a federally-insured entity without 
explicit authorization from the state.242 
The concessions made sense in light of the goal of the legislation: to 
create a tighter relationship between the state and private industry. A 
statutorily-required advisory board to oversee the Bank Secrecy Act 
similarly reflected this aim, drawing as it did from Treasury, Justice, the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, and financial institutions.  
These shifts proved to be an iron fist in a velvet glove: the statute 
gave Treasury the ability to interfere in the running of financial institu-
tions, requiring them to institute anti-money laundering programs, 
designate compliance officers, train employees on a regular basis, and 
assent to an independent audit. The legislation created an indemnity 
from any civil suits, thus meeting a long-standing concern of the Ameri-
can Bankers’ Association, which was uncomfortable about the legal 
implications of such inroads into personal privacy. The legislation also 
made it illegal for employees to discuss any grand jury subpoenas with 
customers; again, criminal penalties, civil fines, and administrative pen-
alties applied. Prior to September 11, the general trend in the use of 
these powers was toward giving prosecutors more discretion in using 
them. Courts, in turn, tended increasingly to decide ambiguities in favor 
                                                                                                                      
 240. Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 
3672 (1992). Title XV is also known as the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
 241. Since 1985, regulatory authorities had required SARs for the Federal Reserve 
Board and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Annual 
Money Laundering Strategy 85 n. 21 (2000).  
 242. Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorism 
Financial Enforcement Regimes After Sept. 11, 2001, 22 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 123 (2003). 
See also Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of the Counter-terrorism and Anti-Money Laundering 
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of prosecutors.243 Unlike the pre-September 11 terrorist measures, money 
laundering statutes required only that the money be traceable to a speci-
fied unlawful activity—not that the defendant be tied to the commission 
of the act. 
Even though these measures had teeth, and were steadily becoming 
more extreme, when held against the dramatic changes post-September 
11, they appear almost mild. The financial industry had managed to fend 
off stronger attempts by the state to involve itself in the financial world. 
In 1994, for instance, Congress directed Treasury to begin regulating 
“money services businesses” (e.g., check cashers, wire money transfers, 
money orders, and traveler’s checks). Three years later the Department 
drafted regulations, but the rules did not issue until 1999, with imple-
mentation set for December 31, 2001. The Bush Administration planned 
to follow in the Clinton Administration’s footsteps, delaying implemen-
tation once more until late 2002 to give the government the opportunity 
to “educate” these businesses about their obligations.244 Where Treasury 
attempted to imbed itself further into the already regulated financial in-
dustry, it came up short: In 1998 Treasury proposed stronger “know your 
customer” requirements, which would have required banks to obtain ex-
tensive, private information, such as where money came from and to 
whom it was going. More than 200,000 negative responses bombarded 
the Department, stretching from left to right on the political spectrum.245 
Congress began openly contemplating rolling back the current controls, 
and so Treasury abandoned ship.246 Efforts to get the Money Laundering 
Control Act of 2000 through Congress also failed. This statute would 
have given the Treasury Department control of foreign banks with ac-
counts in the United States. 
These measures, then, provided a general framework for regulatory 
and investigative powers prior to the attacks. Before moving to those 
introduced post-September 11, it is worth a brief detour into al Qaeda 
funding to help evaluate the effectiveness of the U.S. response. 
2. Al Qaeda Funding 
It is hard to get a grasp on al Qaeda’s funding. For one, the name re-
fers to a network—loosely-affiliated groups that more closely resemble a 
                                                                                                                      
 243. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against 
Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, J. Crim. L. & Criminology 311, 
351 (2003). 
 244. Stephen Fidler & Haig Simonian, IMF Chief Urges United Response to Slowdown, 
Fin. Times (London), Oct. 6, 2001, at 4. 
 245. Staff Report, supra note 1. 
 246. See Know Your Customer, 64 Fed. Reg. 14845 (withdrawn Mar. 29, 1999); Robert 
O’Harrow, Jr., Disputed Bank Plan Dropped, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1999, at E1. 
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movement than an organized entity. For another, attention to al Qaeda’s 
funding—even bin Laden’s direct operations—came rather late in the 
game: it was not until 1998, following the East Africa bombings and the 
listing of al Qaeda as a terrorist organization, that the White House asked 
the National Security Council and the CIA’s Illicit Transactions Group to 
find out how the network operated.247 As mentioned above, up until that 
point, the CIA and others mistakenly assumed that most of the money 
came from bin Laden’s pocket.248 Successive administrations, moreover, 
turned a blind eye to the Saudi role in funding jihadist organizations 
generally and al Qaeda in particular. While the Africa bombing trials in 
early 2001 generated more information about al Qaeda’s funding 
streams,249 it was not until September 11 that the U.S. Administration 
became resolute about finding the money. Yet, even months later, Ken-
neth Dam, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, admitted that the United 
States lacked a complete picture of how al Qaeda managed its fi-
nances.
250
 
Various characteristics of al Qaeda itself make understanding the 
network’s financial structure, even with significant resources, particu-
larly difficult: prior to September 11, some al Qaeda funding 
operations—particularly those close to bin Laden—appear to have been 
organized. A finance committee seems to have reported to bin Laden 
himself. But the extent of financing even then appears for the most part 
to have been limited to actual operational expenses.251 Outside of this 
limited assistance, entities associated with the network financed them-
selves, creating multiple and diverse forms of funding as well as 
methods of moving currency worldwide. As this Article later discusses, 
measures implemented following September 11 reinforced the decentral-
ized nature of the network, making it even more difficult to follow the 
money trail. Resultantly, the numbers ascribed to al Qaeda’s operational 
expenses vary widely. For instance, in 2002, the United Nations floated a 
                                                                                                                      
 247. See Robert Clow, Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Adrian Michaels & Richard Wolffe, 
Team Set Up to Block Terrorist Funds; Asset Breakers New Group of Intelligence Agents and 
Law Enforcement Officials to be Headed by U.S. Treasury, Fin. Times (London), Sept. 17, 
2001, at 6.  
 248. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 20, 34. For the previous assumption, see, e.g., Fi-
nancial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Guidance for Financial 
Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing 4 (Apr. 24, 2002); Financial Action 
Task Force on Money Laundering, Report on Money Laundering Typologies, 2001–
2002 2 (Feb. 1, 2002).  
 249. Id. 
 250. Mark Huband, Gwen Robinson & John Willman. US Urges Allies to Step up Efforts 
to Track Down Terrorist Cell Assets, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 28, 2001, at 1. But see Mi-
chael Mann & Richard Wolffe, US Accuses Africa Banks of Failing to Assist Search, Fin. 
Times (London), Oct. 3, 2001, at 4. 
 251. Staff Report, supra note 1. 
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ballpark figure of between $16 million and $50 million, but it could pro-
vide little information to back up the numbers or increase their 
specificity.252 In 2003, the September 11 Commission put the estimated 
annual al Qaeda budget at some $30 million per year.  
Putting these considerations aside for the moment, what has become 
increasingly evident since 1998 is that, as William Wechsler, director of 
the task force examining bin Laden’s finances, put it, the network is “a 
constant fundraising machine.”253 Like the paramilitary organizations in 
Northern Ireland, money comes from donations and legitimate business 
enterprises, as well as illicit activities that reach across national bounda-
ries. This section briefly considers the source of funds to al Qaeda and 
the manner in which they are transferred.  
a. Money Flows to al Qaeda 
Government expenditures and independent donations from Saudi 
Arabia appear to play a critical role in al Qaeda’s funding and develop-
ment. The Staff Report to the September 11 Commission suggested that, 
“Over the past 25 years, the desert kingdom has been the greatest force 
in spreading Islamic fundamentalism, while its huge, unregulated chari-
ties funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to jihad groups and al 
Qaeda cells around the world.”254 After five months of analyzing docu-
ments and interviewing government officials, U.S. News and World 
Report came to a similar conclusion. The magazine found that Saudi 
money flowed to 20 different states, where training camps, weapons pur-
chases, and recruiting activities occurred.255 In 2002, the United Nations 
Security Council reported that jihadists had secured $300–$500 million 
over the previous decade, the bulk derived from Saudi donors and chari-
ties.256 
As noted in the September 11 Commission Staff Report and else-
where, Saudi money has not just gone to militants. Between 1975 and 
2002, Saudi Arabia spent more than $70 billion on foreign aid—more 
                                                                                                                      
 252. Renesselaer Lee, Congressional Research Service, Terrorist Financing: 
The US and International Response 12, 27 (Dec. 6, 2002), available at http:// 
www.boozman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/WOT%20%20Terrorist%20Financing%20The%20U.S.%
20and%20International%20Response.pdf (citing Second Report of Monitoring Group). 
 253. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 6. See also Council on Foreign Relations, 
Terrorist Financing 5 (2002) [hereinafter Terrorist Financing]. 
 254. Staff Report, supra note 1. The Staff Report to the September 11 Commission 
found that no foreign government directly funded al Qaeda, but it went into detail on many of 
the Saudi links highlighted above and classified the sections of the final report that deal di-
rectly with Saudi Arabia. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 4, 22–24. 
 255. David E. Kaplan, Monica Ekman & Aamir Latif, The Saudi Connection: How Bil-
lions in Oil Money Spawned a Global Terror Network, U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 
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 256. Id. 
DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
362 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 27:303 
 
than two thirds of which went to spreading the (fundamentalist) Wahhabi 
sect worldwide.257 Alex Alexiev, a former CIA consultant on religious 
conflict, referred to the program as “the largest worldwide propaganda 
campaign ever mounted.”258 In 2002, Ain al-Yageen, a weekly Saudi pa-
per, claimed that the money helped to build approximately 1,500 
mosques, 210 Islamic centers, 202 colleges, and 2,000 schools outside of 
Islamic states.259 
Charitable organizations run and funded by Saudis further round out 
the picture. Many of these provide important resources to hospitals, or-
phanages, and disadvantaged communities. But some also funnel money 
to violent struggles. A 1996 CIA report found that of the 50 Islamic 
charities engaged in global assistance, approximately one-third had links 
to terrorist organizations. The grand mufti of Saudi Arabia has overseen 
some of the largest Islamic charities, such as the Muslim World League 
(with 30 branches worldwide) and International Islamic Relief Organiza-
tion (with offices in more than 90 different states).260 U.S. News and 
World Report tied these organizations directly to terrorist movements.261 
The New York Council on Foreign Relations put the point strongly: “[I]t 
is worth stating clearly and unambiguously what official U.S. govern-
ment spokespersons have not: For years, individuals and charities based 
in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for al 
Qaeda; and for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this prob-
lem.”262  
With some $600 billion in Saudi money in U.S. banks and the stock 
market, and substantial benefits distributed around Washington, D.C., 
successive administrations have indeed avoided looking too closely into 
the Saudi role.263 The Carlyle Group, for instance, advised by former 
President George H.W. Bush, former Secretary of State James Baker, 
and former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, has made millions from 
its Saudi links.264 The CIA instructed its station chief in Riyadh not to 
focus on Islamic extremists—even after East Africa—because of politi-
cal sensitivities.265 
The 1998 NSC report provided a breakthrough of sorts—but the 
Clinton Administration made only meager attempts to follow the money. 
Vice President Al Gore met with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in Wash-
                                                                                                                      
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
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 262. Terrorist Financing, supra note 253, at 8. 
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ington D.C. and set up a visit for U.S. counterterrorist specialists to meet 
with Saudi officials in Riyadh.266 The NSC’s William Wechsler and 
Treasury’s Richard Newcomb subsequently traveled to Saudi Arabia and 
met with top security and banking officials.267 But Saudi Arabia had 
sharp divisions between law enforcement and the banking industry and 
minimal regulation of its financial sector. On the U.S. side, the State De-
partment, concerned about the impact of ending the organizations’ 
legitimate charitable efforts, argued against freezing their assets.268 As 
George W. Bush took office, the NSC lobbied the new administration for 
a terrorist asset tracking center. The Treasury Secretary, Paul O’Neill, 
tried to prevent it.269 
Saudi Arabia, however, did not provide the only source of funding 
that strengthened what became al Qaeda.270 Money flowed from the Per-
sian Gulf, Egypt, South Asia, Africa—and the United States. Direct 
governmental support for jihadists, as well as individual charitable dona-
tions, had an impact. During the Cold War, for instance, the United 
States and Saudi Arabia put a $3.5 billion package together to back the 
mujahideen in Afghanistan.271 When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1992, 
one of these mujahideen, Osama bin Laden, traveled to Sudan. There, he 
established a corporate shell, Wadi al-Aqiq, parent to a number of sub-
sidiary firms.272 Jamal Ahmed al-Fadle, the Chief Financial Officer of 
Wadi al-Aqiq, reports that the parent company’s bank accounts stretched 
from Sudan to Hong Kong and Malaysia, with several accounts in Lon-
don at Barclays Bank.273  
Bin Laden’s personal business, however, proved to be far less impor-
tant to the provision of money to al Qaeda than did charitable 
organizations located in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. In drawing from 
these sources, al Qaeda benefited from one of the five pillars of Islam: 
zakat, or charitable giving. The religious doctrine requires that adherents 
give at least 2.5 percent of their income to charity and humanitarian 
causes and that they do it anonymously.274 As a legal matter, the net effect 
of this, where charities were indeed focused on humanitarian assistance 
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Block Terrorist Funds, Fin. Times (London), Sept. 17, 2001, at 6. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 21. 
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with money skimmed at the end of the cycle, was that those donating 
lacked the intent to support violent causes and thus a certain amount of 
culpability. Simultaneously, the anonymity requirement made it difficult 
to trace the origins of the donations. These charitable organizations also 
yielded cyclical funding sources: they became particularly active once a 
year, during Ramadan, although the sporadic nature of the influx of 
funds does not seem to have influenced the terrorist cycle.275  
Setting aside for a moment formal state support for jihadist groups 
and Wahhabist ideology and the role played by charitable organizations, 
in examining the funding for September 11, the September 11 Commis-
sion found “no persuasive evidence” that the drug trade provided an 
important source of revenue for al Qaeda; nor did it determine that the 
network had substantial involvement with conflict diamonds. These con-
clusions, however, appear suspect and, in any event, do not necessarily 
hold for the post-September 11 environment.276 Indeed, Islamist groups 
appear to be increasingly interested in this realm. For example, from 
April to September 2001, Syed Mustajab Shah, Muhammad Abid Afridi, 
and Ilyas Ali negotiated with undercover law enforcement for six hun-
dred kilos of heroin and five metric tons of hashish, as well as four 
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to sell to al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In Sep-
tember they were arrested in Hong Kong, and by March they had been 
extradited to the United States, charged with conspiracy to import and 
distribute drugs and provide material support to al Qaeda.277 
Reported links between al Qaeda and Sierra Leonean diamond 
smuggling also repeatedly surface.278 Frank Wolf, the chair of the House 
Commerce-Justice-State and Judiciary Appropriations Committee ex-
pressed surprise that the September 11 Commission would be skeptical 
of such a link, saying that he had seen “pretty definite” evidence that it 
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DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
Winter 2006] Anti-Terrorist Finance 365 
 
exists.279 To head off increasing public criticism that the diamond trade 
provided a rich source of income to terrorist organizations, the World 
Diamond Council adopted a system of warranties.280 
In sum, with multiple and diverse sources of funding, it has been dif-
ficult to gain a handle on all of al Qaeda’s revenue streams. Money from 
legitimate business mingles with illegitimate funds. The network also 
appears to move resources quickly and through various unregulated 
means.
281
 Alternative remittance systems (ARS), also known as informal 
value transfer systems, provide one substitute for the increasingly regu-
lated Western banking system. 
b. Alternative Remittance Systems and the Transfer of Funds 
It appears that regulations introduced in the Western banking sector 
since the attacks have increased the importance of ARS in the transfer of 
Islamist funds. Although no broad agreement exists on a definition of 
ARS, common elements mark them: most systems developed along eth-
nic and historical lines, providing a way of moving money well before 
the West adopted a formal banking structure. Although it is nearly im-
possible to nail down the total value transferred through such systems, 
the IMF and World Bank estimate the number in the tens of billions of 
dollars.282 The defining feature appears to be the ability to move value 
without moving currency, primarily through netting or book transfers.283 
Perhaps because of higher rates of immigration, such systems are now 
fairly widespread, providing, for many ethnic groups, their primary fi-
nancial service. They are reliable and efficient and available 24 hours a 
day, seven days a week. With minimal paperwork, they offer anonymity, 
and they cost less than formal banking.  
In the United Kingdom, for instance, where Western Union would 
charge £10 to send just £50 to Bangladesh, hawaladars charge only 
£0.50.284 They also offer a way for customers to circumvent limits in cur-
rency exchange regulations.285 Such remittances, moreover, are becoming 
                                                                                                                      
 279. Id.  
 280. Mark Huband, “Conflict” Diamonds Spur Code of Practice, Fin. Times (London), 
Oct. 30, 2002, at 13. 
 281. To fund September 11, for instance, the organization used approximately a dozen 
hawaladars, as well as wire transfers, physical deposits of traveler’s checks, physical move-
ment of cash, and access to foreign funds via debit and credit cards. None of the individual 
transactions exhibited particularly unusual traits. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 13. 
 282. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Treas., A Report to Congress in Accordance 
with Section 359 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 5 (2002). 
 283. 2003 Financial Action Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 4.  
 284. Small World, Economist (U.S. Edition), Oct. 18, 2002. 
 285. 2003 Financial Action Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 4–8. 
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an increasingly important source of money for poorer regions, where 
formal banking systems have yet to be established: “Total global remit-
tances from migrants in rich countries are estimated to be at least $100 
billion (£53 billion) a year, 1 ½ times the level of all foreign aid, with 
remittances from the United Kingdom reckoned to be £2.3 billion in 
2001.”286 As of the time of writing, the extent of the alternative remit-
tance system in the U.S. remains unknown.287 The Inter-American 
Development Bank, however, puts the total in family remittances just 
from Latin American immigrants in the U.S. at approximately $30 bil-
lion for 2004. Most of these transfers involve between $150 and $250.288 
Hawala, which means “transfer” in Arabic, provides one form of 
ARS. Sometimes used as a synonym for “trust,” hawala relies upon per-
sonal connections to transfer money frequently across international 
lines.289 Hawalas originated in South Asia hundreds of years before the 
Western banking system even gained ground. They have now spread to 
Europe, the Middle East, eastern and southern Africa, North and South 
America, and other regions of Asia. Some states outlaw hawalas, but 
they continue to thrive. India, for instance, estimates that up to half of 
the Indian economy goes through the system (a number roughly equiva-
lent to the entire Canadian economy). Pakistan puts its national total at 
around $7 billion.290 While many of the exchanges represent minute 
amounts of money, others routinely run in the tens of thousands of dol-
lars. Hawaladars operate worldwide, although the greatest number of 
transactions is probably in the United Arab Emirates.291  
An important characteristic of hawaladars is that significant varia-
tion exists among them. In some cases, they keep better records than 
commercial banks, share them more readily, and carefully screen their 
customers. With others, their record-keeping, amenability to state access, 
and due diligence falls dramatically short of the more formal banking 
standard. One important consideration weighing on the following discus-
sion is whether new legal tools create the wrong motivations for 
hawaladars. If incentives to further cloak operations and keep minimal 
records exist, then the state’s ability to trace money through the system 
                                                                                                                      
 286. Alan Beattie, Informal Foreign Cash Transfers Cheaper, Says Study, Fin. Times 
(London), Apr. 1, 2005, at 5.  
 287. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Treas., supra note 282, at 5. 
 288. Ronald R. Wilson, Positive Trends in the Fight Against Money Laundering; work of 
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 169 Am. Banker 12 (2004). 
 289. Looney, supra note 2. 
 290. Estimates from Pakistani officials suggest that more than $5 billion goes into Paki-
stan alone, each year, through the hawaladars. This makes the system the largest source of 
hard currency. Interpol suggests that hawala provides approximately 40% of India’s gross 
domestic product. Roughly $680 billion passed through the state in this manner in 1998. Id.  
 291. Id. 
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becomes more difficult—an objective increasingly important as alterna-
tive remittance systems become the preferred mode of transferring 
terrorist funds.  
3. U.S. Initiatives Post-September 11 
Unlike in the United Kingdom, where September 11 accelerated a 
trend already in place, the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., 
suddenly recast the United States’ anti-terrorist finance framework. 
Three of the five central National Security Strategy documents subse-
quently issued by the Bush Administration addressed the matter.292 
Although the National Money Laundering Strategies had previously 
omitted discussion of terrorism finance altogether, from 2002 onward it 
became a central focus of the report.293 And a sudden concern about the 
funding of terrorist organizations operations swept through federal agen-
cies; gone was the malaise that previously marked the system. In the 
administrative realm, the DOJ immediately created what became the Ter-
rorist Financing Unit to coordinate a “national effort to prosecute 
terrorist financing.” The FBI, in turn, established a Financial Review 
Group to centralize the investigation into the money behind September 
11. Renamed the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) and 
housed in the FBI’s counterterrorist division, the unit included staff from 
Customs, the IRS, banking regulators, FinCEN, and OFAC. This organi-
zation represented the first single-office coordinating effort on terrorist 
finance.294 In addition to TFOS, the Bureau ramped up its joint terrorism 
task forces (JTTF): first created in 1980, the FBI doubled their number 
post-September 11 and established a national JTTF in Washington, D.C. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE), and the IRS Criminal Investigative Division 
took part in JTTF meetings, which increasingly focused on terrorist fi-
nance.  
Other organizations followed suit. The CIA formed a new section 
focused on terrorist financing. The FBI, NSA, DoD, and CIA all partici-
pated, with the aim of collecting intelligence, understanding financial 
                                                                                                                      
 292. These include the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, avail-
able at http://www.whitehoue.gov/nsc.nss; the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
(focuses on interdicting and disrupting material support for terrorists); and the National Strat-
egy for Homeland Security, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book (which 
includes eliminating terrorist financing). In the classified realm, the National Military Strate-
gic Plan for the War on Terrorism goes into detail on how the U.S. military should confront 
state sponsors of terrorism, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, and create a global 
environment hostile to terrorism. 
 293. U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Annual Money Laundering Strategy, reports for 
2001–2003, available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/money_laundering.shtml. 
 294. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 41. 
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networks, finding terrorist money, and disrupting operations. Immedi-
ately following September 11, FinCEN set up a Financial Institutions 
Hotline (1-866-556-3974), so that financial institutions voluntarily could 
report any suspicious transactions to law enforcement where terrorist 
activity might be of issue.295 Treasury also formed the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) to identify and prioritize which groups should fall 
subject to blocking orders. In March 2003, Treasury formed a new Ex-
ecutive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes 
(EOTF/FC).296 This office works with other agencies at Treasury and 
other Executive Branch agencies, as well as with the private sector and 
foreign governments, to prevent terrorists from taking advantage of the 
international financial system.  
Despite the incessant Kumbayaa refrain emanating from federal cor-
ridors, however, in some instances cooperation proved short-lived. 
Perhaps the best example of this is Operation Green Quest. U.S. Cus-
toms created the program to identify patterns in counterfeiting, credit 
card fraud, drug trafficking, cash smuggling, illicit charities, and formal 
and alternative financial institutions.297 The bureaucratic barriers—at 
least for the moment—appeared to come down, as prosecutors from Jus-
tice and investigators from IRS, Customs, the FBI, and other agencies 
came together in common cause.298 But the cowboy-like approach of the 
new entity, underscored by a series of raids in March 2002, quickly 
alienated federal agencies, civil rights organizations, and the U.S. Mus-
lim community. Green Quest’s expansionist tendencies raised further 
hackles: in January 2003, the program doubled in size, utilizing some 
300 agents and analysts nationwide. Three months later, it followed Cus-
toms into the DHS fold. DOJ, keen to reign in the maverick 
organization, objected. Michael Chertoff, chief of the Criminal Division, 
and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson pushed the White House 
to relocate Green Quest to DOJ. DHS angrily pushed back and alleged 
                                                                                                                      
 295. U.S. Dep’t of the Treas. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2002 National Money 
Laundering Strategy, 20 n.22 (2002). 
 296. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., U.S. Treasury Department Announces New 
Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (Mar. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js77.htm. 
 297. See Hearing on the Administration’s National Money Laundering Strategy for 2001 
Before the Senate Banking Committee, at 10, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Hon. Jimmy 
Gurule, Undersecretary for Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treas.); Jason Peckenpaugh, 
Building a Behemoth: The Challenge of Constructing a Homeland Security Department May 
Make the Epic Struggle to Create the Defense Department Look Easy, Government Execu-
tive, Sept. 1, 2002, at 34; Zagaris, supra note 242, at 6.  
 298. Peter Spiegel, U.S. Team Created to Target al Qaeda Finances, Fin. Times, Oct. 26, 
2001, at 5. 
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that the FBI was trying to sabotage investigations by refusing to turn 
over information.299 
Bickering between the two agencies ultimately led, in May 2003, to 
the signing of a formal memorandum of agreement between the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of DHS. In a nutshell, DOJ won, becoming 
the lead federal law enforcement agency in the national effort to inter-
rupt terrorist finance.300 DHS could only play ball according to the rules 
set by the FBI.301 
DHS, however, did not take defeat lying down. Although the Memo-
randum of Understanding required that Operation Green Quest cease as 
of June 30, 2003, and that DHS only investigate matters related to terror-
ist finance with the consent of the FBI, by July 2003 ICE had launched 
its own initiative: Operation Cornerstone.302 The basic premise was to 
find and eliminate financial system vulnerabilities that either attract 
criminals or provide a target for terrorists. DHS called it “a new financial 
crimes investigative initiative,” whose aim was to “[i]dentify vulnerabili-
ties in financial systems through which criminals launder their illicit 
proceeds, bring the criminals to justice and work to eliminate the vulner-
abilities.” DHS also announced a new initiative meant to build bridges 
with private industry: SHARE (Systematic Homeland Approach to Re-
ducing Exploitation).303 In addition to these initiatives, DHS complained 
to Congress that the memorandum hurt their ability to conduct investiga-
tions into financial crime.  
The Senate responded by directing the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to evaluate the impact of the memorandum on the Secret 
Service. GAO dodged the administrative bullet, responding that since the 
agreement only related to the FBI and ICE, questions involving the Se-
cret Service were irrelevant. As for the other claims, GAO could not 
determine that ICE’s mission or role in investigating non-terrorism-related 
                                                                                                                      
 299. Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch: Whose War on Terror? News-
week, Apr. 9, 2003. 
 300. Memorandum of Agreement and Collaborative Procedures Concerning Terrorist 
Financing Investigations, reprinted in Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues, Letter to the Hon. Thad Cochran, Chair and the Hon. Robert C. Byrd, Ranking 
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations, 
United States Senate; Subject: Investigations of Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and 
Other Financial Crimes, General Accounting Office, GAO-04-464R, Financial Crimes Investi-
gations, Feb. 20, 2004, Enclosure II, at 14–18, ¶ 2 [hereinafter Memorandum of 
Understanding]. 
 301. Id. ¶ 4. 
 302. 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, at 22. 
 303. Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Boosts 
Money Laundering Investigation Capabilities, Secretary Ridge Announces New Financial 
Investigations Initiatives, July 8, 2003, http://www.useu.be/Categories/Justice%20and%20 
Home%20Affairs/July0803USMoneyLaundering.html. 
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crimes had been harmed.304 GAO also noted, albeit with politically-
guarded administrative language, that the Memorandum of Understand-
ing had served to make things worse: “Shifting priorities and large-scale 
reorganizations in these agencies produced a certain amount of turmoil 
and anxiety, which initially was exacerbated by the Agreement, particu-
larly for ICE agents, who may have perceived the Agreement as 
minimizing their role in terrorist financing investigations.”305 The report 
continued, “Our interviews with FBI and ICE officials . . . indicated that 
long-standing jurisdictional and operational disputes regarding terrorist 
financing investigations may have strained interagency relationships to 
some degree and could pose an obstacle in fully integrating investigative 
efforts.”306 
Continued administrative infighting aside, the fact that federal agen-
cies cared enough to fight over these new initiatives illustrates the 
sudden focus placed on interrupting financial flows. The Executive, 
however, was not alone in its response. The USA PATRIOT Act and the 
wide-ranging powers contained therein allowed the federal government, 
on the one hand, access to private financial information and, on the 
other, the ability to suspend property rights without reference to the judi-
ciary. This section evaluates the USA PATRIOT Act and Executive Order 
13,224, issued under the authority of IEEPA. 
a. USA PATRIOT Act 
The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act represented an abrupt about-face by 
the Bush administration. Just two months before, Paul O’Neill an-
nounced that he would ease the United States’ regulatory regime and 
depend upon international cooperation, rather than threats of sanctions, 
for success in combating illicit money flows.307 As previously mentioned, 
when the NSC tried to set up a terrorist asset tracking center, O’Neill 
tried to kill it.308 The USA PATRIOT Act turned the administration’s pol-
icy 180 degrees. The sheer breadth of measures—and, indeed, focus of 
an entire section on the matter—emphasized the centrality of anti-
terrorist finance in the state’s counterterrorist strategy.309 Simultaneously, 
the statute collapsed the anti-money laundering and counterterrorist fi-
                                                                                                                      
 304. Senate Report 108-86 (July 2003), Title I of Senate Appropriations Committee 
report on the DHS Appropriations Bill for 2004. 
 305. Memorandum of Understanding. supra note 300, at 9. 
 306. Id. at 5. 
 307. Stephen Fidler & Haig Simonian, IMF Chief Urges United Response to Slowdown, 
Fin. Times (London), Oct. 6, 2001. 
 308. David E. Kaplan, Monica Ekman & Aamir Latif, The Saudi Connection, U.S. News 
& World Report, Dec. 15, 2003, at 18. 
 309. Title III: The International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001. 
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nancial enforcement regimes, bringing the three streams that previously 
marked the anti-terrorist finance realm crashing together.310 The length of 
the statute and the rate at which it flew through Congress meant that 
even years later, the private sector was still struggling to come to grips 
with its implications.311 The legislation made changes in four key areas: it 
broadened Executive powers under the IEEPA; it significantly expanded 
the state’s regulatory regime; it strengthened forfeiture powers and 
shifted the burden of proof; and it introduced a range of extraterritorial 
authority. The legislation also required Treasury to submit a series of 
reports, most of which contemplated the introduction of further meas-
ures.
312
 
i. Expanded Powers Under the IEEPA 
The USA PATRIOT Act made three important changes to the 
IEEPA.313 First, it amended the previous statute to allow the Executive 
Branch to submit classified evidence in camera and ex parte. Second, it 
allowed the state to block assets during the pendency of an investiga-
tion—which in practical terms meant indefinitely. This gave the state an 
important bargaining tool to use against the accused during the investiga-
tion. The statute included neither humanitarian exceptions nor provision 
to set funds aside for legal defense. Third, it authorized the President, 
“when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been at-
tacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals,” to “confiscate any 
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign 
person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has 
planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks 
against the United States.”314 It thus neither required any link between the 
assets and any particular act of violence nor any proportionality between 
the amount of property seized and the crime. The language also had the 
effect of removing the judiciary from the proceedings altogether,  
                                                                                                                      
 310. Zagaris, supra note 242. 
 311. Bruce Zagaris, The Money Laundering Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001, 323 PLI/Est 417 (2003). 
 312. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 215, codified in 50 
U.S.C. 1861 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]; Id. § 314 (semi-annual report on suspicious 
activity); Id. § 324 (general report on Title III); Id. § 326(b) (ways to improve the ability of 
financial institutions to identify foreign nationals); Id. § 356(c) (joint Treasury, Federal Re-
serve, and SEC report on how to apply bank secrecy act requirements to investment 
companies); Id. § 357 (role of IRS in administration of Bank Secrecy Act); Id. § 359 (addi-
tional measures for alternative remittance systems); Id. § 361 (how to improve compliance 
with the regulatory requirements in the USA PATRIOT Act); Id. § 366 (exemptions to cur-
rency transaction reports). 
 313. Id. § 106. 
 314. Id.  
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concentrating power in the Executive. Part III.C.2 of this Article goes 
into detail on the use of IEEPA writ large post-September 11. 
ii. Beefed-up Regulatory Regime 
Perhaps the most significant—and certainly the most extensive—
shift came in the increased regulatory powers imposed by the state. The 
USA PATRIOT Act required banks, savings associations, credit unions, 
securities broker-dealers, mutual funds, futures commission merchants, 
and introducing brokers to enhance their customer identification meas-
ures.
315
 They became required to use the full and accurate name of each 
customer and to record their date of birth, social security number, and 
passport number.316 Such lists had to be maintained for five years. Their 
existence made it easier to link up different accounts and transactions at 
different entities. These requirements fell just short of the “know your 
customer” proposal defeated two and a half years before. All financial 
institutions in the United States (the above, plus casinos, money services 
businesses, mutual funds, and operators of credit card systems), as well 
as a slew of businesses (insurance companies, unregistered investment 
companies, investment advisers, commodity trading advisors, dealers in 
precious metals, stones, or jewels, travel agents, vehicle sellers, and all 
those involved in real estate closings and settlements) became required 
to institute anti-money laundering programs.317  
The statute expanded the number of entities required to file SARs.318 
Where before the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 required banks and credit 
unions to report $10,000 or more in cash transfers, now “any person who 
is engaged in a trade or business” that received more than $10,000 in 
cash must file an SAR. Here, it is worth noting that $10,000 in the 1970s 
is the equivalent of $2,625 today—which means that, together with the 
documentation that accompanies credit card purchases, a significant por-
tion of consumers’ buying habits and purchases can now be traced by the 
government.319 
                                                                                                                      
 315. Id. § 318 (expanding the definition of financial institution to include those operating 
outside the United States).  
 316. Id. § 326. On May 9, 2003, Treasury issued the final regulations governing this 
section. See 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, appendix G, at 
50. 
 317. USA PATRIOT Act supra note 312, § 352. 
 318. Id. § 356(a)-(b) directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with SEC and 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, to require securities broker-dealers, futures commission 
merchants, commodity trading advisors, and commodity pool operators to file SARs. The 
proposed rule for securities broker-dealers was issued on December 31, 2001, and the final 
rule was issued on July 1, 2002; for others, the proposed rule was issued on May 5, 2003. 
2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, appendix G, at 51. 
 319. Jay Stanley, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex: How the American Government 
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The statute required non-financial trades or businesses to file cur-
rency transaction reports with FinCEN.320 And all unlicensed money-
transmitting businesses were brought into the regulatory tent.321 The leg-
islation further required that all financial institutions conduct due 
diligence for transactions that bore a resemblance to money laundering 
schemes.322 All financial institutions that establish, maintain, administer, 
or manage any private banking account, or correspondent account, for 
any non-U.S. person had to apply due diligence procedures to detect and 
report money laundering activity.323 
Concerned that offshore banking, subject to minimal supervision, 
provided potential terrorists and criminals with too much anonymity 
(making it difficult to trace the proceeds of crime), Congress amended 
the Bank Secrecy Act and gave the Secretary of the Treasury discretion-
ary authority to place restrictions on foreign jurisdictions, institutions, or 
types of account if they posed a “primary money laundering concern” to 
the United States.324 (No terrorist link need be found.) Treasury could 
require financial institutions to maintain additional records for certain 
transactions, to identify foreign beneficial owners of accounts located at 
U.S. financial institutions, and to identify customers using foreign ac-
counts at banks within the United States. (Treasury has only used these 
powers twice since September 11: both in support of the U.S. FATF 
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories process for Ukraine and 
Nauru—neither tied directly to terrorism.325) The statute essentially for-
bade correspondent accounts—defined broadly to include most 
relationships a U.S. financial entity can have with a foreign financial 
institution—with shell banks (unregulated entities with no physical pres-
ence in any jurisdiction), where such banks were not recognized or 
regulated by depository institutions.326 
                                                                                                                      
can Civil Liberties Union, Aug. 2004, at 17. Although not specifically required by the 
legislation, subsequent rules issued by Treasury required, amongst other entities, that casinos 
file SARs. See also Zagaris, supra note 311, at 448. 
 320. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, § 365. Interim final rule issued Dec. 31, 2001; 
2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, appendix G, at 52. 
 321. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, § 373. 
 322. Id. § 314(b). 
 323. Id. § 312; 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, appen-
dix G, at 49. The statute defined due diligence to include internal, written anti-laundering 
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at 50. 
 324. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, § 311. 
 325. 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, at 13.  
 326. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, § 313. The United States issued interim guid-
ance almost immediately following passage of the USA PATRIOT Act on Nov. 27, 2001, 
proposed a rule on Dec. 27, 2001, and issued a final rule on Sept. 18, 2002. 2003 National 
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Such regulations served a dual purpose: not only were they meant to 
alert Treasury to possible criminal activity, but they provided law en-
forcement with a paper trail for use in investigations. To assist in this 
second aim, Title III further allowed Treasury to specify any region, en-
tity, person, or account; financial institutions could then be required to 
search their records to determine if they contained any information rele-
vant to the target.327 The legislation demanded that entities report any 
positive matches within two weeks or, in an emergency, within two days. 
Law enforcement could then file a subpoena to obtain the information. 
Criminal and civil penalties for failure to disclose information applied. 
This power, used extensively after passage of the statute, quickly be-
came known in some circles as a “Google search.”328 The statute set no 
bounds on who could make such requests, allowing everyone from law 
enforcement to the Postal Service to file to obtain information where any 
offense related to money laundering lay at stake. Some 200 different 
crimes qualified. This power immediately created a problem for banks, 
which were inundated with requests—often several each day, addressed 
to the wrong people, and vaguely worded. The American Bankers Asso-
ciation complained and said Treasury should narrow the scope of the 
requests, create standardized forms, and specify the time period within 
which it needs the information to distinguish between urgent and non-
urgent requests.  
On November 19, 2002, only 15 days into the operation of this 
power, FinCEN announced a moratorium on requests directly to finan-
cial institutions.329 FinCEN inserted itself into the process, requiring a 
form from law enforcement requesting customer account information 
and asserting that it relates to money laundering or terrorist investiga-
tions. FinCEN then would go to banks to obtain the information. (This 
meant, in effect, that FinCEN had become an information broker.330) By 
2003, FinCEN had supported more than 2,600 terrorism investigations 
and received more than 2,600 SARs on possible terrorist financing.331 In 
                                                                                                                      
Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, appendix G, at 49. Soon after passage of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, Treasury listed al-Taqwa, “fear of god” in Arabic, to demonstrate that 
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 327. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, § 314. 
 328. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 60. Treasury issued regulations under this section 
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 329. Zagaris, supra note 311. 
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2003, FinCEN forwarded such searches on 962 suspects, two-thirds of 
whom appeared to have no relation to terrorism.332  
iii. Expansion of Asset Forfeiture Provisions 
In addition to new powers under the IEEPA and the introduction of a 
more extensive regulatory system, Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act 
expanded the list of predicate offenses for the freezing and forfeiture of 
property. New “specified unlawful activities” for criminal money laun-
dering provisions included foreign criminal offenses, foreign public 
corruption, extraditable offenses, some export control offenses, computer 
offenses, customs and firearm offenses, and felony violations of the For-
eign Agents Registration Act of 1938.333 Foreign predicate offenses 
occurring inside the United States fell under the new rubric.334 The aim 
of adding these offenses was to prevent corrupt foreign officials from 
taking advantage of the U.S. banking system.335 The statute also included 
illegal money remission business336 and bulk cash smuggling greater than 
$10,000 across domestic bounds.337 Penalties included forfeiture of the 
amount smuggled, plus up to five years’ imprisonment. Where the 
money may not be available, the state can essentially bill the individual 
for the total—this is known as “value” forfeiture. Civil forfeiture penal-
ties also applied. This provision responded to press reports highlighting 
the physical movement of cash by suspected members of al Qaeda.338 
Charges of racketeering in response to suspected terrorist activity also 
became eligible for an application of civil penalties.339 
The statute did provide an opportunity for individuals to contest the 
forfeiture of assets; however, it shifted the burden of proof. The target 
could file a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and assert 
an affirmative defense—either that the property was not subject to con-
fiscation or that the owner was innocent. But the statute simultaneously 
allowed the court to consider evidence otherwise inadmissible under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, where the judiciary considered it reliable and 
                                                                                                                      
Affairs, 108th Cong. 5 (2003) (statement of David D. Aufhauser, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treas.)). 
 332. Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Activity: Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,579 (Sept. 26, 2002) (Final Rule); 67 Fed. Reg. 9874 
(Mar. 2002) (Interim Rule and Proposed Rule). See also Michael Isikoff, Show Me the Money: 
Patriot Act Helps the Feds in Cases With No Tie to Terror, Newsweek, Dec. 1, 2003, available 
at http://www.msnbc.com/news/997054.asp. 
 333. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, § 315. 
 334. Id. § 320. 
 335. Zagaris, supra note 311. 
 336. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, § 373. 
 337. Id. § 371. 
 338. Zagaris, supra note 311. 
 339. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, § 806. 
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compliance with the Federal Rules would jeopardize U.S. national secu-
rity. This provision essentially shifted the burden to individuals whose 
assets had been confiscated to demonstrate that the state should not have 
seized their property or that they were innocent owners—while simulta-
neously allowing evidence to be used against them that normally would 
be impermissible in a court of law. 
iv. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The USA PATRIOT Act also provided extraterritorial jurisdiction. It 
brought foreign persons laundering money in the United States, foreign 
banks, and other entities within the reach of the judiciary.340 The statute 
empowered the courts to seize assets pending trial for use in any final 
judgment. The statute also amended the existing forfeiture law to give 
the government control over assets deposited overseas.341 The mechanism 
employed essentially allowed the state, where a foreign bank has a cor-
respondent account in the United States, to seize it, requiring the bank to 
debit the terrorist account located overseas. Critically, the state could 
block such assets during the pendency of an investigation. Although 
meant to address an emergency, the state could exercise the procedures 
indefinitely. This quickly became a source of much concern. Where a 
potential conflict of laws existed between foreign jurisdictions and the 
United States, the statute granted the Attorney General, as opposed to the 
court, discretion to determine the most appropriate course of action. The 
same section required both U.S. and foreign banks to maintain and make 
certain records available to the courts. Severe penalties for noncompli-
ance with requests for information applied. In addition to the above, the 
statute required the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to take reasonable steps to 
encourage foreign governments to include originator information in wire 
transfer instructions. The United States subsequently pursued this aim 
through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).342 
b. Exercise of IEEPA Powers Post-September 11 
Less than two weeks after the attacks, under the authority of the 
IEEPA, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,224—an initiative he 
                                                                                                                      
 340. Id. § 317. 
 341. Id. § 319. Interim guidance issued Nov. 27, 2001; proposed rule issued Dec. 27, 
2001; final rule issued Sept. 18, 2002. 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, 
supra note 5, appendix G, at 50. 
 342. By November 2003 the United States had proposed and obtained FATF’s commit-
ment to ensuring originator information was included in wire transfers. 2003 National 
Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, appendix G, at 50. 
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proudly referred to as “Draconian.”343 It essentially replaced a criminal 
law standard with an intelligence standard and made it illegal for anyone 
to attempt to alleviate any humanitarian suffering resulting from the sei-
zure of assets.344 The instrument began innocuously enough: it declared a 
national emergency and created a “Specially Designated Global Terror-
ists” (SDGT) list, blocking “all property and interests in property” of 
designated terrorists and individuals contributing material support to ter-
rorism.345 This included al Qaeda and its associated groups, Osama bin 
Laden, and supporters. The order provided a list of specified foreign per-
sons the Secretary of State determined posed a risk to national security, 
foreign policy, the economy, or U.S. citizens.  
From there, however, the order became considerably more extreme: 
it incorporated a list of persons the Secretary of the Treasury determined 
to be acting for or on behalf of the persons listed under the order (or sub-
ject to it) or assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or 
technological support for those listed—and any persons Treasury deter-
mined to be otherwise associated with those listed. This meant that any 
business that did not cease interacting with the listed entities could 
themselves be listed and have their assets frozen. It also meant that mere 
association—and not demonstrated material support—would be suffi-
cient for the state to confiscate all property. Moreover, once blocked, the 
Executive Order made it illegal for anyone to deal in blocked property or 
                                                                                                                      
 343. Brian Groom, John Willman & Richard Wolffe, Bush Targets Terrorist Funds, Fin. 
Times (London), Sept. 25, 2001, at 1.  
 344. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786, 790 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 
U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2002). The order also issued under the authority of the National Emergen-
cies Act (50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2001)), the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (§ 5, 22 
U.S.C. § 287(c) (1945) (amended 2001)), and 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1951) (amended 2005). In addi-
tion, Bush cited S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8, 1998), S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999), S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000), 
and S.C. Res. 1363, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001).  
 345. Thereafter, the White House continued the emergency on an annual basis. The first 
extension issued Sept. 18, 2003. Notice of Sept. 18, 2003, Continuation of the National Emer-
gency with Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 68 
Fed. Reg. 55,189 (Sept. 22, 2003). The second issued Sept. 24, 2004. Message from the Presi-
dent of the United Sates transmitting Notification that the National Emergency Declared with 
Respect to Persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism is to continue in 
effect beyond Sept. 23, 2004, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1622(d), H.R. Doc. No. 108-217, at 3 
(2004); Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Persons who Commit, 
Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, H.R. Doc. No. 108-217, at 1. Also note that on 
Jan. 23, 1995, Executive Order 12,947, President Clinton declared a national emergency under 
the IEEPA for a threat to the Middle East; this was modified Aug. 20, 1998, by Executive 
Order 13,099 (which added four additional people, including bin Laden). Exec. Order No. 
12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13,099, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 
(Aug. 25, 1998). President Bush continued this emergency on Jan 16, 2004, for another year. 
Notice of Jan. 16, 2004, Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Terrorists 
who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,991 (Jan. 21, 2004), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050118-7.html. 
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for any U.S. entity to try to avoid or conspire to avoid the prohibitions—
or to make donations to relieve human suffering to persons listed under 
the order or determined to be subject to it. Any foreign banks who re-
fused to provide information to the U.S. government risked having their 
assets and transactions within the United States frozen.  
Executive Order 13,224 centered on two goals: stopping the money 
flow to al Qaeda and convincing the public that something was being 
done.346 In regard to the former, OFAC could already target Osama bin 
Laden and al Qaeda under Executive Order 12,947.347 Executive Order 
13,224, however, divorced the terrorist list from the Middle East peace 
process. It also made it illegal for all U.S. actors, and not just financial 
institutions, to engage in business with the listed entities.  
In regard to the latter goal, the signing of this document turned into a 
public relations exercise extraordinaire: “At 12:01 a.m. this morning, a 
major thrust of our war on terrorism began with the stroke of a pen. To-
day, we have launched a strike on the financial foundation of the global 
terror network.” Bush continued, “Just to show you how insidious these 
terrorists are, they oftentimes use nice-sounding, non-governmental or-
ganizations as fronts for their activities. We have targeted three such 
NGOs.” He threw the gauntlet: “If you do business with terrorists, if you 
support or sponsor them, you will not do business with the United States 
of America.” Paul O’Neill echoed this sentiment:  
If you have any involvement in the financing of the al Qaida or-
ganization, you have two choices: cooperate in this fight, or we 
will freeze your U.S. assets; we will punish you for providing 
the resources that make these evil acts possible. We will succeed 
in starving the terrorists of funding and shutting down the insti-
tutions that support or facilitate terrorism.348 
Despite the bellicosity of these remarks, the administrative structure 
designed to implement the measures fell somewhat short of the promise. 
An OFAC report in April 2004, for instance, showed only four staff 
members dedicated to terrorist finance—as opposed to, for instance, 
                                                                                                                      
 346. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 45. 
 347. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 31 C.F.R. 595 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 
U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2003); Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 
§ 597 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2003); Staff Report, supra note 
1, at 78–80; Zagaris, supra note 242, at 130. 
 348. Such strong, presentational remarks continued. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treas., Contributions by the Department of the Treasury to the Financial War on 
Terrorism: Fact Sheet 6 (Sept. 2002) (“The war on terrorism is only beginning, and it is 
certain to demand constant vigilance. In the year since that terrible day, we have hit them hard. 
Our goal is to bankrupt their institutions and beggar their bombers.”) See also Levitt, supra 
note 3. 
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twelve people enforcing trade embargos on Cuba.349 Although a sudden 
surge of names graced the list, the average number added monthly 
quickly dwindled.350 By May 2002, the Department of Treasury had 
blocked the assets of 210 groups and people, freezing $34 million. Allied 
countries blocked another $82 million.351 On average, the Executive 
added six people a month thereafter, bringing the total to 397 by January 
2005.352 
Not all of these on the list related to September 11: Continuity IRA, 
the Loyalist Volunteer Force, GRAPO (the First of October Anti-Fascist 
Resistance Group), the Communist Party of the Philippines, and the 
Communist Party of Nepal, for instance, found themselves included. The 
bulk of them, however, bore some link to Arab states or the Islamic faith. 
According to the Washington Post, by September 2002 the government 
was monitoring more than 500 hundred Arab and Muslim businesses in 
the United States.353 This scrutiny, and the federal government’s rather 
loose standards, led to a drop in contributions to Islamic charities.354 
Treasury issued “voluntary best practices guidelines” containing a thinly 
veiled threat: they called for “rigorous, self-imposed financial oversight; 
high levels of disclosure and transparency; and immediate severing of all 
ties to any foreign recipient associated with a terrorist organization.” The 
                                                                                                                      
 349. Between 1990 and 2003, only 93 terrorism-related investigations took place at 
OFAC, as opposed to some 10,683 Cuba-related investigations during the same time period. 
And fines for Cuba-related offenses amounted to $8 million dollars; those charged with terror-
ism paid only $9,425. Mark Frank & Richard Lapper, U.S. Squeeze Angers Cubans: Bush 
Clampdown is Seen as Blow to Family Ties, Fin. Times (London), May 10, 2004, at 4. 
 350. The initial register froze the assets of 27 people and groups suspected of terrorist 
finance. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html. See also Mike Allen 
& Steven Mufson, U.S. Seizes Assets of Three Islamic Groups, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 2001, at 
A1. Of these, 12 were individuals and 15 were organizations. Less than a month later the Ad-
ministration added another 39 names to the list. U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, Terrorism: What you Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions 
(2005), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html. 
See also Joseph Kahn & Judith Miller, U.S. Freezes More Accounts: Saudi and Pakistani As-
sets Cited for Ties to Bin Laden, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2001, at A1; Richard Wolffe, U.S. 
Freezes Assets Linked to Terror Network, Fin. Times (London), Oct. 13, 2001, at 1. Roughly a 
fortnight later another 22 names issued, and within five days 62 more individuals and entities 
found their assets blocked. The pace continued, but the number of entities added each time 
diminished. By May 2002, 210 names and groups found themselves on the list. 
 351. U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Office of Public Affairs, U.S.-EU Designation of 
Terrorist Financiers Fact Sheet (PO-3070) (May 3, 2002), available at http:// 
www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3070.htm. 
 352. U.S Dep’t of the Treas., Treasury Designates Individual Financially Fu-
eling Iraqi Insurgency, al Qaida (JS-2206) (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http:// 
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2206.htm. The complete lists are available from OFAC 
online. See also Allen & Mufson, supra note 350. 
 353. U.S. Investigates Scams for Terrorist Ties, 104 Business Credit, Sept. 1, 2002, at 1. 
 354. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
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government continued, “Although wholly voluntary, if implemented with 
sufficient resources and diligently adhered to in practice, the guidelines 
offer a means by which charities can protect themselves against terrorist 
abuse, enhance donor confidence, and significantly reduce the risk of a 
blocking order.”355 The standards the government used, and the basis on 
which it made its decisions, fell short of the democratic norms otherwise 
endorsed by the state. I return to this point in Part III. 
C. International Initiatives 
The United States spends more on its military than the next eight 
states combined, but it cannot go after terrorist finance on its own.356 The 
United States and the United Kingdom depend upon mutual legal aid 
treaties, formal requests between intelligence services, instruments of 
international law, and diplomatic pressure to make headway in this 
realm. Well aware of the importance of international assistance,357 both 
states are pushing for global norms. Several obstacles stand in the way.  
In the regulatory realm, FATF members, for instance, cannot even 
agree on the definition of “charity.” And each states tends to view its 
regulatory system as preferable: the United Kingdom sees its Charity 
Commission as “superior to anything in America, where charities are 
overseen chiefly for tax purposes.”358 In contrast, Americans brag that 
they are “light years ahead of the rest of the G7” in regulating their fi-
nancial sector.359 In regard to the freezing of assets, states are divided 
over which organizations they should allow charities to support: Britain 
and, indeed, Europe more generally tend to see only the military arms of 
Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, whereas the United 
                                                                                                                      
 355. 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, at 14. 
 356. Martin Wolf, Exporting the National Interest: Getting the Objectives of U.S. For-
eign Policy Right Matters Far More Than the Dispute Over Multilateralism Versus 
Unilateralism, Fin. Times (London), July 24, 2002, at 17. 
 357. See, e.g., Stephen Fidler, Carola Hoyos & Richard Wolffe, Bush Tells Iraq to Allow 
UN Arms Inspections, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 27, 2001, at 1; Alan Beattie, Changing the 
Guard: International Monetary Fund, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 30, 2001, at 4; Edward 
Alden, The Money Trail: How a Crackdown on Suspect Charities is Failing to Stem the Flow 
of Funds to al Qaeda, Fin. Times (London), Oct. 18, 2002, at 19. See also Terrorist Financ-
ing, supra note 253, at 2 (echoing the importance of international political will); Kenneth 
Dam, Hunting Down Dirty Cash: The International Coalition Must Step Up its Efforts to Stem 
the Flow of Terrorist Funds or Risk Further Attack, Fin. Times (London), Dec. 12, 2001, at 
17; Weapons Against Terrorist Funds, Fin. Times (London), Sept. 28, 2001, at 20. 
 358. The Iceberg Beneath the Charity, The Economist (U.S. Edition), Mar. 15, 2003, at 
85. 
 359. Id. 
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States wants to collapse the distinction to ban both the military and po-
litical branches.360  
Perhaps the biggest impediment, however, to gaining practical coop-
eration lies in the realm of intelligence: claiming protection of its 
sources and methods of collecting information, the United States in par-
ticular is loath to provide evidence to other states of those individuals 
and entities whose assets it wants frozen.361 As a result, most of those 
subject to blocking orders have been U.S.-based.362 I will return to this 
point in the policy discussion. For now, I will simply paint, in broad 
brushstrokes, the general international structure for anti-terrorist finance, 
highlighting the British and U.S. roles in its development. What quickly 
becomes apparent is that, in connection with the strong role the United 
Kingdom and the United States have adopted in the international realm, 
the developing international structures tend to mirror the two states’ ap-
proaches. The attendant problems echo the issues raised in the second 
part of this Article. 
Three points are worth emphasizing at the outset: First, like the do-
mestic measures in both states, it was not until very recently that the 
international structures began to focus on international anti-terrorist fi-
nance. Second, many of the mechanisms applied derive from anti-money 
laundering efforts and tend to collapse the anti-money laundering, anti-
terrorist finance, and anti-organized crime efforts into one stream. Third, 
relatively few multilateral efforts on terrorist financing are underway; the 
United States and United Kingdom have largely driven existing efforts, 
with strong support from other members of the G7.363 In this section I 
briefly consider actions taken by the United Nations, the Financial Ac-
tion Task Force, and other multilateral and regional bodies.364 
                                                                                                                      
 360. Id.; Harvey Morris & Gareth Smyth, Lebanon Set to Refuse to Freeze Terror Assets, 
Fin. Times (London), Nov. 8, 2001, at 8. 
 361. Alden, supra note 357.  
 362. The Iceberg Beneath the Charity, supra note 358. 
 363. See, e.g., John Authers, G20 Meeting Upbeat Over Outlook for World Economy, 
Fin. Times (London), Oct. 28, 2003, at 11; Alan Beattie, Harmony Rules as G7 and IMF 
Delegates Set Agenda, Fin. Times (London), Apr. 22, 2002, at 3; Stephen Fidler & Haig Si-
monian, IMF Chief Urges United Response to Slowdown, Fin. Times (London), Oct. 6, 2001; 
Stephen Fidler & Haig Simonian, G7’s Sights Fixed on Slowdown, Terror Cash, Fin. Times 
(London), Oct. 6, 2001, at 4. 
 364. I omit discussion of the IMF, which proves rather ineffective in the anti-terrorist 
realm. The main IMF instrument is the Financial Sector Assessment Program, but participa-
tion in the program and publication of the results is voluntary. Fewer than 30 states 
participated in 2001. The IMF maintains a separate program to analyze offshore financial 
centers, which also is voluntary. Poorer states, and indeed, staff members at the IMF, point out 
that significant terrorist funds pass through G7 states. While the IMF indicated it would incor-
porate the FATF’s recommendations, it lacks any mechanism to ensure compliance. See Alan 
Beattie, Money-laundering Focus Stirs Feelings of Disquiet, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 17, 
2001, at 8. 
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1. The United Nations 
Three UN treaties relate to illicit money flows: first, the Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
required signatories to criminalize money laundering and freeze the as-
sets of those involved in drug trafficking.365 Just over a decade later 
similar provisions crossed over into the counter-terrorist realm: the In-
ternational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
made it an offense to provide or collect funds intending or knowing that 
they would be used for terrorist offenses.366 It also made it possible to 
freeze the assets of those involved. Article 18(1) of the Treaty delved 
into the regulatory realm, with a “know your customer” and SAR re-
quirement.367 As in the United Kingdom, not only did the measures move 
from anti-drug trafficking and money laundering to anti-terrorist finance, 
but then the whole regime transferred over into the criminal realm writ 
large. Finally, the Palermo Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime synchronized national definitions of crime associated with money 
laundering and required signatories to extradite suspects, protect wit-
nesses, strengthen international cooperation, and establish strong 
regulatory regimes (including customer identification, record-keeping, 
and the filing of SARs).368 To supplement these initiatives, the United 
Nations developed model laws related to money laundering and terrorist 
finance, which are remarkably similar to their British and U.S. counter-
parts.369 
Outside of the General Assembly, the UN Security Council made 
minor efforts in 1999 to address the flow of funds to the Taliban and al 
Qaeda. Following September 11, though, the Security Council suddenly 
focused its efforts on the issue.370 Security Council Resolution 1368, is-
sued September 12, 2001, called on all states to bring perpetrators and 
those “responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators” 
to justice.371 It expressed the Security Council’s desire to take “all neces-
                                                                                                                      
 365. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotro-
pic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989). 
 366. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 
1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) (entered into force Apr. 10, 2002). 
 367. Ben Brandon, Playing Hard Ball, Legal Wk. Global, Apr. 8, 2003. 
 368. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Dec. 12, 2000, 
U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (entered into force Sept. 29, 2003). 
 369. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Model Legislation on Laundering, Confisca-
tion and International Cooperation in Relation to the Proceeds of Crime (1999), 
http://www.imolin.org/imolin/ml99eng.html. See also U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Model Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing Bill (2003), http:// 
www.unodc.org/pdf/report_money_laundering_2003_09.pdf. 
 370. See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) (calling on the Taliban 
to give up bin Laden or face an asset freeze). 
 371. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
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sary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks . . . and to combat all forms 
of terrorism.” This included the swift implementation of all conventions 
related to terrorism, including the 1999 treaty focused on the Suppres-
sion of the Financing of Terrorism.372 Just over a fortnight later, Security 
Council Resolution 1373 required all member states to create laws des-
ignating supporters of terrorism and to freeze their assets.373 The 
language of the resolution is noteworthy. The Security Council: 
Decides that all States shall: (a) Prevent and suppress the financ-
ing of terrorist acts; (b) Criminalize the willful provision or 
collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their 
nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds 
should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in 
order to carry out terrorist acts; [and] (c) Freeze without delay 
funds and other financial assets or economic resources of per-
sons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or 
participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts.374  
The resolution also announced the Security Council’s decision that 
all states shall “[d]eny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or 
commit terrorist acts.” The resolution’s assertions earned for it the de-
scription within the UN of being “one of the most expansive resolutions 
in the history of the [Security] Council.”375 The resolution itself did not 
include any names, nor did it define terrorism. But it established a new 
bureaucratic entity to ensure that all member states of the UN satisfied 
the requirements.  
The newly-formed Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) incorporated 
one member from each state. Five-member subcommittees each oversaw 
one-third of the UN member states. The CTC required member states to 
submit reports on their efforts to implement the resolution. By 2002, 
more than 100 states had complied, passing new laws to deal with terror-
ist finance and money laundering, with approximately 170 states 
                                                                                                                      
 372. By 2001, 19 global or regional treaties addressed international terrorism. See The 
Secretary-General, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 18–19, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/160 (July 3, 2001). 
 373. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  
 374. Id. 
 375. Policy Working Group, Report on the United Nations and Terrorism, ¶ 32, U.N. 
Doc. S/2002/875, A/57/273 (Sept. 10, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/terrorism/ 
a57273.htm [hereinafter Report on the United Nations and Terrorism]. See also Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism  
Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation, U.N.  
Doc. SC/7158 (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/ 
sc7158.doc.htm. 
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maintaining the ability to seize assets.376 The CTC revamped the model 
legislation explicitly to address terrorist finance.377 
In addition to these steps, the UN Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 1455, which was directed at terrorists and terrorist supporters linked 
to al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban. The instrument estab-
lished and provided for the update of a list of individuals and entities and 
obliged all member states to freeze the assets of those on the list. The 
United States provided most of the names subsequently included. 
In October 2001 the Secretary-General established the Policy Work-
ing Group on the United Nations and Terrorism “to underline the depth 
of shared international commitment to an effective, sustained and multi-
lateral response to the problem of terrorism.”378 The underlying aim was 
to contextualize the UN’s role, to prioritize UN activities regarding ter-
rorism, and to come up with recommendations on the best way to 
proceed. In 2002 the working group issued a report, stating that the UN 
ought to focus on areas where the organization has a comparative advan-
tage. It suggested a three-pronged approach: to dissuade disaffected 
groups from embracing terrorism; to deny groups or individuals the 
means to carry out acts of terrorism; and to sustain broad-based interna-
tional cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. The report suggested 
that the CTC would serve as the primary vehicle to deny opportunities 
for terrorist acts to occur—particularly through promulgating model leg-
islation.379 The Policy Working Group also emphasized the importance of 
ratifying and implementing the International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Financing of Terrorism, as well as the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime.380 
Before moving to the Financial Action Task Force, one final aspect 
of the UN’s role in anti-terrorist finance bears mention: the Kimberly 
process. This UN-sponsored initiative focuses on preventing the use of 
diamonds as a form of terrorist finance. While much has been made of 
this, reports from Amnesty International and Global Witness suggest that 
the World Diamond Council’s efforts as of October 2004 represented 
little more than public relations maneuvers.381 
                                                                                                                      
 376. Staff Report, supra note 1. 
 377. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Model Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime 
and Terrorist Financing Bill, supra note 369. 
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2. The Financial Action Task Force 
In 1989 the G7 created the Financial Action Task Force, a multilat-
eral government organization focused on setting international standards 
to prevent the laundering of criminal proceeds. Like the legislation 
sweeping through the United Kingdom and the United States at the time, 
the organization targeted drug trafficking.382 The FATF included 33 direct 
members, with various regional bodies that reached out to more than 100 
states worldwide.383 In the early 1990s the organization articulated 40 
recommendations to prevent money laundering. FATF updated these in 
1996 and again in 2003. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this inter-
national effort is the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories Process 
(NCPT) adopted by the organization. Unlike the Vienna Convention, 
which lacks an enforcement mechanism, the FATF used the NCTP to 
ensure compliance and pressure states not already party to the agree-
ment. It was not until very recently (2000) that the FATF began issuing 
its blacklist.384 
Following the attacks of September 11, the FATF expanded its remit 
from money laundering to include international standards for terrorist 
finance. At a special meeting called in Washington, D.C., for October 
29–30, 2001, the United Kingdom tabled a number of strong proposals 
that ranged from requiring all states to ratify the UN Suppression of Ter-
rorism Financing Convention to demanding that the IMF and World 
Bank endorse the FATF anti-money laundering regime. Gordon Brown, 
the U.K. Chancellor, announced at the time: “The ready supply of fi-
nance is a lifeblood of modern terrorism. Those who finance terror are as 
guilty as those who commit it.”385 The Madrid bombings again generated 
support within the organization “to drive terrorists out of the financial 
system by strangling their funding sources.”386 The strategy mirrored that 
                                                                                                                      
 382. Brandon, supra note 367. 
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in Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act: strengthening the regulatory re-
gime, more closely supervising Alternative Remittance Systems and 
charities, as well as cash couriers, and improving international coopera-
tion and information-sharing.387  
In June 2003, the FATF released an updated Forty Recommenda-
tions, with key changes expanding predicate offenses, introducing more 
stringent due diligence requirements, and extending the regulatory re-
gime to a broader range of financial institutions.388 The new guidelines 
also introduced tighter requirements for correspondent banking, third 
party introducers, foreign political officials, and issuance of bearer 
shares, banned shell banks worldwide, and required states to establish 
financial intelligence units. FATF took additional steps to specifically 
address anti-terrorist finance. The Eight Special Recommendations fol-
lowed, which focused on areas such as the criminalization of terrorist 
finance, powers for asset forfeiture, the licensing of money remitters, 
and regulation of NGOs.389 Together, the Forty Recommendations and 
the Eight Special Recommendations provide a laundry list of possible 
options for states who want to shut down terrorist finance. What gives 
the measures teeth is the enforcement mechanism in the agreement: the 
FATF can recommend economic sanctions against non-cooperating 
states and territories. The organization worked with the IMF and World 
Bank to develop a way to determine whether states or territories are in 
compliance.390 What is notable about the advice of the Forty Recommen-
dations and the Eight Special Recommendations is that, like the 
measures in the United Kingdom and the United States post-September 
11, it suggests both a normalization procedure and an extension of exist-
ing money laundering practices—assuming, of course, that they are 
appropriate for detecting terrorist activity. 
3. Regional and Bilateral Efforts 
The European Union does not represent the only regional body tak-
ing steps in this direction, but it appears to be the most active.391 And like 
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the United Kingdom and the United States, its emphasis on terrorist fi-
nance has come rather late in the game: the Council of Europe’s 1990 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Pro-
ceeds from Crime required signatory states to cooperate with anti-money 
laundering rules.392 In 1995 the EU created the Egmont group to address 
terrorist financing through the creation of national financial intelligence 
units.393 But it was not until the September 11 attacks that a pan-
European focus on, specifically, counter-terrorist finance came into be-
ing.  
On September 20, 2001, three senior EU officials traveled to Wash-
ington to consult on how to proceed in this area.394 The following day, the 
European Council met and approved over 30 measures to respond to ter-
rorist finance and money laundering. These included a European-wide 
arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism, a list of alleged terror-
ists, joint investigative teams, increasing the priority of responding to 
financing among law enforcement, the implementation of all interna-
tional legal regimes as quickly as possible, and the creation of a 
Financial Intelligence Unit in each member state to interrupt money 
laundering.395 In December 2001 the European Parliament and Council 
amended Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the fi-
nancial system for money laundering to include a “gatekeeper” 
requirement for all lawyers, accountants, and notaries to supply informa-
tion on suspicious transactions to national authorities. The amended 
directive exempted attorneys from the reporting requirement where they 
simply act to ascertain a client’s legal position or in connection with ju-
dicial proceedings.396 “Thus, legal advice remains subject to the 
obligation of professional secrecy unless the legal counselor is taking 
part in money laundering activities, the legal advice is provided for 
money laundering purposes, or the lawyer knows that the client is  
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seeking legal advice for money laundering purposes.”397 This Directive 
provides only a guideline, imposing a general (albeit enforceable) duty. 
It is up to member states to implement the details into law, which the 
United Kingdom has done. The amended money laundering directive 
also expanded predicate offenses to include all serious crime.398 Efforts 
continued within the EU to establish the legal structure to allow the re-
gion to go after terrorist money: in June 2002, for instance, the European 
Council issued a Framework Decision, adopting a common definition of 
terrorism. In June 2005 the Council adopted the matter as one of its pri-
orities for the second half of 2005. 
In addition to these general measures, the EU immediately took 
steps to block specific individuals’ and organizations’ assets. Among 
these individuals were approximately 170 Taliban officials, including 
most government officials (governors of provinces, court officials, offi-
cials with visa and passport offices, and deputy ministers), the Head of 
the Olympic committee, representatives in organizations like the UN, 
ambassadors, the consulate general of Afghani provinces, and the like. 
The EU also froze the assets of numerous commercial entities, such as 
Afghan Airlines, various banks in Afghanistan, other international NGOs 
and humanitarian groups with ties to Afghanistan, and medical facilities 
in the state. By October 1, 2001, the EU had frozen approximately $100 
million in Taliban assets, $88 million of which was located in the United 
Kingdom.399 In December 2001 the EU designated 42 more entities.400 On 
May 3, 2002, the EU issued a list of 18 suspected terrorist and terrorist 
groups. The action coincided with the U.S. issuance of freezing orders 
on groups and individuals associated with ETA.401 Within a month the 
EU circulated another list of suspects linked to al Qaeda.402 Unlike the 
United States’ listing process, however, Europe introduced more safe-
guards against the inclusion of the wrong people. The EU requires 
checks prior to listing, includes an appeals process, and sanctions states 
for entering names wrongly. The EU also excepts everyday living funds 
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from being frozen, as well as money required for legal costs. This 
sharply contrasts with the U.S. approach, which specifically forbids any 
assistance, even if directed at relieving humanitarian suffering. 
Outside of these regional advances, both the United Kingdom and 
the United States have employed various bilateral mechanisms to en-
courage international assistance. The United States appears to be 
increasing its pressure, for instance, on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while 
being careful at the same time to publicly praise them for any advances 
in this area.403 Other states, such as China and Switzerland, agreed to co-
operate with U.S. initiatives in this area.404 By far the most outspoken 
U.S. ally in the post-September 11 environment has been the United 
Kingdom.405 The 2001 East Africa embassy bombing trials in the United 
States drew attention to the role of European financial institutions, in-
cluding Barclays Bank, in transferring al Qaeda assets.406 By October 2, 
2001, the United Kingdom had frozen $88.4 million in assets linked to 
Afghanistan.407 Britain also played a key role in pushing through many of 
the EU measures.408 This led U.S. Treasury officials to describe the Brit-
ish government and banks as “incredible allies and a big help” in efforts 
to stop terrorist financing post-September 11.409 
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III. How Effective? 
The dirty little secret behind efforts to stem terrorist finance in the 
United Kingdom and the United States is that, to date, such initiatives 
have been spectacularly unsuccessful in making a significant dent in ter-
rorist operations. From the vanquishing tone of language on both sides 
of the Atlantic, one might be forgiven for thinking otherwise: within 
months of Executive Order 13,224 and the USA PATRIOT Act, the Bush 
Administration claimed victory in the war against terrorist finance.410 But 
the U.S. government has brought only a handful of related prosecutions. 
The only terrorist finance ring reported broken in the United States’ 2002 
National Money Laundering Strategy report related to the conviction of 
Mohammad Hammoud and the “cigarettes for Hezbollah” plan. The rest 
correlated to drugs and ordinary criminal activity.411 A substantial per-
centage of cases brought to court failed. Those cases the U.S. 
government cites as successes often rested on charges of fraud or false 
statements and not on terrorist finance.412 The only smoking gun so far 
appears to be the case of Mohammed Ali Hasan al-Moayad, who has 
been charged with providing material support to al Qaeda and Hamas. 
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His extradition from Germany is still pending.413 The problem is not 
unique to the United States: the United Kingdom also has only had a few 
successful prosecutions in this realm.414 As was previously mentioned, 
the Assets Recovery Agency press releases note only two cases that ap-
pear to be related to paramilitary organizations.415 
Nor is there any indication that these programs have harmed terrorist 
groups’ ability to operate in substantial ways. To the contrary, a year af-
ter the September 11 attacks the United Nations released a report stating 
that al Qaeda sources remained intact, with between $30 million and 
$300 million available from legitimate business enterprises.416 Various 
international intelligence and law enforcement bodies reached similar 
conclusions.417 In the face of such claims, even the U.S. administration 
backpedaled: Alan Larson, the Undersecretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, confirmed in October 2002 it was “unquestionably true” that al 
Qaeda still had financial means to carry out devastating attacks on the 
United States. He continued, “I don’t think lack of resources is a major 
impediment to the operations of terrorist organizations at this stage.”418 In 
December 2002, the Staff Report to the September 11 Commission de-
termined that despite the broad measures implemented, “al Qaeda 
continues to fund terrorist operations with relative ease. The amounts of 
money required for most operations are small, and al Qaeda can appar-
ently still draw on hard-core donors who knowingly fund it and 
sympathizers who divert charitable donations to it.”419 In the United 
Kingdom, the December 2004 Northern Bank raid—and the state’s fail-
ure to recover any of the £26.5 million stolen by PIRA (except for the 
£50,000 voluntarily returned by those responsible)—speaks volumes. 
Indeed, the level of crime in which paramilitaries engage in Northern 
Ireland appears to be growing—and diversifying. Similarly, the number 
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of al Qaeda attacks worldwide has steadily increased over the past four 
years. Between September 2001 and June 2004, the network carried out 
nearly twice as many attacks as in the five years prior to September 11.420 
For the first time since it began publication, in 2005 the U.S. State De-
partment classified its report, Annual Patterns of Global Terrorism, 
avoiding the embarrassment of numbers that starkly demonstrated U.S. 
failure to limit al Qaeda’s ability to operate worldwide.  
Not only is the frequency of attacks increasing, but the network ap-
pears increasingly to be aiming at “soft” targets such as transportation 
systems, night clubs, and places of religious worship. Many of these op-
erations require minimal funds: the Madrid bombing in March 2004, for 
instance, used ammonium nitrate and cell phones for its execution and is 
believed to have cost at most $10,000.421 The attacks in Istanbul in No-
vember 2003 cost less than $40,000.422 And Osama bin Laden continues 
to have widespread support in the Palestinian Authority, Indonesia, Jor-
dan, Morocco, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere.423 
Far from failing to stem the operational ability of terrorist groups, 
some of the measures have actually undermined the two states’ counter-
terrorist efforts through inefficiency and waste. Part III postulates that 
one reason such provisions have proven unsuccessful is because both the 
United Kingdom and the United States have effectively taken money 
laundering tools and applied them to terrorist finance. In many ways, 
such devices are ill-suited to this function: SARs have flooded the sys-
tems on both sides of the Atlantic, making it more difficult for officials 
to find the needle in the haystack. Recent changes in the United King-
dom and the United States are forcing terrorist money out of the 
regulated sector, and the money laundering metrics the states use to 
gauge success appear ill-suited to the challenge of terrorism.  
Rights-based concerns also undermine the current regimes. In light 
of the states’ goal of promoting democratic norms as a way to counter 
the terrorist threat, this result is of consequence. Using the United States 
as an example, Part III.B considers how anti-terrorist finance provisions 
affect free speech, freedom of association, privacy, property, and due 
process. Other administrative and regulatory rules also impact entitle-
ments. But counterterrorism can be distinguished by the breadth of rights 
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affected, by the elimination of intent, by reliance on secret evidence and 
ex parte proceedings, and by the stigma it imposes when labeling entities 
sympathetic to terrorism. This Article emphasizes that disregard for indi-
vidual rights and the humanitarian affects of the current provisions 
alienate important allies both at home and abroad, with black lists prov-
ing central in this regard. Part III briefly highlights an alternative to these 
white lists and raises an example of where the United Kingdom, in par-
ticular, has been more effective in addressing terrorist finance. It 
concludes with a discussion of the unique challenges posed by the Inter-
net and warns against the wholesale transfer of money laundering 
techniques to this realm. 
A. Money Laundering Versus Terrorist Finance 
At a practical level, perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the 
British and U.S. responses has been the transfer of many anti-money 
laundering tools into anti-terrorist finance. In the United States, for ex-
ample, the 2002 and 2003 National Money Laundering Strategies 
claimed these instruments as central to the fight against terrorism, while 
the USA PATRIOT Act collapsed the two regulatory regimes into one. 
Although some similarities between the two phenomena exist, the differ-
ences are substantial and carry consequences for the efficiency of the 
system, the ability of the state to counter terrorist threats, and the fair-
ness of the resultant regime.  
The similarities are fairly obvious: money laundering and terrorist 
finance make use of similar methods to hide and move money. They de-
pend on a lack of transparency and monitoring. And they make use of 
the same financial systems—such as wire transfers, alternative remit-
tance systems, bulk currency shipments, money transmitters, money 
changers, and commodity-based trade. To some extent, both might be 
said to be political in nature: money launderers may support particular 
political candidates, make extensive use of the media, and sponsor social 
projects in poor areas. Terrorist organizations obviously seek political 
ends. And most have propaganda arms that deal with the media. PIRA, 
for instance, runs the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau. Al Qaeda too 
recognizes the importance of public dialogue. The so-called “Manchester 
Manual” writes, “Islamic governments . . . are established as they [al-
ways] have been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and 
teeth.”424 Left-wing organizations in the United Kingdom and the United 
States in the 1970s issued lengthy, turgid prose that attempted to explain 
why they were doing what they were doing—an approach mimicked by 
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the Unabomber in his manifesto, “Industrial Society and Its Future.”425 
Terrorist organizations also provide economic aid to regions in need. The 
“no go” areas in Derry and Belfast and the creation of “incident centres” 
in the 1970s provide salient examples. And, as paramilitarism in North-
ern Ireland again demonstrates, there may be overlap between criminal 
money laundering and terrorist operations. Money laundering depends 
upon an underlying crime, whereas terrorist finance does not. Put some-
what crudely, the former tends to take dirty money and try to make it 
clean, whereas the latter often (although not always) uses clean money 
for illicit purposes. This makes it difficult to identify the entities raising 
the money for terrorist ends. A victim who might otherwise alert law 
enforcement to the presence of criminal activity is unlikely to report 
such efforts, and those involved are less likely to carry previous criminal 
convictions. 
Although one solution might be to develop a profile of legitimate 
for-profit and not-for-profit enterprises likely to engage in terrorist activ-
ity, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern patterns in financial 
transactions that would signify terrorist activity. Indeed, New York 
Clearinghouse, an organization of the largest money-center banks, con-
cluded after a post-September 11 two-year study that it simply cannot be 
done.426 Despite repeated efforts to develop typologies appropriate to ter-
rorist finance, the FATF reached a similar conclusion.427 The profiles 
developed, then, tend to rely on ethnicity and nationality, raising a slew 
of problems that range from inaccuracy and counter-productivity to the 
infringement of individual rights.428  
To monitor the possible use of legitimate funds for terrorist ends, 
therefore, the state must involve itself deeply in the private sector. This 
means that the state must examine a huge amount of data in minute de-
tail to detect the necessary information. Approximately 12 million 
currency transaction reports are filed annually in the United States; how 
ought law enforcement proceed to analyze the specifics?429 In the United 
Kingdom, the task falls to the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS), itself a creature of the drug trafficking legislation in the mid-
                                                                                                                      
 425. Ted Kaczynski, Unabomber’s Manifesto: Industrial Society and Its Future, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 19, 1995. 
 426. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 56. 
 427. 2003 Financial Action Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 4, ¶ 10. See also 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report on Money Laundering 
Typologies: 2001–2002 6 (2002). 
 428. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., SAR Bull., 
Jan. 2002. 
 429. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against 
Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, J. Crim. L. & Criminology 311, 
437 (2003). 
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1980s. Following September 11, the organization established a Terrorist 
Finance Team. Its job is to review SARs, combine the information with 
intelligence and open source information to determine terrorist financ-
ing, and then refer the information to, inter alia, MI5, Inland Revenue, 
and the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit at Scotland 
Yard.430 Unlike the United States, which sets $10,000 as the threshold 
reporting requirement, there is no de minimis limit for suspicious activity 
reports in the United Kingdom. Only common sense restricts the number 
of reports generated.431 Effective analysis might create important leads, 
but in its absence, a proliferation of false alarms may undermine state 
security. The resources involved in finding the proverbial needle in the 
haystack, moreover, could be substantial and less effectively spent than 
on other approaches, such as human intelligence, more clearly tailored to 
terrorist means. And the white noise created by the deluge of data in-
creases the difficulty of ferreting out real threats. 
Simultaneously, issues of financial privacy come to the fore, with a 
possible impact well beyond the terrorist realm. In the United Kingdom, 
the Financial Services Authority issued guidelines requiring strict en-
forcement of the know-your-customer rules adopted post-September 11. 
Banks began requiring additional documents for second accounts, trans-
ferring money, and sometimes even routine customer use of checks. By 
mid-2003, some money laundering experts expressed frustration at the 
over-regulated environment and its impact on customers and business: as 
Kevin Tomlinson, the money laundering reporting officer at Virgin 
Money stated, “We feel that some of the proposed changes to money 
laundering regulation go too far, and the government is in danger of los-
ing the good will of the industry in wanting to combat money laundering 
. . . There seem to be more and more hoops for everyone to go through.” 
Lucy Warwick-Ching reported in the Financial Times, “Many consumers 
. . . who are upset by the threatening tone of these letters and the need to 
constantly prove who they are, have complained to their providers.”432  
The volume of money involved in each type of activity also differs: 
the International Monetary Fund puts the total money laundered globally 
                                                                                                                      
 430. For more discussion of NCIS’s role in anti-terrorist finance post-September 11, see 
Gavin Hinks, On the Trail of the Terrorists, Accountancy Age, Oct. 31, 2002, at 7. 
 431. Bob Reynolds, By Appointment to the Spies, Accountancy, Jun. 1, 2004. See also 
Rosemary Bennett, Jimmy Burns & Brian Groom, UK Plans Force to Track Down Terrorist 
Funds, Fin. Times (London), Oct. 16, 2001, at 1; Burns & Groom, supra note 414; Edward 
Alden, Robert Shrimsley & Mark Turner, Closing Down Bank “Will Hit Somalis,” Fin. Times 
(London), Nov. 9, 2001, at 8. 
 432. Lucy Warwick-Ching, Drive Against “Dirty Money” is Attacked: Money Launder-
ing Crackdown, Fin. Times (London), July 12, 2003, at 28. 
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each year at around $600 billion.433 In contrast, while the amount of 
money flowing to terrorist organizations overall is unknown, those 
whose finances have been documented appear to require much less 
money. As highlighted in the first Part of this Article, PIRA operates on a 
budget of some £1.5 million. The Real IRA and the Ulster Defence As-
sociation require only £500,000. To some extent this reflects the ends of 
the entities involved: profit primarily drives launderers, whereas terrorist 
organizations tend to be more interested in non-financial goals, such as 
obtaining political legitimacy or convincing a particular target popula-
tion of their views. Relatedly, unlike ordinary criminals, terrorists tend to 
avoid living conspicuous lifestyles that would alert authorities to the 
presence of extra income. Terrorist organizations also tend to move what 
money they have in smaller amounts and in ways that are much harder to 
detect.  
As Part II of this Article suggested, the movement of paramilitary 
organizations into the political realm may increase the demand for funds 
and, therefore, the amount of money such groups transfer. Yet the cir-
cumstances in which organizations have moved in this direction raise 
their own set of issues, particularly regarding whether states should en-
courage such political activity and, if so, whether the state should 
attempt to intercept the funds or, instead, encourage political arms to 
draw money from paramilitary activities. Here, money laundering provi-
sions appear inadequate—indeed, counterproductive—as a way to 
pursue state aims. 
1. Suspicious Activity Reports 
Ironically, SARs did not, nor should they have, nor would they now, 
discover any of the financial activity in which the September 11 hijack-
ers engaged.434 Nevertheless, Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act 
                                                                                                                      
 433. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 312, Title III, § 302(a)(1). In 2003 financial firms in 
Europe and the United States spent more than $5 billion between them trying to prevent laun-
dering activities. Coming Clean; Money-laundering, Economist (U.S. Edition), Oct. 16, 
2004.  
 434. Al Qaeda moved the money to fund September 11 in three ways: $130,000 was 
wired to hijackers in the United States from the UAE and Germany; members physically car-
ried cash/traveler’s checks to the United States; and some established overseas accounts, 
accessed via ATM or credit cards in United States. When they arrived in the United States, 
they opened bank accounts under their real names. They made use both of large national banks 
and smaller regional ones. While they lived in the United States, they made wire transfers of 
between $5,000 and $70,000, making the transactions virtually invisible in comparison to the 
billions of dollars moving daily through the international financial system. Their banking 
pattern—depositing a significant amount of money and then making smaller withdrawals—fit 
their student profiles. They did not use false social security numbers. And they did not seem to 
have a particularly sophisticated grasp of the U.S. banking system. Staff Report, supra note 
1, at 53. See also Michael Peel & John Willman, The Dirty Money That is Hardest to Clean 
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expanded the number of institutions required to file SARs to include not 
just depository institutions but also money services business, securities 
and futures industries, and, under subsequent regulations from Treasury, 
casinos and card clubs. This radically increased the number of SARs 
filed with FinCEN: from approximately 163,000 filings in 2000, by 2004 
the number had leapt to nearly 670,000 (See Figure 1). The Economist 
reported, “[B]anks in America and elsewhere are trying to cover them-
selves by filing ever more ‘suspicious activity reports.’ Regulators are 
swamped with information. Alas, most of it is useless.”435  
The United Kingdom too saw a sudden increase in suspicious activ-
ity reported to the state: In October 2001 the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service received 4,387 reports—more than four times the 
number filed in October 2000.436 By June 2003 NCIS was receiving 
around 7,000 SARs per month.437 Importantly, the cost of this expansion 
to either the United Kingdom and the United States in terms of adminis-
trative overhead and diversion of resources has yet to be determined; an 
independent audit by KPMG, however, raised concern about the low sig-
nal-to-noise ratio and the tendency of entities to over-report.438 The 
quality of information contained in such reports on both sides of the At-
lantic, moreover, falls somewhat short of the ideal.439 
                                                                                                                      
Up: Financial Institutions are Keen to Eradicate Money-Laundering by Terrorists and to 
Freeze Assets, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 20, 2001, at 16. 
 435. Coming Clean: Money-laundering, supra note 433. 
 436. Jimmy Burns, Rise in Reports of Dubious Financial Transactions, Fin. Times (Lon-
don), Nov. 23, 2001, at 2. 
 437. Gavin Hinks & Paul Grant, Analysis; Pressure on to Beat Laundering, Accoun-
tancy Age, June 19, 2003, at 5. 
 438. Privy Counsellor Review Committee, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001 Review: Report Presented to Parliament Pursuant to § 122(5) of the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2002, Dec. 18, 2003, HC 100. 
 439. Compare Jimmy Burns, UK Rethinks its Strategy on Fighting Money Launderers, 
Fin. Times (U.S. Edition), July 2, 2003, at 4, with the December 2002 report of the U.S. Treas-
ury Office of the Inspector General (stating that many of the half-million SARs filed between 
April 1996 and December 2000 had incomplete or wrong information and multiple duplica-
tions), cited in Zagaris, supra note 311, at 451. 
DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
398 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 27:303 
 
Figure 1 
Number of Suspicious Activity Report 
Filings in the U.S. by Year440 
 
Year Total 
1996 52154 
1997 81242 
1998 97078 
1999 120941 
2000 163184 
2001 204915 
2002 281373 
2003 507217 
2004 689414 
 
a. Politics and Profiling 
Whether resources are better spent on SAR analysis or criminal in-
vestigation remains, of course, a matter of speculation. If SARs were 
indeed unearthing more terrorist activity, then SAR analysis may be 
worth the expense. It appears, however, that financial institutions’ ten-
dencies to identify terrorist activity have less to do with actual movement 
of funds by illicit groups and more to do with political pressure. In Sep-
tember 2001, for instance, only 27 SARs filed in the United States 
mentioned terrorism. The following month, 446 reports suddenly sug-
gested connections to violent organizations. While the numbers 
remained high for the next few months, they steadily declined and, by 
September 2002, were back down to 24.441 The numbers remained low—
until the advent of the United States’ war on Iraq and some well-
publicized reports on state investigations into financial institutions with 
customers possibly linked to international terrorism.442 At that point, the 
number of SARs citing possible terrorist links again skyrocketed.  
                                                                                                                      
 440. Statistical data for SAR report filings is continually updated as previous filings are 
processed and new reports are received; this may lead to some discrepancy between different 
sources. The numbers in this chart are taken from Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, 
SAR Activity Review: By the Numbers, Issue 4, at 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480204.pdf. 
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In many ways, the reason for the apparent disconnect between finan-
cial institutions’ ability to identify the flows of terrorist funds and the 
underlying terrorist threat is obvious: States, which are privy to classi-
fied intelligence material, are more likely than banks to know the 
identity of terrorist suspects. Without this information, and lacking a re-
liable profile on which to base their decisions, financial institutions tend 
to revert to racial profiling. 
Whether motivated by a desire to improve national security or by 
concerns about running afoul of the measures adopted post-September 
11, financial institutions in the United States have been rather aggressive 
about filing SARs. By 2005 these institutions were submitting approxi-
mately 20 percent of their SARs in response to law enforcement 
inquiries and name matches with OFAC’s specially designated terrorist 
list.443 Eighty percent of SARs, however, were voluntary. Depository in-
stitutions tended to focus on charitable organizations and Islamic 
foundations, individuals presenting personal identification from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and specific Middle Eastern states, and wire activity to or 
from suspect states.444 Casinos, in turn, focused on individuals connected 
with the Middle East—that is, individuals having Arab-sounding names 
or carrying passports from states considered suspicious.445 
The filing of SARs based on these assumptions means that otherwise 
innocuous activity becomes suspicious merely on the basis of ethnicity. 
And suspects’ names quickly ascend the reporting chain. In the United 
States, the number of names forwarded to federal law enforcement for 
further action correspondingly increased with the number of SARs filed: 
from just 9,112 in all of 2000, the total increased to 13,649 in just the 
first ten months of 2002.446 Many of these reports concerned wire trans-
fers to or from the Middle East. SARs, however, and documents that 
would disclose the existence of an SAR, are privileged from discovery in 
civil litigation—even if the discovery is necessary for an affirmative de-
fense.447 Moreover, from 2003, the United States began exchanging 
SARs with other states through the Financial Investigative Units. By  
                                                                                                                      
 443. Id. at 10. 
 444. Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips, 
and Issues, Issue 5, at 22–23 (2003). This trend continued. See Bank Secrecy Act Advi-
sory Group, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips, and Issues, Issue 8, at 15 (2005). 
 445. Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips, 
and Issues, Issue 8, at 10, 13 (2005).  
 446. Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips, 
and Issues, Issue 5, at 13 (2003). 
 447. See Cotton v. PrivateBank, 235 F. Supp. 2d 809 (N.D. Ill. 2002). The Bank Secrecy 
Act is the source of this authority, although FinCEN regulations and federal bank regulators’ 
regulations establish absolute privilege. See Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, The SAR 
Activity Review: Trends, Tips, and Issues, Issue 5 (2003). 
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operating under international treaties, such as the UN Convention on the 
Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, and “soft law” (for instance 
FATF’s Forty Recommendations), the federal government can circum-
vent privacy laws that might otherwise block the transfer of financial 
data.448  
The problem is that SARs, effectively hidden from view, may carry 
real consequences for those named on their pages. It is difficult to get 
one’s name removed from such lists when they are not even discoverable 
through judicial action. Yet “an individual or entity reported on a SAR 
may encounter problems subsequently with immigration or customs of-
ficials of the same or even a different jurisdiction.”449 What makes this of 
particular concern for issues of individual rights is that, at least in the 
United States, some of the reports appear to be filed solely on the basis 
of ethnicity. 
b. Possible Ways to Address the Flood 
Governments on both sides of the Atlantic are not unaware of the 
problem caused by the glut of SARs flooding the system. Indeed, the 
more than four-fold increase in reports in both states would be hard to 
ignore. Britain’s National Criminal Intelligence Service took the initia-
tive to hold a series of seminars for private industry, laying out under 
what conditions reports ought to be filed. NCIS officials also began visit-
ing various institutions to encourage them to use common sense. In the 
United States, by 2005 FinCEN had also taken concrete steps to reduce 
the sheer volume of filed information. To reduce duplicate reporting, in 
December 2004 FinCEN revised its guidelines to clarify that blocking 
reports filed with OFAC satisfied the SAR reporting requirement.450 In 
2005 FinCEN lowered the information requirements of the SAR report-
ing forms by, inter alia, eliminating the “Continuation Sheet,” which 
recorded traveler’s checks, money orders, and wire transfer document 
numbers.451  
While these changes may help to address some of the difficulties to 
which the system gives rise, its general structural problem persists: 
SARs ineffectively address the ways in which terrorists, as opposed to 
money launderers, move money. And there is still no disincentive for 
financial institutions to file as many SARs as may possibly apply. They 
have nothing to lose by over-reporting but incur considerable risk (i.e., 
                                                                                                                      
 448. Bruce Zagaris, supra note 311. 
 449. Id. at 451–52. 
 450. Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips, 
and Issues, Issue 8, at 38 (2005).  
 451. Money Transmitter Regulators Association, News—Streamline Suspicious Activity 
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the forfeiture of their assets) if they neglect to report activity the state 
later deems suspicious. Indeed, the United States has indicated its will-
ingness to go after such offenders: in 2002, Trustco Bank, N.A., in 
Glenville, New York, became the first institution cited for violating re-
porting requirements.452 
Another approach for either state would be to increase the account-
ability of the filing banks—that is, over-reporting might incur some sort 
of penalty; alternatively, efficient reporting might be rewarded. But this 
policy would send a mixed message to financial institutions already 
thrust into the front lines of intelligence gathering. Moreover, the re-
sources such institutions would devote to compliance would be 
considerable, affecting their ability to compete internationally with rival 
organizations. Such sanctions may also alienate private industry—at a 
time when the state needs its cooperation to head off real threats. 
An additional strategy may be for intelligence or law enforcement 
organizations to share information and then target specific regions, 
banks, individuals, and charities. For the most part, this reflects the cur-
rent approach in the United States. But banks complain that intelligence 
services provide insufficient information. And there is evidence that this 
is the least effective of the current alternatives—that is, detection sys-
tems that “rely heavily on existing investigative methods,” in contrast to 
reporting requirements, may be more effective than reporting require-
ments in obtaining convictions. It is unclear whether this is because of 
the ease of targeting individuals already suspected of criminal activity453 
or whether there is a more direct relationship between conducting inves-
tigations and then using finances to develop the case. Nevertheless, this 
approach may offer a more promising route to interrupting terrorist fi-
nance. 
An important, additional consideration underlies any approach 
adopted: as demonstrated by the Saudi connection, some terrorist or-
ganizations receive considerable state support in a way that ordinary 
criminals attempting to launder funds do not. This suggests that other 
tools, such as diplomatic pressure and foreign policy alteration, may be 
far more effective in preventing terrorists from gaining access to funds 
than trawling through the records of thousands of organizations, only a 
small percentage of which may be knowingly providing support to ter-
rorist organizations. Here, however, U.S. efforts fall short.  
Saudi Arabia, whose role in funneling money to jihad movements 
worldwide was discussed in Part II of this Article, remains largely  
                                                                                                                      
 452. T.J. Grasmick & Robert M. McNamara Jr., Bank Secrecy Act Can Affect Expansion, 
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unaffected by anti-terrorist financial provisions instituted post-
September 11. For instance, although Saudi Arabia announced in March 
2002 that it would target al-Haramain, one of the largest charities, to 
prevent it from sending funds to al Qaeda, soon thereafter the charity 
actually expanded into Bosnia and Somalia and opened a $530,000 Is-
lamic centre in Sarajevo.454 It was not until al Qaeda increased its attacks 
in Riyadh that Saudi Arabia began acting to curb the flow of money. On 
May 12, 2003, suicide bombers killed 34 people in the city. The follow-
ing year, between May 29 and May 31, al Qaeda took foreign oil 
workers hostage in an attack that left 22 people dead. Less than a fort-
night later a cell kidnapped and executed a U.S. citizen. And in 
December 2004 terrorists attacked the U.S. consulate.455 The Saudi re-
sponse, however, fell significantly short of the actions necessary to curb 
the flow of finances to al Qaeda.456  
The United States was slow to cry foul. When a RAND Corporation 
study leaked in August 2002, for instance, accused the Saudis of com-
plicity “at every level of the terror chain,”457 the Bush Administration 
quickly distanced itself from the report. Two months later, the Council 
on Foreign Relations put together a special task force that was critical of 
President Bush for not maintaining political pressure: “The administra-
tion appears to have made a policy decision not to use the full power of 
U.S. influence and legal authorities to pressure or compel other govern-
ments to combat terrorist financing more effectively.”458 In November 
2002 a Washington Post article reported that the Administration had a 
plan to lean on Saudi Arabia, but senior Administration officials denied 
the claim.459 While the September 11 Commission Staff Report on Ter-
rorist Finance underscored the Saudi role in backing violent movements 
worldwide, the sections of the final report specifically addressing the 
House of Saud remained classified. Congress similarly initiated inquiries 
                                                                                                                      
 454. Alden, supra note 357, at 19. 
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 459. See Edward Alden & Mark Huband, Washington to Warn Saudis on Terror Financ-
ing, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 27, 2002, at 12. 
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into Saudi Arabia,460 but such efforts were sporadic, and U.S. dependence 
on Saudi elites appears to have blunted their impact. 
2. Pushing Money Out of the Regulated Sector 
While the purpose of money laundering investigations is to prose-
cute perpetrators and obtain the funds,461 terrorist financing investigations 
also need to accomplish other important goals, such as interrupting the 
flow of money to violent groups or preventing successful operations, 
whether or not they obtain a prosecution.462 Stopping money from flow-
ing through the regulated sector either by freezing it or by introducing 
sweeping regulations here harms one of the important national security 
aims of the state: law enforcement does not just lose a conviction, but it 
may be unable to trace the funds as extensively as may be required to 
interrupt operations or to find those linked to terrorist networks. 
Examples of the benefits of retaining terrorist actors in the regulated 
sector readily present themselves. Because they operated within the 
Western banking system, September 11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and 
Khalid al Mihdhar left a trail: they opened bank accounts in New Jersey 
and used debit cards to pay for their hotel room. Al Hazmi bought tickets 
on Flight 77 for himself and Salem al Hazmi, giving the authorities clues 
as to other perpetrators. Nawaf al Hazmi and another man who flew 
Flight 77, Hani Hanjour, used the same address to open bank accounts at 
the same New Jersey bank. Another hijacker from that flight, Majed 
Moqed, used the same address to open an account at another New Jersey 
bank. This information linked all five together, assisting federal law en-
forcement officers in quickly determining those responsible. 
Because of the changes instituted post-September 11, however, the 
means by which groups linked to al Qaeda raise money and transfer 
funds has changed. The increased regulation of the Western banking sys-
tem means that value is being moved through alternative means. Greater 
emphasis has been placed within terrorist networks on using trusted ha-
waladars, as well as couriers.463 To finance the Bali and Jakarta attacks, 
                                                                                                                      
 460. See Waller, FBI Polarized by “Wahhabi Lobby,” supra note 403, at 27; see also 
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(2001) (emphasizing the importance of asset forfeiture as the most direct way of preventing 
criminals from benefiting from money and describing its centrality to anti-money laundering 
efforts). 
 462. 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy, supra note 5, at 2 (note that this 
is the second major report since September 11). See also Global Financial Crime: Terror-
ism, Money Laundering and Off Shore Centres (Donato Masciandaro ed., 2004).  
 463. See Underground Finance Mechanisms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on Int’l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. On Banking, 
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for instance, jihadists physically moved $100,000 and then $30,000 from 
the southern Philippines to Indonesia.464 And terrorists transfer increasing 
percentages of their funds into gold.465 While these techniques may have 
hampered the movement of resources, they have also made it harder to 
trace funds and find those responsible for terrorist violence.466 Simulta-
neously, al Qaeda has become more diffuse and harder to distinguish 
from the broader worldwide jihadist movement. An “array of loosely 
affiliated groups, each raising funds on its own initiative,” has replaced 
the group’s more centralized structure.467 And, while al Qaeda’s overall 
budget may have diminished, the organization requires less money now 
than it did prior to September 11: at that time, between $10 million and 
$20 million per year went to supporting the Taliban—an entity no longer 
in power in Afghanistan.468 Information from detainees also suggests a 
shift in how al Qaeda spends its money: what before went to recruitment 
and training now funds violent operations and supports active mem-
bers.469  
The net result is that it is becoming harder not just to stop financial 
flows but to find high-ranking individuals who are responsible for vio-
lence. Perhaps as a result, as of the time of writing no major convictions 
of individuals intimately involved in al Qaeda appear to have resulted 
from successfully following the flow of funds to the organization. This 
contrasts sharply with the situation prior to September 11, where finan-
cial flows proved central to many of the Southern District of New York 
trials of suspected jihadists.  
Individuals caught in the judicial process tend to be those lower 
down in the chain, whose small contributions have little impact on an 
organization’s overall ability to mount operations. In money laundering 
cases, individuals convicted of financial offenses tend also to be charged 
with other substantive offenses, making the financial charge a way to 
augment punishment. But this element is missing in the terrorist finance 
realm.470 In the United Kingdom this directly relates to the state’s deci-
sion to divorce asset forfeiture from an underlying offense. But perhaps 
nowhere is the ill-fitted nature of the application of the money launder-
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ing regime to terrorist finance more evident than in the realm of SARs 
traditional money laundering tools. 
3. Metrics Used to Gauge Success 
Both formal and informal accounting measures in the anti-terrorist 
finance realm rely on traditional money-laundering metrics to gauge 
success. In the United States, for instance, annual money laundering re-
ports examine the number of states with blocking orders in force, the 
number of entities with seized assets, and the value of money frozen as 
indications of success. The Northern Ireland money laundering reports 
use similar categories. But these numbers say little about whether the 
money laundering regime targets the right people—and how important 
those that become caught in the system are to the flow of terrorist funds. 
Similarly, announcements from the Executive amount to scorekeeping, 
in which the total dollar amount seized becomes the indicator of state 
success.  
While such exercises may prove helpful for public relations pur-
poses, the standards they set for those attempting to interrupt the 
financial flows are out of synch with what may be the most effective in-
dicators of success. Because metrics play a role in determining agencies’ 
emphases, the use of the wrong standards influence the effectiveness of 
state counterterrorist efforts. 
Better indicators would include the successful conviction rate of 
those responsible for supplying money or the level within the terrorist 
network of those caught because of financial strictures. Here, the isola-
tion of the regime from the underlying offense makes accounting more 
difficult: previously, financial offenses might augment sentences, making 
the level of involvement of those found guilty of complicity easier to 
determine. Yet these numbers in this area are revealing: statistics related 
to straight money laundering efforts suggest that the few successful con-
victions in this realm tend to be focused on underlings: In 2002, 80 
percent of those sentenced did not receive a leadership enhancement. 
And almost 80 percent of those sentenced laundered less than $1 mil-
lion.471 Transferring this regime into anti-terrorist finance and expecting 
it to net substantially dissimilar results defies logic. States might also 
adopt a way of tracking the number and extent to which following 
money trails helped security forces to interrupt planned operations or to 
catch perpetrators in past operations. Right now, however, the public 
standards of effectiveness do not track these successes. 
                                                                                                                      
 471. U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Annual Money Laundering Strategy (2002), su-
pra note 411, at 7.  
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One issue compounding the current accounting system is that the 
United States does not know the total value of money flowing to al 
Qaeda. Pushing the money out of the Western regulated sector is not go-
ing to help matters here; putting resources, first, into finding out how 
much money is there and, second, into finding out how it is moved 
would give the state a much better indicator of what level of funding it is 
intercepting. This means putting more money into alternative areas, such 
as signals intelligence and human intelligence, to strengthen the financial 
picture. 
B. Rights-Based Considerations 
In addition to the practical effect of many of these measures, rights-
based concerns can hardly be ignored—particularly in the context of the 
U.S. and U.K. aim of promoting democratic norms. Anti-terrorist initia-
tives in both states implicate free speech, freedom of association, 
privacy, property, and due process.  
In the interests of length, this Part focuses on U.S. initiatives. It does 
not provide exhaustive constitutional analysis; instead, it gives some ex-
amples of how current measures affect the above rights—a function 
made more important by the limited scholarly attention to anti-terrorist 
finance.  
None of these rights, of course, are absolute: administrative and 
regulatory bodies, for instance, have powers that allow them to interfere 
with property rights. Underlying the discussion, however, is the sugges-
tion that property seizures in the counterterrorist realm represent 
something different in kind. The elimination of intent, use of secret evi-
dence and ex parte proceedings, and the stigma attached to the label 
“terrorist”—to say nothing of the practical impact of discounting rights 
as part of a counterterrorist strategy—suggest that special care should be 
taken in freezing and forfeiting assets as part of an anti-terrorist regime. 
1. Rights Impacted 
The United States’ anti-finance provisions post-September 11 had an 
immediate and profound affect on individual rights. The First Amend-
ment to the Constitution includes in free speech the solicitation of funds, 
long considered a necessary constituent for the effective flow of infor-
mation and ability of citizens to advocate different positions.472 Yet 
significant risks currently accompany any contribution to an Islamic 
charity or any dealing with Islamic or Arab businesses. The Casey Foun-
dation conducted a survey of 30 mosques and found that all of them had 
                                                                                                                      
 472. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
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suffered a loss of funds. In “Assessing the Need: Addressing the Prob-
lem,” Louise Cainkar reported that Islamic religious leaders cited 
“widespread community fears of the federal government . . . feelings of 
being watched and followed, [and] reductions in charitable giving.”473 
These findings are borne out by statistics: the Treasury Department, 
through April 2005, lists 743 people and 947 organizations with frozen 
assets. Of these, 98 percent (725) of the people and 96 percent (907) of 
the organizations appear to be Muslim and/or Arab.474 Because of the 
reduced standard of proof required to freeze assets—namely, mere asso-
ciation—a number of prominent banks have adopted internal policies 
that require employees to refuse interaction with Islamic and Arab enter-
prises.475 And Islamic publications have seen the sudden withdrawal of 
advertisers.476 Co-religionists, in turn, are unable to fulfill their religious 
duty to support Islamic charity work, impacting freedom of religion.477 
This brings the state into conflict with well-established religious beliefs.  
Privacy, long read into the penumbra of the rights afforded by the 
Constitution, has also taken a hit. Under the USA PATRIOT Act, any 
federal agency can now obtain sensitive and private data without any 
subpoena or judicial intervention, as long as it is investigating one of 
some 200 possible offenses. The irony is that many of the provisions 
adopted after September 11 had previously been rejected precisely be-
cause of privacy concerns. The Bush Administration marketed them to 
the financial community as central to the counterterrorist effort. David 
Aufhauser, General Counsel at Treasury, for instance, announced that 
with 24-hour surveillance the state could “home in on and bomb terror-
ists on the basis of a clue as tiny as a tyre-track in a desert.” He told an 
audience of international bankers “that they should use the same sort of 
technology on their customers.”478 In January 2002 Assistant Attorney 
General Michael Chertoff notified the Senate Banking Committee that, 
                                                                                                                      
 473. Louise Cainkar, Assessing the Need: Addressing the Problem, The Faith 
Communities and Urban Families Project 27 (Nov. 2003) (sponsored by the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation). See also Nancy Dunne, U.S. Muslims See Their American Dreams Die: 
Since September 11 the Community Has Felt Threatened, Fin. Times (London), Mar. 28, 2002, 
at 10 (discussing the disappointment of the Muslim community in the Bush Administration 
stemming from government raids). 
 474. U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Office of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 350. 
The total number includes aliases and different spellings of names cited elsewhere on the list. 
See also The Iceberg Beneath the Charity, supra note 358. 
 475. Author interviews with large firm investment bankers, New York City, New York 
(June 27, 2005). 
 476. Author interview with editor of the Arab-American News (Autumn 2004). 
 477. Author participation in Global Security and Cooperation program of the Social 
Science Research Council on the impact of post-September 11 measures on the Islamic com-
munity in the United States. 
 478. The Needle in the Haystack, The Economist, Dec. 14, 2002, at 81. 
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in relation to § 314’s new information-gathering powers, “[t]he principal 
provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act no longer apply to letter 
requests by a government authority authorized to conduct investigations 
or intelligence analysis for purposes related to international terrorism.”479  
These provisions put banks between a rock and a hard place: cus-
tomers, in the absence of a subpoena, might mount legal challenge to the 
bank’s decision to hand information to the government. It raised serious 
issues related to the institutions’ ability to ensure the security of custom-
ers’ financial data.480 On the other hand, though, strict penalties applied 
for failure to do so. And it was bad for business to be associated with 
terrorist groups. 
Many of the new powers had to be tailored to specific sectors, creat-
ing a dense and complex web of federal powers. Treasury released 
hundreds of pages of regulations. To assist in complying with the statute, 
a cottage industry sprang up that further implicates the right to privacy.  
Bridger Tracker Online 5.5 provides a good example. This software 
takes the identification requirements in § 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
and allows banks to compare their lists and account or transaction infor-
mation against more than 20 different federal watch lists, only one of 
which is the OFAC SDN list. By January 2005, more than 80 percent of 
U.S. banks used the program. The company boasts that the software 
helps institutions to better “know your customers.”481 Nevertheless, its 
accuracy could only be presented in relative terms: “With its sophisti-
cated and proprietary fuzzy logic, Bridger Insight yields false positive 
rates three times lower than competitive products.”482 The upshot of these 
changes was that Treasury became privy to everyday financial transac-
tions, and private companies became an extension of the state’s 
counterterrorism efforts.483 In the meantime, privacy rights took a hit. 
These developments are at odds with the importance of privacy not 
just to the liberal, democratic state but to international banking and fi-
nance.
484
 In the past, the idea of third party records as voluntary held 
when individuals willingly relinquished them. But now, the reporting 
                                                                                                                      
 479. Rob Garver, Will USA Patriot Act Prove A Recipe for Trouble? Government Access 
to Banking Information vs. Right to Privacy, American Banker, Apr. 23, 2002, at 10 [here-
inafter Recipe for Trouble?]. See also Rob Garver, Launder Rules Will Apply Across Financial 
Services, American Banker, Apr. 23, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Launder Rules]. 
 480. Recipe for Trouble?, supra note 479; Launder Rules, supra note 479. 
 481. Bridger Insight, https://secure.bridgerinsight.choicepoint.com/free-trial-request.asp 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
 482. Press Release, Bridger Insight, Bridger Systems Announces Release of Bridger 
Tracker™ Online 5.5.0.0 (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.bridgerinsight.choicepoint.com/press-
release-online-55.htm.  
 483. Trustco Bank, N.A., in Glenville, New York became the first bank cited for viola-
tions of the USA PATRIOT Act. See Grasmick & McNamara, supra note 452, at 50. 
 484. See, e.g., The Needle in the Haystack, supra note 478. 
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requirements for financial institutions means that they must maintain 
certain records and so the judicial assumption of voluntariness falls 
somewhat short.485 
Perhaps the most significant legal right impacted is one often left off 
the litany of rights frequently associated with counterterrorist concerns: 
property. Although title may not be lost under Executive Order 13,224, 
the government can impose indefinite forfeiture. Under the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the state can block assets “during the pendency of an in-
vestigation.” No limits are set on the length of such an inquiry. The 
courts have held that indefinite forfeiture does not constitute a taking, as 
it does not permanently vest property in the United States.486  
2. Distinguishing Anti-terrorist Finance 
The lowering of standards highlighted above is not unique to the 
United States. The United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 employs a 
civil law standard, which deviates from the criminal law requirement. 
Using this standard, the state can divest individuals suspected, but not 
convicted, of terrorist activity of their property.  
Nor are limits on individual entitlements, such as property rights, 
unique to the counterterrorist realm. Various spheres in the contemporary 
administrative state restrict transactions and waive protections otherwise 
afforded under due process. Under export controls, regulatory bodies 
deny licenses. Administrators routinely make decisions that may have a 
multimillion-dollar impact. Review of their decisions may only require 
“some evidence.” And zoning boards limit what property owners can do 
with their land. 
                                                                                                                      
 485. The Privacy Protection Study Comm’n, Personal Privacy in an Informa-
tion Society: The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Comm’n ch. 9, at 3 (1977), 
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/ [hereinafter Privacy Comm’n Re-
port]. On voluntary disclosure and compulsory process:  
U.S. v. Miller [425 U.S. 435 (1976)] reaffirmed that customer bank account records 
are not the private papers of the customer. An individual has neither ownership nor 
possession of such records, reasoned the Court; therefore, the records are simply the 
“business records of the bank.” This line of argument and the precedents which 
have developed it extend back through the Eighteenth Century. The crucial element 
in this traditional view is that the individual, lacking a “proprietary” interest in a 
bank’s records of his account, has no legal right he can assert to challenge access to 
those records by government or anyone else.  
Privacy Comm’n Report, supra, ch.9, at 4 (emphasis added). For eighteenth century tradi-
tion, see William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 382 (1854); 
S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 372 (1969). 
 486. Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2002), 
aff ’d 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Many courts have recognized that a temporary blocking 
of assets does not constitute a taking because it is a temporary action and not a vesting of 
property in the United States.”).  
DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
410 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 27:303 
 
The whole subject of the legitimacy of government deprivation of 
private property rights is complex and well beyond the scope of this 
study. Much of the discussion centers on regulations that deliberately 
address economic concerns. Thus some stated government interest in 
building on the economic health of the state is admitted as justification.  
That dialogue, however, has little to do with forfeiture that is not 
concerned with routine, economic issues. And, as implied by the preced-
ing discussion, whatever rights that may be involved in regulatory cases 
(e.g., those in the Fifth Amendment), the type of forfeitures under con-
sideration in antiterrorist finance affect a entirely different area of 
constitutional rights—including the First Amendment, the right to pri-
vacy, and the like.  
My argument here is not necessarily a doctrinal claim about actual 
violations of these rights but rather a concern that if antiterrorist finance 
is designed to promote democratic values, attention must be drawn to 
legislation that may disserve these values. Well-established doctrines of 
the legitimate right of government to deprive individuals of their prop-
erty are not inconsistent with this approach. 
In addition to the breadth of rights affected by anti-terrorist finance 
measures—all of which play an important function in the overall health 
of a democracy, three additional considerations set anti-terrorist finance 
apart: the elimination of intent, the use of secret evidence, and the stigma 
associated with designation. 
a. Elimination of Intent 
Even as anti-terrorist finance provisions impact property rights, in-
tent has all but dropped from the equation. Executive Order 13,224, for 
instance, does not include any requirement that the individual involved 
knowingly assist terrorist activity. But how can the state infer intent from 
mere associational links? Unlike drug laws, where possession may be the 
trigger for asset forfeiture, more nebulous accusations appear sufficient 
for the Executive to deny an individual access to his assets. In the case of 
Benevolence International Foundation, for instance, the FBI claimed that 
the founder, Enaam Arnaout, had links to bin Laden in the 1980s. Con-
sidering the United States’ $3.5 billion package for mujahideen in 
Afghanistan at the same time, this hardly appears adequate evidence on 
which to expropriate all of Arnaout’s resources. Indeed, the state never 
was able to bring criminal charges on these grounds; instead, it simply 
suspended his access to his property until the state could bring suit on 
different charges. 
The standard is a low one: many people may be involved in raising 
money for Islamic causes; they may share a common religion; they may 
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even disagree with U.S. foreign policy. But this does not mean they are 
terrorists. Banks carry out business with numerous customers, whose 
behavior they cannot hope to regulate outside their direct relationship. Al 
Taqwa provides a good example. A financial network based in Switzer-
land and the Bahamas, the Bush Administration alleged al Taqwa had 
ties to terrorism. The Administration claimed that Hamas maintained 
accounts there, that in October 2000 Al Taqwa extended a clandestine 
line of credit to “a close associate” of Osama bin Laden, and that the 
chairman of the bank provided financial assistance to bin Laden and al 
Qaeda in late September 2001.487 On November 7, 2001, Treasury froze 
the assets of organizations and individuals associated with al Taqwa.488 
When the Swiss Banking Commission audited the firm of Youssef Nada, 
who owned al Taqwa, though, it found no evidence of money laundering 
or of other organizations using the bank as a front company.489 
Efforts to target such businesses carry real economic costs: Arab 
Bank, the third largest Arab lender, first established a New York Office in 
1982. In February 2005 the bank cited the “litigation environment in the 
U.S.” as the reason why it would begin shutting down its U.S. opera-
tions. The bank claims that it was unaware that payments from a Saudi 
charity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were going to the families of 
suicide bombers. Shukry Bishra, the chief banking officer, stated, “We 
have zero role in determining who receives the payments and why that 
beneficiary received the payments.” He suggested that the U.S. govern-
ment used the courts “to target Arab individuals, banks, and 
governments.”490  
The prevailing political attitude in Washington, however, does not 
buy this argument. President Bush stated in November 2001: “We fight 
the terrorists and we fight all of those who give them aid. America has a 
                                                                                                                      
 487. The PATRIOT Act: Investigating Patterns of Terrorist Financing: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Instigations of the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv., 107th Cong. 10 
(2002) (statement of Juan C. Zarate, Dep. Ass’t Secretary for Terrorism & Violent Crime), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/021202jz.pdf [hereinafter Zarate]. 
See also Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror Watch: Preaching Violence, Newsweek, 
Sept. 29, 2004.  
 488. Zarate, supra note 487. Federal agents raided offices in Minnesota, Ohio, Massa-
chusetts, and Washington. Id. at 6. Bush announced that the networks provided al Qaeda with 
fundraising, financial, communications, weapons-procurement, and shipping assistance. Mat-
thew Levitt, Policy Watch #585: Navigating the U.S. Government’s Terrorist Lists, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Police Watch/Peace Watch, Nov. 30, 
2001, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1463.  
 489. See Donald G. McNeill, Jr., Italian Arab is Perplexed by Swiss Raid, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 8, 2001, at B8. 
 490. Arab Bank Says It Didn’t Know of Payments to Bombers’ Families, Bloomberg, Feb. 
10, 2005, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=a_0CRqtqmut0 
&refer=europe. 
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message for the nations of the world: . . . If you feed a terrorist or fund a 
terrorist, you’re a terrorist, and you will be held accountable by the 
United States and our friends.”491 Nearly two years later he reiterated his 
earlier remarks:  
I want you to know, the doctrine that says, ‘Either you’re with 
us, or you’re with the terrorists,’ it still stands, and we enforce it 
every single day. If you harbor a terrorist, if you feed a terrorist, 
if you finance a terrorist, you’re just as guilty as the killers who 
struck America on September the 11th, and we’ll hold you ac-
countable as well.492 
While this language may make good political rhetoric, as a legal 
doctrine it leaves something to be desired. There is an enormous differ-
ence between making contributions that eventually flow to terrorist 
activity and actually, intentionally, funding such activity. The reliance on 
intent, rather than a substantive violation, represents a relatively recent 
departure. Here, the so-called “spoon” and drug forfeiture laws are of 
consequence.493 By the Bush Administration’s own admission, the shift to 
eliminating intent gives the state unprecedented power to go after private 
assets.494 The courts, however, have been loath to interfere in this realm, 
seeing it as firmly within the Executive’s domain.  
It is important at this point to distinguish between punishing indi-
viduals aiding designated state sponsors (or giving direct aid to 
individuals engaged in terrorism) and the forfeiture or blocking of assets 
of an individual merely associated with someone suspected of terrorism. 
In the former instance, an individual does not need to share a mens rea to 
be found in violation of the law. The transfer of assets to the named state 
or individual constitutes a crime. In the latter instance, however, no ac-
tual help to further terrorist offenses needs to occur. Mere associational 
links are sufficient to lose access to one’s assets. This would be the 
equivalent to saying that once a terrorist state has been so designated, 
knowing anyone of that nationality is sufficient to lose one’s home. Put 
in this context, the new approach appears preposterous. If the actual 
                                                                                                                      
 491. President George W. Bush, Remarks to Troops and Families at Fort Campbell (Nov. 
21, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011121-3.html. 
 492. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Dinner of Senatorial Candidate Norm 
Coleman and Congressional Candidate John Kline in Minneapolis (July 15, 2002), in 38 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1177, 1181. 
 493. See Cuéllar, supra note 429, at 402; Annotation, Validity under Federal Const. of 
So-called ‘Head Shop’ Ordinances or Statutes Prohibiting Manufacture and Sale of Drug Use 
and Related Paraphernalia, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 15 (1984). 
 494. Mark Kantor, The War on Terrorism and the End of Banking Neutrality, 118 Bank-
ing L.J. 891, 892 (2002) (citing press briefing by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer 
on September 24, 2001). 
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funding of terrorists or terrorist organizations is not included as a neces-
sary condition to freeze assets, mere association, without intent, seems 
an insufficient basis on which to seize or freeze an individual’s assets. 
b. Secret Evidence and Due Process Concerns  
Another distinguishing factor between antiterrorist finance provi-
sions and regulatory or administrative procedures centers on the practical 
effect of the use of secret evidence and other characteristics of the anti-
terrorist finance regime that give rise to due process concerns.  
The USA PATRIOT Act § 106 explicitly amended the IEEPA to al-
low the Executive to submit classified evidence in camera and ex 
parte.495 The movement to the civil realm is important here: the courts 
have held that because terrorist financial freezing does not fall under 
criminal law, the defendant’s claim to a Sixth Amendment right to con-
front accusers does not apply.496  
As a constitutional matter, strong arguments can be raised on both 
sides of the divide: on the one hand, it is well-established that temporary 
and permanent aliens have a Fifth Amendment right to due process.497 
And the Supreme Court has routinely held the ability to confront wit-
nesses and answer evidence as central to due process.498 But a 
constitutional argument could be made to the contrary that, according to 
the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act (FISA) and IEEPA-related 
cases, discretionary use of secret evidence is permitted: where the latter 
allows for it, the former demands it. Indeed, in the national security 
realm, the courts historically have been reluctant to interfere in such due 
process claims. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. v. John 
Ashcroft, although decided on different grounds, cited precedent for al-
lowing secret evidence.499 In Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. Paul 
O’Neill, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion not to allow in camera 
and ex parte proceedings. It suggested that just because the judiciary 
                                                                                                                      
 495. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(g). 
 496. Joan M. O’Sullivan-Butler, Combating Money Laundering and International Ter-
rorism: Does the USA PATRIOT Act Require the Judicial System to Abandon Fundamental 
Due Process in the Name of Homeland Security?, 16 St. Thomas L. Rev. 395 (2004). 
 497. Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 
(2001). 
 498. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (“Certain principles have remained 
relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action 
seriously injures an individual and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, 
the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that 
he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.”). 
 499. Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Submit Evidence in Camera and ex Parte, 
Benevolence Int’l Found., Inc. v. John Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (No. 02 
C 763); see also U.S. v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that secret proceed-
ings do not violate due process). 
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considers secret evidence does not mean that it relies exclusively on it. 
The use of such information may be necessary where “acute national 
security concerns” are of issue. Many contend that terrorism presents 
something different from ordinary crime; thus some sort of mechanism 
is needed to allow law enforcement to work with intelligence informa-
tion.  
The general rule appears to be that a court cannot dispose of the 
merits of a case on the basis of secret evidence.500 Yet this is under attack. 
In anti-terrorist finance cases that it has brought since September 11, the 
government has not only asserted the right to secret evidence, but it 
claims that it is entitled, on the strength of the evidence, to obtain sum-
mary judgment.501 
Setting aside for the moment the purely legal question of whether 
secret evidence and ex parte proceedings can be used in anti-terrorist 
finance efforts, the fact they are used suggests that we might want to 
maintain a higher standard than that employed in regulatory or adminis-
trative procedures. The risks of not doing so are significant. The so-
called “Supergrass” trials in Northern Ireland prove illustrative. In the 
early 1980s Britain attempted to crack down on terrorist suspects by al-
lowing individuals to turn witness for the state. Much of the secret 
evidence, though, later used to convict scores of individuals, turned out 
to rest on personal vindictiveness. The phenomenon is not unknown in 
the United States: the government detained Hany Kiareldeen, a Palestin-
ian living in New Jersey, after an informant accused him of meeting with 
one of the individuals convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bomb-
ings. When Kiareldeen realized that the main source of the information 
was his wife, with whom he was locked in a bitter child custody battle, 
he informed the judge, who began to question the evidence and process 
in more depth. The state released Kiareldeen. 
The problem of vindictiveness is not insurmountable: one possible 
solution, put forward in the BIF memo, might be for the prosecution to 
issue a statement of undisputed facts, which can then be used to build the 
case. This would give the defense the opportunity to counter the 
                                                                                                                      
 500. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff ’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); 
Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 501. In Benevolence International, the plaintiff’s lawyers argued against this, saying 
“The government cannot . . . be permitted to seize an American corporation’s assets indefi-
nitely, never bring criminal or civil charges, and obtain dismissal of the corporation’s suit for 
return of its property by using ‘evidence’ that the corporation cannot see or respond to.” Pl.’s 
Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Submit Evidence in Camera and ex Parte at 15, Benevolence 
Int’l Found., Inc. v. John Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (No. 02 C 763). In 
addition, the lawyers argued that this violated due process rights guaranteed under Matthews v. 
Eldridge. Id. 
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charges.502 Nevertheless, the law as currently written incorporates no 
such protection.  
Other concerns haunt the process, underscoring the importance of 
maintaining a stronger due process standard. For example, the impact on 
property rights goes well beyond ordinary regulatory regimes, even as 
courts deny protections ordinarily connected with such invasive mecha-
nisms in criminal law. The judiciary has interpreted interest in property 
in its broadest sense, deferring to OFAC regulations: “an interest of any 
nature whatsoever, direct or indirect,” which could include “any other 
property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest or 
interests therein, present, future, or contingent.”503 The only check on this 
system is that a mid-level government official makes the decision. An 
informal audit revealed that officials omitted even this minimal adminis-
trative record on at least three occasions.504 
Searches conducted in the course of anti-terrorist finance efforts may 
be extensive, and the impact of freezing assets may prove substantial. In 
December 2001 Larry Thompson, the Deputy Attorney General, author-
ized a FISA search of the offices of the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) 
and its director’s home.505 From the former, the FBI collected records, 
video equipment, financial literature, promotional books, tapes, email, 
and computers, as well as servers, modems, a cell phone, hand-held ra-
dios, a credit card imprinter, and diskettes. From the director’s home, 
agents took computers, diskettes, video photographs, documents, re-
cords, audio tapes, cassette tapes, date books, a cell phone, a camera, a 
palm pilot, credit cards, foreign currency, and $13,030. The federal gov-
ernment simultaneously froze all GRF assets, forcing the organization to 
close, and INS deported a key GRF fund raiser. Although in January 
2002 GRF sued the state and requested a return of the materials seized, 
the suit failed.506 The court held that an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations must be given controlling weight when challenged unless it 
                                                                                                                      
 502. Id., at 17. 
 503. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.311–312, 595.310. 
 504. In the case of the Illinois charities, the suspension of assets lasted ten or eleven 
months—hardly the pressing emergency to which the measure was meant to apply. Staff 
Report, supra note 1, at 51. 
 505. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–29. GRF, which began operating in 1992 as a domestic, non-
profit enterprise headquartered in Illinois, funneled millions of dollars to alleviate human 
suffering in 25 states. In 1995 it funded programs in Chechnya, Bosnia, Pakistan, Kashmir, 
and Lebanon. In 1996 it expanded to Afghanistan and Azerbaijan; in 1997 to Bangladesh, in 
1998 to Iraq and Somalia; in 1999 to Albania, Belgium, China, Eritrea, Kosovo, and Turkey; 
and in 2000 to Ethiopia, Jordan, and Sierra Leone. It also funded programs in Gaza and the 
West Bank. Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 506. Global Relief Found., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 787. 
DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
416 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 27:303 
 
was plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, especially in 
matters involving foreign policy and national security.507  
The Staff Report for the September 11 Commission highlighted “the 
highly deferential standard of review afforded to the President in the ex-
ercise of his Commander in Chief powers under IEEPA.”508 The report 
reflected: “Although effective in shutting down its targets, this aggressive 
approach raises potential civil liberties concerns, as the charities’ sup-
porters insist that they were unfairly targeted, denied due process, and 
closed without any evidence they actually funded al Qaeda or any terror-
ist groups.”509 This deference allows the state to waive the notice 
requirements otherwise inherent in due process. The courts explained: 
Because of the Executive’s need for speed in these matters, and 
the need to prevent the flight of assets and destruction of re-
cords, the President and his designees cannot provide pre-
deprivation notice under these circumstances . . . Pre-deprivation 
notice would, in fact, be antithetical to the objectives of these 
sanctions programs and, as a result, it is OFAC policy when ini-
tiating a blocking pursuant to IEEPA not to provide pre-blocking 
notice.510  
Further distinguishing anti-terrorist finance from other administra-
tive and regulatory capabilities is a certain conflict of interest in the way 
the current system operates. Defendants who have had their assets frozen 
must apply to OFAC for a license to release funds. The license dictates 
who can represent the defendants, how much money the defendants can 
spend, and which issues they can raise. This basically puts Executive 
branch officials in control of who can sue them, the terms upon which 
they are sued, and how vigorously the lawsuit is pursued.511 And others 
cannot step up to pay for legal fees: the Executive Order makes any such 
support illegal, raising issues related to the rule of law. The courts have 
yet to rule on the merits of the claim that this violates a Fifth Amend-
ment right to due process and a First Amendment right to sue for redress. 
(The one case to address this issue, Benevolence International Founda-
tion, ended up being plea bargained.)512  
                                                                                                                      
 507. Id. at 792. As of the time of writing, the Department of Justice still has not brought 
any criminal charges against GRF. 
 508. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 11 n.4. 
 509. Id. at 11. 
 510. Global Relief Found., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 803–04. 
 511. Corrected Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 38, Benevolence Int’l 
Found., Inc. v. John Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (No. 02 C 763).  
 512. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 does not prevent the state from freezing criminal funds that could 
be used for legal defense. See D. Randall Johnson, The Criminally Derived Property Statue: 
DONOHUE FINAL TYPE.DOC 5/3/2006 3:39 PM 
Winter 2006] Anti-Terrorist Finance 417 
 
The use of secret evidence and ex parte proceedings, the significant 
impact on rights, the absence of notice, and the conflict of interest that 
characterize the current regime raise important due process concerns that 
set anti-terrorist finance efforts apart from other state administrative and 
regulatory regimes. 
c. Stigma 
Finally, even if no criminal charges follow, the stigma of investiga-
tion is hard for an entity to counter. A few examples suffice: Bob Simon, 
from CBS’ 60 Minutes, claimed during one show that several Muslim 
groups in Herndon, Virginia, had terrorist ties. Reported on the basis of 
an anonymous source (that turned out to be Rita Katz), the story sug-
gested that the groups invested in Mar-Jac Poultry, a chicken-plucking 
farm in Gainesville, Georgia, where possibly millions of chickens had 
gone “missing.” Customs agents raided the farm but found nothing. Mar-
Jac filed suit against the network and the city of Atlanta. Because of the 
investigation, the poultry farm is facing bankruptcy, and banks, “wary of 
being accused of financing terrorism, may cut its credit lines.”513  
Global Relief Foundation, as already noted, became the subject of 
freezing orders under the IEEPA. Although the state never brought 
criminal charges, the stigma attached to GRF undermined its operations. 
The courts ruled that the mere statement that such groups are under in-
vestigation, without more defamatory statements, is insufficient to merit 
legal claims.514 
3. Political and Humanitarian Costs 
Just as the United States and United Kingdom appear aware of the 
problem caused by the sudden increase in SARs, both states seem, at a 
minimum, to realize the implications of the inroads into the rights of par-
ticular states or ethnic groups without more evidence of a direct 
connection to terrorist activity. International partners, vital in responding 
to global terrorist movements, may be alienated. And domestic and in-
ternational populations that the states need to help respond to terrorist 
claims may find both ethnic targeting and the states’ refusal to respond to 
humanitarian issues unacceptable. Such behavior underscores terrorist 
assertions, which, since September 11, have painted Western states as 
                                                                                                                      
Constitutional and Interpretive Issues Raised by 18 U.S.C. § 1957, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
1291 (1993). 
 513. Moving Targets, The Economist, Sept. 14, 2002, at 80. See also John Sugg, Ter-
rorist Chicken Laundering, AlterNet, June 12, 2003, available at http://www.bintjbeil.com/ 
articles/2003/en/0612_sugg.html. 
 514. See, e.g., Global Relief Found., Inc. v. New York Times Co., 390 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
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solely interested in targeting individuals on the basis of race and religion 
with little regard for their rights.  
a. International Fallout 
More than 80 percent of the money the United States blocked post-
September 11 came under state control within the first three months of 
the attacks.515 The state’s immediate and sudden creation of lists of indi-
viduals and entities for the purposes of asset blocking, however, 
appeared to occur without sufficient evidence. Early cases quickly dem-
onstrated the weakness of the U.S. charges against those the state 
accused of complicity in terrorist aims. And lower standards of proof did 
nothing to increase international confidence in U.S. standards of justice. 
As Part II noted, the U.S. initiatives essentially replaced a criminal law 
standard with an intelligence one: mere links to terrorists or terrorist or-
ganizations became sufficient as a basis on which to seize assets. 
Together with the targeting of a specific ethnic and religious commu-
nity—a similar targeting of which would cause considerable domestic 
unrest in states with a larger percentage population drawn from the Arab, 
Muslim community—the lack of due process involved created concern. 
Simultaneously, the Bush Administration refused to provide additional 
information on which the claims had been made. The Staff Report for 
the September 11 Commission found:  
These early missteps have made other countries unwilling to 
freeze assets or otherwise act merely on the basis of a U.S. ac-
tion. Multilateral freezing mechanisms now require waiting 
periods before money can be frozen, a change that has elimi-
nated the element of surprise and virtually ensured that little 
money is actually frozen.516  
A United Nations monitoring panel established in January 2004 to 
determine whether and to what extent financial measures had been effec-
tive against al Qaeda concluded that the network had successfully evaded 
sanctions, while the financial sanctions regime itself had lost credibil-
ity.517  
Several examples of apparent errors on the part of the United States 
present themselves. Take, for instance, the London-based Palestinian 
Relief and Development Fund, known as Interpal. First registered in the 
United Kingdom in August 1994, the organization “provides aid to, as-
sists, guides and comforts poor and needy Palestinians in the West Bank 
                                                                                                                      
 515. Lee, supra note 252, at 1. 
 516. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 48. 
 517. Fidler, supra note 421. 
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and Gaza strip, Jordan and Lebanon. It aims to relieve the hardship and 
suffering of these distressed persons by co-operating or working with 
other charitable organizations in the region.” Its income between January 
2000 and December 31, 2001, was more than £4 million. On August 21, 
2003, President Bush accused the group of sending funds to Hamas. The 
Charity Commission for England and Wales, which registers charities, 
responded within three days by temporarily freezing Interpal’s bank ac-
counts. Its subsequent investigation, however, failed to find any evidence 
to back this claim. By September 2003, the United Kingdom released the 
organization’s assets and closed its inquiry, announcing, “The U.S. au-
thorities were unable to provide evidence to support allegations made 
against Interpal within the agreed time scale.”518 The Commission openly 
stated that it was “alert to the possibilities of charities being used to fur-
ther or support terrorist activities.” It was willing to look at the U.S. 
allegations and work with law enforcement for investigation, but it 
noted, “The Commission’s own work reveals that connections or links 
between registered charities in England and Wales and terrorist organiza-
tions are very rare.”519  
In another case, Aqeel al-Aqeel, the former director of al-Haramain, 
filed a lawsuit against four U.S. officials for including him in the spe-
cially designated global terrorist list. In the face of U.S. refusal to release 
any evidence implicating al-Aqeel, the Dutch government unfroze his 
assets.520  
Perhaps the best example, though, is al-Barakaat. “The blessing” in 
Arabic, al-Barakaat served as the principal banking system in Somalia. 
Founded by Ahmed Nur Ali Jumale in 1985, by September 11 it had 
more than 180 offices in 40 different states, with its headquarters in the 
United Arab Emirates. The U.S. government alleged that from 1992 
Osama bin Laden served as both a customer and a silent partner of the 
organization, which supposedly had close links to al-Itihaad al-Islamiya 
(AIAI), a group of Islamists that the Defense Intelligence Agency con-
sidered a major threat in Somalia. In July 1999 the FBI in Minneapolis 
opened a full field investigation and found other al-Barakaat branches in 
                                                                                                                      
 518. Cilina Nasser, Closure of U.S. Terror-designated Charity Shatters Many Lives, 
Daily Star (Lebanon), Aug. 27, 2004. 
 519. Palestinians Relief and Development Fund, paras. 10, 11 (The Charity Com-
mission, Sept. 24, 2003), available at http://www.epolitix.com/NR/rdonlyres/262ED501-45CE-
4FDE-9866-A7FD4530F60F/0/THECHARITYCOMMISSION24SEPTEMBER2003.doc (re-
sults of the Charity Commission’s inquiry into the affairs of the Palestinians Relief and 
Development fund, known as INTERPAL). 
 520. P.K. Abdul Ghafour, Ageel Sues U.S. Officials, Arabnews.com, May 14, 2005, 
http://www.arabnews.com/search (search “Aqeel Sues US Officials”; then follow hyperlink to 
article). See also Saudi to Sue Senior U.S. Officials, Aljazeera.net, May 15, 2005, http:// 
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San Diego, Washington, D.C., Charlotte, Cincinnati, New York, and Se-
attle. The following year it opened a criminal investigation.  
Following September 11 al-Barakaat became one of the first organi-
zations to have its assets frozen. On November 7, 2001, federal agents 
broke into eight Barakaat offices around the United States and seized 
their records. President Bush held a press event, alleging that Jumale was 
a friend and a supporter of bin Laden and estimating that some $25 mil-
lion went through his organization to terrorist operations. Jumale and 
others the state associated with the network and placed on the list could 
not so much as buy a stick of gum in the following months without vio-
lating Executive Order 13,224. After five months of trying to get its 
assets unfrozen (and OFAC not returning its calls), the organization 
brought suit in April 2002. 
In the interim, the FBI began to realize that the information it had 
collected from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and various intelligence 
bodies was contradictory. Out of tens of thousands of documents from 
al-Barakaat, nothing appeared out of order. It turned out that bin Laden 
had not been in Afghanistan with Jumale. The FBI spent time in UAE, 
which cooperated fully with the investigation. Despite scores of inter-
views with individuals involved in the case (including Jumale) and 
unfettered access to the organization’s records, the “FBI could not sub-
stantiate any links between al-Barakaat and terrorism.”521 
The United States did not just go after the U.S. assets of those asso-
ciated with al-Barakaat. It placed three Swedish citizens and one 
Canadian on the UN list. In January 2002, the Swedes petitioned OFAC 
and the UN to remove their names. Canada also moved to take its citizen 
off the list. Sweden unsuccessfully tried to convince the Security Coun-
cil to use criminal evidentiary standards for constructing the list. The 
United States vigorously opposed this, on the grounds that most of the 
names would be removed. The Swedish effort spurred France to try to 
convince the Security Council to establish even basic rules, such as crite-
ria for sanctions and a procedure for review. Eventually the United States 
removed five people from the list and said it would consider other ap-
peals.522 The UN, in turn, created an evidentiary requirement for the list 
                                                                                                                      
 521. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 84. 
 522. For the current UN list, see U.N. Security Council, 1267 Comm., The New Con-
solidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban and al-
Qaida Organization as Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee, available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267LIstEng.htm. 
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as well as an appeals procedure. The Swedes brought suit in the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, claiming a violation of due process.523 
The case became a lightning rod for human rights and due process 
violations associated with U.S. actions post-September 11. Well known 
Swedes collected money for the men’s defense, and a prominent attorney 
took the case. One of the men, Abdirisak Aden, had run for office in the 
2000 Swedish elections; none of them had criminal records. Ultimately, 
this designation, and many of those made immediately after September 
11, undermined U.S. efforts to stem the flow of funds to terrorist organi-
zations. The Staff Report of the September 11 Commission later found: 
The post-9/11 period at OFAC was “chaos.” The goal set at the 
policy levels of the White House and Treasury was to conduct a 
public and aggressive series of designations to show the world 
community and our allies that the United States was serious 
about pursuing the financial targets. It entailed a major designa-
tion every four weeks, accompanied by derivative designations 
throughout the month. As a result, Treasury officials acknowl-
edged that some of the evidentiary foundations for the early 
designations were quite weak . . . The rush to designate came 
primarily from the NSC and gave pause to many in the govern-
ment. Some believed that the government’s haste in this area, 
and its preference for IEEPA sanctions, might result in a high 
level of false designations that would ultimately jeopardize the 
United States’ ability to persuade other countries to designate 
groups as terrorist organizations. Ultimately . . . this proved to 
be the case with the al-Barakaat designations.524 
By 2004 the United Nations recognized that its list had “begun to 
lose credibility and operational value” and needed updating. Only 21 
states submitted names for list—the bulk of which originated from the 
United States—including approximately 174 people and 111 groups as-
sociated to al Qaeda. By 2004, not a single person on the list had been 
stopped by the travel ban.525  
The credibility gap meant not only that states tended to be uncoop-
erative, but that those responsible for intentionally funding terrorist 
operations continued to act with impunity: more than two years after the 
attacks, for example, Youssef Nada and Ahmed Idris Nasrddin, both of 
whom were central to al Qaeda’s international financing, remained in 
                                                                                                                      
 523. Press Release, 1267 Committee Approves Deletion of Three Individuals and Three 
Entities From its List, U.N. Doc. SC/7490 (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http:// 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7490.doc.htm.  
 524. Staff Report, supra note 1, at 79. 
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business in several European states.526 Al-Taqwa, supposedly shut down, 
continued to operate.527 And a number of individuals placed on the lists 
began to bring suit.528 
This problem of the alienation of allied (and non-allied) states is par-
ticularly important. On the one hand, the lack of evidence provided 
means that Islamic states, in complying with U.S. requests, look as 
though they are simply “caving in to Western demands at the expense of 
Muslim tradition,” risking “a backlash against the governments.”529 In-
deed, Islamic banks are beginning to go on the offensive.530 As 
governments prove reluctant to trust the United States, the U.S. govern-
ment is forced to adopt more coercive methods to achieve their 
objectives. This means a growth in extraterritorial powers—the approach 
adopted by the anti-terrorist finance provisions in the USA PATRIOT 
Act. Such coercion, however, consumes political advantage that might be 
better applied to more effective ways to interrupt terrorist operations. 
And it creates a gulf between states. A Financial Times article explained 
on September 25, 2001: “President George W. Bush’s order freezing ter-
rorist assets is directed as much against international banks and 
governments as Osama bin Laden’s network.”531 This is a dangerous per-
ception to cultivate when one needs international allies to counter a 
global terrorist threat. 
b. Assisting Terrorist Claims and Aims 
Not only do such measures alienate important allies in the battle 
against terrorism, but the manner in which they have been implemented, 
particularly on this side of the Atlantic, appears to validate some of 
Osama bin Laden’s claims. Specifically, the campaign against Muslim 
charities does little to undermine the assertion that the United States is 
targeting Muslims. As the Staff Report to the September 11 Commission 
                                                                                                                      
 526. See Edward Alden, Mark Huband & Mark Turner, Al Qaeda “Financiers” Active in 
Europe: A UN Report Reveals a Lack of Action Over Youssef Nada and Ahmed Idris Nasred-
din, Fin. Times (London), Nov. 14, 2003, at 11; Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Terror 
Watch: Dubious Link between Atta and Saddam, Newsweek, Dec. 17, 2003 (web exclusive). 
 527. Alden et al., supra note 526. 
 528. For example, Yasin al Qadi (aka Yasin Kadi), the former director of Blessed Relief 
(Muwafaq Foundation) sued in the European Court of Justice to have his name removed from 
the list. Constant Brand, EU Court Hears Terror Blacklist Case, Guardian (London), Oct. 14, 
2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-3263794,00.html. 
 529. Looney, supra note 2. 
 530. See Nigel Dudley, Islamic Banking—Structure is a Necessary Target—A New Insti-
tution Aims to Set Industry-wide Standard for Islamic Banking, The Banker, May 1, 2003; 
James Drummond, Islamic Banks Stung by Claims They Fund Violent Extremists, Fin. Times 
(London), Oct. 8, 2001, at 6. 
 531. Richard Wolffe, “Wake-up Call” Warns Banks to Co-operate Freezing Assets, Fin. 
Times (London), Sept. 25, 2001, at 3. 
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notes, “the campaign has aroused controversy on various political, reli-
gious and humanitarian grounds and is viewed in some quarters as 
broadly anti-Islamic.”532  
A few examples suffice: Al Sanabil Association for Relief and De-
velopment, established in 1993 in response to UNRWA budget cuts, 
sponsored 1,200 Palestinian families, spending approximately $800,000 
in 2003 on orphans and $55,000 on needy patients. The organization also 
distributed food and home appliances to displaced persons. Treasury 
froze the group’s assets in August 2003, claiming that its funds went 
through Hamas. Those previously benefiting from the organization wit-
nessed the devastating affect, as the UNRWA proved unable to provide 
even basic needs for the more than 1.3 million Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Considerable 
publicity in the region drew attention to the United States’ actions—and 
the lack of evidence to support its allegations.533 
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), a nonprofit charitable 
organization founded in 1992 and run by U.S. citizens, raised millions 
for humanitarian aid in twelve locations: Pakistan, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, 
Tajikistan, Yemen, Bangladesh, Turkey, Dagestan, Georgia, China, and 
Ingushetia.534 When OFAC froze the organization’s assets in 2001, BIF 
offered to have the FBI itself take the money overseas to a Charity 
Women’s Hospital in Daghestan and a children’s tuberculosis hospital in 
Tajikistan that would otherwise be forced to close. OFAC refused the 
request. Most employees had to be let go, and the charity was unable to 
raise new funds to support its humanitarian relief. Ultimately, the frozen 
funds were all spent on BIF’s legal fees, with a devastating affect on the 
regions it previously served. Such actions, as well as the overt inclusion 
of a clause in the Executive Order banning assistance for real humanitar-
ian need created by the freezing of assets—in conjunction with the clear 
use of the measures against the Arab and Muslim populations in the 
United States and overseas—does little to undermine al Qaeda’s claims. 
U.S. policy post-September 11 also brings the United States into 
conflict with Islamic states that depend upon the flow of alternative re-
mittances for the health and welfare of their populations. Aside from 
foreign policy considerations, the United States has an interest in  
                                                                                                                      
 532. Staff Report, supra note 1, summary. See also Lee, supra note 252. 
 533. Nasser, supra note 518. 
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ensuring that many of these regions remain economically viable and tied 
to U.S. influence as a way to prevent the creation of a vacuum into 
which extremist movements can move. Somalia provides a good exam-
ple: aid agencies there became concerned that shutting down al-
Barakaat, the largest remittance company in Somalia, would push the 
state into the hands of extremists. Approximately $500 million per 
year—a number far in excess of the foreign aid given to the region—
flowed through this entity. The company ran highly efficient transfers. 
The United Nations itself used the system. And the humanitarian costs of 
shutting it down would be considerable: with an economy already driven 
into the ground from war, weather, and border closures, at least 50 per-
cent of the Somali population, according to Save the Children, depended 
upon funds from abroad for their basic existence. Blocking these funds 
does not marginalize fundamentalists; it makes them more powerful. The 
United States ignored these claims, however, taking the rather absurd 
position that Western Union operated along the borders and Moneygram 
had one office in Mogadishu—and so money would continue to flow to 
the region.535 These more expensive and extremely limited alternatives, 
however, proved dreadfully inadequate to address the significant levels 
of need within Somalia. 
It is not just Islamic states with the potential to host fundamentalist 
movements that feel the affect of an increased regulatory system. For 
example, although Latin America is not specifically listed on the annex 
to Executive Order 13,224, it would be wrong to assume that the area is 
not affected. In 2000 the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs spent roughly $11 million on drugs, terrorism, and 
money laundering in the Bahamas, Central America, and South Amer-
ica.536 The United States could use its post-September 11 authority to 
target financial institutions in the region: the Executive Order grants the 
Secretary of State discretion without any standards of culpability. While 
acknowledging this reality, President Bush downplayed the region’s con-
cerns: “Although the blocking powers enumerated in the Order are 
broad, my Administration is committed to exercising them responsibly, 
with due regard for the culpability of the persons and entities potentially 
covered by the order.”537  
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This claim, however, is a hollow one. The point is that the powers 
are available, and in order to ensure compliance with the new regulatory 
regime, remittance businesses will incur new expenses. The affect is felt 
well beyond the counterterrorist realm. Latin American immigrants in 
the United States, for instance, send an average of $250 each to their 
home states 8–10 times each year. But transfer fees raise the costs to up 
to 20 percent of the value they send. Increased regulatory requirements 
make remittances—which exceed U.S. foreign aid to the region—even 
more expensive.538 Moreover, Latin American institutions may well reject 
even legitimate business they would have accepted in the past. States 
may opt to introduce even stricter rules than those in the United States to 
retain other economic benefits of association with Washington. And eco-
nomic consequences may follow: just as Mexico is recovering from the 
1994 peso crisis, these policies may trigger an economic downward spi-
ral, destabilizing the Mexican economy.539 Concerns abound elsewhere: 
in 2003 the expatriate community in the United States sent some $1 bil-
lion to Cuba. In May 2004 the Administration announced new limits on 
this transfer. The measures capped remittances at $1,200 per year and 
allowed only one visit every three years, instead of annually, as previ-
ously. Cubans in the United States reacted strongly to what they soon 
saw as a humanitarian crisis.540 
c. The Problem of “Black Lists” 
In considering the political and humanitarian costs of the current 
regime, special attention ought to be given to the problem of “black 
lists.” Here, the issues described in Part III.A (the overburdening of the 
regulatory regime) and those in Part III.B (the rights implicated in the 
current regime) are related. That is, with the overburdening of the 
regulatory regime, one alternative is to depend on the creation of black 
lists, which, outside the judicial realm, raise significant issues related to 
rights. As one prominent lawyer noted, the construction of these lists 
lacks a certain scientific accuracy.541 Indeed, the cases cited earlier in this 
Article demonstrate that often the wrong people—or at least individuals 
for whom no evidence of culpability is forthcoming from the state—
become caught in the process. As individuals increasingly challenge 
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their terrorist designations in court, belief in the justness of anti-terrorist 
seizures erodes, affecting both domestic and international support for the 
regime itself. The United States’ refusal to allow any sort of independent 
arbitration to accompany the creation of lists substantially weakened the 
UN attempt to build a dossier of dangerous individuals. Simultaneously, 
the lack of such a structure opens the door to abuse from other states. 
In other words, while the United States focuses on the “war on ter-
ror,” it is entirely conceivable that other states, particularly those in parts 
of the world where al Qaeda may have a particularly strong hold, may 
attempt to use any existing regime to target political opponents. Here 
U.S. policy may be contradictory: while a significant aim of the “war” 
may be to establish democratic regimes (with the assumption that their 
presence will strengthen U.S. national security), black lists themselves 
may become a tool with which other regimes silence voices demanding 
democratic change. And there will be little or no recourse without any 
independent arbitration of the placement of individuals on these lists. 
The policy may even more directly increase the threat to national se-
curity. As states such as Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and Pakistan detain, 
torture, and confiscate the assets of “militants,” local communities may 
become enraged, strengthening the hand of Islamists. Dangerous long-
term consequences may result. In other words, as the rule of law erodes, 
so too may non-militant political space. 
The United States defends its position by claiming that it cannot re-
veal the sources on which its list is based; this would compromise its 
intelligence-gathering abilities, as well as operatives in the field. In some 
cases, this most certainly is true; in others, this assertion may be just a 
way to conceal the lack of any real information beyond speculation. But 
even legitimate intelligence concerns should not deter the United States 
from seeking to establish mechanisms that could verify its underlying 
data. If anything, such an independent process would bolster the U.S. 
claim that particular individuals contributed to terrorist movements and 
allow the United States to freeze the assets of those it considers a real 
threat, assuming that freezing the assets is, indeed, the appropriate step 
to take—as opposed to following the money to determine who is respon-
sible for violence, interrupting operations, and bringing the perpetrators 
to justice. 
Because terrorism is as much a propaganda battle as anything else, 
the nature of the process for constructing black lists matters. Who the 
United States includes in its lists becomes as important as who it ex-
cludes.542 Relatedly, there are a range of entities and individuals missing 
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from the U.S. lists that counterterrorist experts would expect to see. 
Their absence tends to underscore the unique geopolitical ties of certain 
states and entities—notably Saudi Arabia and those connected to the rul-
ing Saudi elite. By not including them on the lists, however, the United 
States further undermines its claims to be acting in a just manner. The 
inclusion, instead, of individuals either unconnected to terrorism or con-
nected only in a minor capacity breeds a cynicism that undermines U.S. 
counterterrorist efforts. 
Perhaps one of the most important innovations in the development of 
British anti-terrorist measures, in fact, lies in the importance the state 
finally granted to the role of public communications. The Select Com-
mittee on Northern Ireland Affairs recognized that “publicity campaigns 
can be more effective than law enforcement in certain situations” and 
urged “the Government to give serious consideration to the role which 
such campaigns might play in the future strategy for dealing with spe-
cific facets of organized crime such as fuel laundering and tobacco 
smuggling.”543  
This involved more than just attempting to accumulate the right in-
formation—admittedly, one of the weaknesses of the bureaucracy. Prior 
to the creation of the Organized Crime Task Force, the United Kingdom 
lacked even a definition of organized crime, making it difficult for the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland to collect data on operational suc-
cesses in this sphere. Once the state adopted the appropriate metrics, its 
public outreach mechanisms could take the information generated and 
move the battle to the next level: “We recommend that the Government 
ensure that the judiciary in Northern Ireland are fully apprised of the 
strong links which have now been established between paramilitary or-
ganisations, serious and organized crime and the range of offences which 
provide these groups and individuals with their income.”544 
The public proved an equally important target.545 Parliamentarians 
lamented the situation in Northern Ireland, where it was acceptable to 
“pull one over” on the government. Indeed, much of the emphasis in the 
recent reports of the organized crime task force centers on the idea that 
paramilitary activities are not victimless crimes. This theme is repeated 
on the task force’s web site, launched in 2002. In many ways, this is an 
extremely effective strategy: instead of falling into the early 1980s trap 
of calling paramilitaries criminals, the state is emphasizing the criminal-
ity of certain types of behavior in which paramilitaries engage. 
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Admittedly, this effort is limited to illicit sources of funding; but it is an 
effective way to address criminal methods from which many terrorist 
organizations raise funds. 
Opportunities for pursing a similar route in the United States may 
also exist. Zakat, for instance, requires individuals not just to contribute 
anonymously but, as read by moderate Islamic scholars, also enjoins 
them to ensure the gift reaches its intended recipient. Islam, moreover, 
only demands anonymity between the recipient and the donor, making 
this requirement entirely acceptable. In theory, at least, this means that 
states should be able to trace funds—and that theological reasons may 
exist for individuals to object to charities funneling money to terrorists. 
If the U.S. government helps to publicize this interpretation (without 
tainting it as U.S. propaganda), its anti-terrorist efforts may be more suc-
cessful. But this strategy requires the state to recognize the importance 
of public relations in its overall counterterrorist effort—a consideration 
largely absent from the current regime. 
One intriguing approach not yet explored in this Article is the crea-
tion of “white lists,” which would confer rewards on regions, states, or 
entities that prove particularly helpful in tracing terrorist assets.546 It ap-
pears as though the U.S. government has already tried something 
similar: in October 2002 the United States agreed that the Financial Ac-
tion Task Force would suspend its “name and shame” program to allow 
the International Monetary Fund to offer technical assistance to states 
that introduce more stringent anti-terrorist finance measures.547 This idea 
deserves further discussion. 
C. Future Concerns: The Electronic Sphere 
The United Kingdom and United States—and terrorist organizations 
that threaten both states—are just now beginning to explore the signifi-
cance of the Internet and e-commerce in the terrorist realm.548 This area 
raises important issues related to anonymity, the lack of geographic 
bounds, and clandestine communications.  
The CIA World Factbook estimated in 2002 that more than 10,000 
ISPs and more than 580 million users occupy the electronic realm.549 Ter-
rorist groups can use the Internet to solicit donations, share data, and 
recruit supporters. One site, for instance, www.azzam.com (named after 
                                                                                                                      
 546. See Jonathan Winer, How to Clean up Dirty Money, Fin. Times (London), Mar. 23, 
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Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s mentor), posted a page entitled, “What 
Can I Do to Help Jihad and the Mujahideen?” The text asserted:  
Jihad is a profitable investment that pays handsome dividends. 
For someone who is not able to fight at this moment in time due 
to a valid excuse they can start by the collection and donation of 
funds . . . Azzam Publications is able to accept all kinds of Zakat 
and Sadaqah donations and pass them on where they are most 
needed.550  
Global Jihad Fund had a site requesting money “to facilitate the 
growth of various Jihad Movements around the World by supplying them 
with sufficient funds to purchase weapons and train their individuals.”551 
It included links to web sites funding the Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbol-
lah.552  
What tools can and will states use to address concerns raised by this 
medium? And what will be their affect? As Part II of this Article demon-
strated, Northern Ireland terrorist organizations are increasingly turning 
to the Internet as a way to solicit and move money. What is the role of 
traditional crimes conducted online, such as stolen identification and 
credit card theft, intellectual property piracy, and online security fraud? 
In Northern Ireland, increasing terrorist use of the Internet has meant an 
ever smaller gap between counterterrorism and ordinary criminal law. 
Instead of the latter being applied to the former, however, counterterror-
ist provisions, considerably broader and lacking traditional safeguards, 
have flowed over into the criminal realm. What does this mean for the 
state of criminal law more generally? Will we see the movement of such 
crimes into the civil realm, given their separation from conviction of an 
underlying offense? These questions have yet to be addressed. 
In relation particularly to al Qaeda-type organizations, how will ter-
rorist organizations exploit charitable organizations online to solicit 
funding for violence? And how will they use the Internet to move 
funds—e.g., cash, brokerage, and securities firms? A host of issues are 
of consequence here, ranging from the protection of individual rights to 
the applicable levels of culpability. For instance, how will the alienation 
of the Muslim and Arab community since September 11 effect the state’s 
efforts to obtain language capabilities necessary for it to monitor devel-
opments in the electronic realm? 
If the United Kingdom and the United States persist in simply apply-
ing the traditional money laundering regime to these new media, many 
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of the issues highlighted in this Article—such as inefficiencies in the 
financial sector more broadly and the ineffectiveness of driving actors 
out of the regulated sectors—may well apply. Simultaneously, increased 
state monitoring and regulation may lead to further use of encryption, 
making the tracing of such funds even more difficult. If the United States 
is successful at weakening encryption standards, however, the effect may 
be felt more broadly, both in the U.S. industry’s ability to keep pace with 
international competition and in a possible increase in computer-based 
crime unrelated to terrorism.  
These, of course, are broad, sweeping generalizations whose investi-
gation is beyond the bounds of this particular Article. But they are 
illustrative of a host of questions that attend the expansion of the money 
laundering regime to the electronic sphere. Instead of simply transferring 
the anti-money laundering regime to counterterrorist efforts, careful 
analysis that begins and ends with these media and, specifically, terror-
ism needs to occur. As of yet, however, sufficient attention to these 
questions, and the host of queries that mark the use of the electronic sec-
tor for terrorist finance, has been lacking. 
IV. Conclusion 
On December 1, 2001, Hamas orchestrated two suicide bombings in 
Israel that left 25 people dead. The following day, Prime Minister Sharon 
asked President Bush to act against Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development (HLFRD), a California corporation headquartered in Texas 
which, according to its annual report, distributed approximately $6 mil-
lion per year to refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel.553 (It also raised 
money for non-Islamic causes, such as the victims of the Oklahoma City 
bombing and, in 2001, the attacks on the World Trade Center.) By De-
cember 4, 2001, the United States had frozen the organization’s assets 
and raided its offices in Texas, California, New Jersey, and Illinois. 
President Bush said the money went to Hamas to “support schools and 
indoctrinate children to grow up into suicide bombers.”554 (Ironically, one 
supposedly Hamas-controlled institution financed by HLFRD, the al 
Razi hospital in the West Bank, also received support from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development and the UAE Red Crescent.)555  
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On March 7, 2002, HLFRD sued the DOJ, the Department of State, 
and the Department of the Treasury. The organization claimed a viola-
tion of its First Amendment right to religious freedom, Fourth 
Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and Fifth Amendment right to due process. Court documents revealed 
that the decision to freeze the organization’s assets came from a Novem-
ber 5, 2001, 49-page memo written by Dale L. Watson, assistant director 
of the counterterrorist division of the FBI, claiming that HLFRD was the 
“primary fund-raising entity for Hamas.” The complaint noted that the 
group conducted extensive charitable and humanitarian work with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, NATO, the 
UNHCR, Turkey, the UN World Food Program, UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, and the UN Interna-
tional Children’s Emergency Fund. 
The state never brought criminal charges against HLFRD. Nor, as 
was earlier noted, did it manage to prosecute BFI, or a host of other 
charities whose assets it froze, for terrorist contributions.556 The United 
States’ failure to substantiate such claims, the introduction of measures 
that allowed for freezing assets on the basis of mere association, and the 
state’s disproportionate focus on Muslim charities created an environ-
ment hostile to legitimate Islamic businesses and charities. Admittedly, 
the alienation of Arabs and Muslims is also the product of other official 
policies, such as indefinite detention, and informal practices, such as plan-
ning commissions’ reluctance to approve the building of mosques in the 
aftermath of September 11. But the cumulative impact is borne in the eco-
nomic affect on families, as well as a larger strain on social services. At a 
broader level, minority groups may develop a lack of confidence in the 
political process, preventing social cohesion and political participation. 
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And remittances that need to go to develop civil society in economically-
deprived regions where Islamists recruit may disappear. 
These issues, and others that haunt U.S. efforts to respond to al 
Qaeda, are not unique to that state: recent events have increasingly 
forced Britain to grapple with how to address the flow of funds to terror-
ist organizations outside the Northern Ireland context. This point was 
vividly brought home on July 7, 2005: four suicide bombers detonated 
explosives in central London. Starting from King’s Cross, the men trav-
eled north, south, east, and west, making their point that no one within 
the United Kingdom was safe. At least 52 people died and more than 700 
sustained injuries. A group calling itself the Secret Organization of al 
Qaeda in Europe claimed responsibility. Within a fortnight officials ap-
prehended the believed leader of the cell, Haroon Rashid Aswat, in 
Pakistan as he attempted to cross the border into Afghanistan with 
£17,000 in cash.  
None of the suicide bombers, all British subjects, had appeared on 
the British security services’ financial or intelligence radars. The United 
Kingdom’s regulatory measures, moreover, would not have been able to 
intercept Aswat’s domestic expenditures or his subsequent physical 
transfer of assets. And he had been trained in the United States—where 
he similarly escaped the regulatory regime established post-September 
11. Both states might have more successfully mounted freezing orders: 
Aswat was already known to intelligence agencies on both sides of the 
Atlantic, and he was carrying a British passport under his own name 
when Pakistani authorities caught him on the border. But for the success-
ful intercept of any funds physically carried either at that time or 
previously, the complicity of a range of governments would be re-
quired—here the evidentiary standards needed to convince other states to 
follow suit is of great importance. While increased regulation and asset 
forfeiture may represent important law enforcement tools writ large, the 
impact on individual rights—particularly property—and the effective-
ness of such measures in the face of terrorist challenge deserves greater 
attention.  
In Part II of this Article I suggested that the United Kingdom and the 
United States follow a similar trajectory in their treatment of anti-
terrorist finance. In the former, from 1972 forward Northern Ireland pa-
ramilitaries expanded the source of their funds. Although prior to this 
time Northern Ireland retained the authority to suspend property rights, it 
used it only sporadically. Upon the advent of Direct Rule, Westminster 
retained the powers for Northern Ireland but initially rejected incorporat-
ing them into the rest of the United Kingdom. The battle against drugs 
and, specifically, money laundering, however, changed this. Gradual in-
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roads into property rights and the growth of regulatory mechanisms later 
moved into anti-terrorist finance and, from there, back into money laun-
dering statutes. The attacks on September 11 did not so much create as 
accelerate a process already in motion, moving the whole regime into the 
regular criminal realm while divorcing the procedures from underlying 
criminal offenses. This shift into the realm of civil law weakened the 
burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, evidentiary rules, and the 
standards employed to determine guilt. 
The United States’ familiarity with anti-terrorist finance is much 
more recent. Executive Orders issued in the mid-1990s, combined with 
the 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, created the 
precedent for a sudden interest in the issue post-September 11. The drug 
war also contributed to its structure. Post-September 11 the United States 
aggressively changed its administrative, legal, and, to some extent, po-
litical agenda to interrupt the flow of money to terrorist organizations. 
Like the changes instituted in the United Kingdom, Title III of the 2001 
USA PATRIOT Act, and the issuance of Executive Order 13,224 under 
the IEEPA, significantly impacted individual rights. Like the United 
Kingdom, the United States began to avoid criminal law; it went one 
step further, however, by trying to dodge the judiciary all together. The 
Executive drew on an intelligence standard—mere links to known terror-
ists—as a sufficient basis for the suspension of property.  
Domestic measures form only part of the picture. Both states have 
taken a leading role in trying to establish international norms, particu-
larly by working through the United Nations, the Financial Action Task 
Force, and the European Union. Such initiatives are relatively recent, and 
they tend to reflect the national approaches of the two regions, highlight-
ing the importance of examining the effectiveness of the states’ efforts to 
stem terrorist finance. 
In Part III I built on these findings by suggesting that U.K. and U.S. 
measures undermine the states’ counterterrorist regimes and carry nega-
tive implications for the financial sector more broadly. The primary 
reason for the negative effect may be the unsuitability of the money 
laundering regime to the counterterrorist realm. Suspicious Activity Re-
ports, sensitive to politics, have flooded the systems, making the analysis 
of terrorist financial flows more difficult. Simultaneously, the states have 
forced the flow of funds outside the traditional structures, making it 
more difficult to find those responsible for the last attack and head off 
future attacks before they occur. The metrics used to gauge success, 
moreover, are ill-fitted to anti-terrorist concerns.  
Another concern raised in relation to the current regimes centers on 
rights, where free speech, freedom of association, privacy, property, and 
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due process have been negatively impacted. While none of these are ab-
solute—indeed, infringements on property rights are a staple of 
administrative and regulatory bodies—what makes the inroads into 
rights of concern is the omission of intent, use of secret evidence and ex 
parte proceedings, and stigma attached to being labeled complicit in ter-
rorist activities. Public perception, moreover, so critical in any state’s 
counterterrorist program, takes into account the status of rights. Here, 
the United States in particular has directed its new asset forfeiture laws, 
with the reduced evidentiary standards and sidestepping of judicial re-
view, to Arab, Muslim entities. This has led to the alienation of a 
community very much needed in the midst of a deadly threat. The state’s 
actions have also led to a drying up of funds to areas of the world that 
depend upon remittances for basic needs. Humanitarian consequences of 
these actions aside, the result is that many of these regions may become 
ripe for recruitment to terrorist organizations targeting the West. Unlike 
the United Kingdom, the United States refuses to allow for concessions 
to alleviate humanitarian suffering of those subject to U.S. sanctions. 
This does little to help battle al Qaeda’s claims against the United States, 
which underscore the West’s treatment of Arabic Muslims worldwide. 
The use of black lists creates a special problem. Lacking important 
safeguards, this mechanism is increasingly being challenged and losing 
credibility in both the domestic and international realm. At the same 
time, U.S. refusal to allow external review of these lists opens the possi-
bility of abuse. Here, the United States’ efforts to democratize states may 
be at odds with the tools being provided to dictatorial regimes to main-
tain their control of the political apparatus. An independent process 
would strengthen U.S. and, indeed, British claims as to the involvement 
of individuals in violent movements, while protecting against the under-
mining of other important national security concerns. Related to black 
list concerns is the importance of propaganda in the battle against terror-
ist claims. Who is not included in such directories matters as much as 
who does appear on the lists. The absence of individuals that appear to 
carry a high level of culpability tends to breed cynicism and undermine 
states’ efforts to present their approach as a just one. The United King-
dom appears to be recognizing the importance of such public 
communication as part of its overall efforts; this presents a promising 
way forward. 
The United Kingdom and the United States, and terrorist entities that 
operate in both regions, are just now beginning to explore what the 
Internet and e-commerce mean for their respective endeavors. Issues re-
lated to anonymity, the lack of geographic bounds, and clandestine 
communications will be particularly important in this area in the coming 
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decade. The wholesale transfer of money laundering tools, however, 
should be treated with some skepticism: many of the same concerns that 
haunt both states’ anti-terrorist finance efforts, plus a host of additional 
issues unique to the electronic realm, attend. At the very least, this area 
deserves extensive examination. At stake is the ability of the United 
Kingdom and United States to head off the terrorist threat. 
